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Thinking (with) the Unconscious in 
Media and Communication Studies: 
Introduction to the Special Issue
Steffen Krüger1
University of Oslo, Norway
Jacob Johanssen2
University of Westminster, United Kingdom
doi: 10.5937/comman11-13131 
Abstract: Under the title Digital Media, Psychoanalysis and the Subject, this spe-
cial issue of CM: Communication and Media seeks to reassess and reinvigorate psycho-
analytic thinking in media and communication studies. We undertake this reassessment 
with a particular focus on the question of what psychoanalytic concepts, theories as well 
as modes of inquiry can contribute to the study of digital media. Overlooking the field 
of media and communication studies, we argue that psychoanalysis offers a reservoir of 
conceptual and methodological tools that has not been sufficiently tapped. In particular, 
psychoanalytic perspectives offer a heightened concern and sensibility for the unconscious, 
i.e. the element in human relating and relatedness that criss-crosses and mars our best 
laid plans and reasonable predictions. This introduction provides an insight into psy-
choanalysis as a discipline, indicates the ways in which it has been adopted in media 
research in general and research into digital media in particular and, ultimately, points 
to its future potential to contribute to the field. 
Keywords: digital media, the unconscious, psychoanalysis, subjectivity, the psycho-
social
1  Contact with author: Steffen.Krueger@media.uio.no.
2  Contact with author: J.Johanssen@westminster.ac.uk.
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1. Introduction
For the past two decades, critical research into media and communication 
has sought ways to understand the significant shift brought about by digitalisa-
tion and the proliferation of networked online media. With this shift, questions 
of individuality, the single media user as an entity and her/his relations to soci-
ety have taken on a renewed salience. Digital media enable individual choices 
with regard to how media content is selected, appropriated, (dis)engaged with 
and modified on an unprecedented scale. Such developments have resulted 
in scholarship that has explored individual agency and questions of power in 
relation to digital media in manifold ways, be it through simple consumption 
choices, online activism, fan practices or many other forms of engagement.
At the same time, the individual as such has become part of the content 
being produced. People find themselves instigated to express and share who 
they are and relate to others via multiple, networked media channels on diverse 
platforms that create – afford, shape and suggest – relations that indicate just 
how interminable the processes of subjectification and individualisation are. 
Within the corporate realm, these platforms are characterised by the double 
objective of enabling feelings of community whilst also profiting from the 
ensuing communication (see e.g. Burston, Dyer-Witheford & Hearn, 2010; 
Fisher, 2012; Fuchs, 2014; Krüger & Johanssen, 2014; Krüger, 2016). Relying 
on targeted data extraction as business models (Turow, 2011; Fuchs, 2014), 
the relations they facilitate tend towards the commodification of the individual 
and, intentionally or not, open up possibilities for corporate and governmental 
surveillance. Thus, a focus on “big data” (boyd & Crawford, 2012), the politics 
of algorithms (Bucher, 2012; Mager, 2012; Gillespie, 2014), media populism 
(Moffitt, 2016) and, recently, so-called “fake news” (Bessi & Ferrara, 2016; 
Giglietto et al., 2016) have complicated accounts that emphasise individual 
choice and agency by pointing out how these individual choices become aggre-
gated into the behaviours of “new masses” (Baxmann et al., 2014).
The notions and concepts with which researchers have sought to emphasise 
and highlight relevant aspects of this shifting situation, such as “convergence” 
(Jenkins, 2006), “connectivity” (van Dijck, 2013), “participation” (Jenkins, 
2006; Carpentier, 2011), “produsage” (Bruns, 2008), “interactivity” (Lister 
et al., 2009: 21ff), “user-generated content” (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010), and 
“digital labour” (Terranova, 2000; Fuchs, 2014) have long since become com-




CM : Communication and Media  XI(38) 5–40 © 2016 CDI
mon parlance. They are challenged and defended, changed and rearranged. A 
variety of approaches, theories, models and assumptions attach themselves to 
these concepts that focus on a diverse range of angles, including gender, eth-
nicity, class, subculture and group memberships from micro, meso and macro 
perspectives. With these come diverse philosophies and worldviews that often 
concern questions of activity, passivity and agency with regard to media use as 
well as media power.
Yet, whereas many of these approaches can be seen as responses to the re-
newed interest in, as well as centrality of, the individual media user, the concep-
tions of the subject and subjectivity underlying these works frequently remain 
implicit and in need of reflection and clarification. What is established by such 
“implicit notions” of subjectivity (Dahlgren, 2013: 72) is an idea of media users 
leaning strongly towards rationality, cognition, categorisation and assimilation. 
While, as mentioned above, consumer choices become ever finer grained to 
meet individual demand and while content is frequently tailored to meet the 
expectations, or suspicions, of political loyalists, the challenge that the resulting 
notions of individuality pose to our conceptions of the subject have only started 
to be confronted by media and communication research and related fields (see 
Wilson, 2010; Lupton, 2016; Bröckling, 2016).
In order to counter the tendency of foregoing the relevance of subjective 
experience and its impact on the social, Peter Dahlgren has recently advocated 
“reactivating concerns about the subject” (2013: 73) in media studies research, 
stating that researchers in the field also need to consider “communicative modes 
beyond the rational” (2013: 82). Heeding this call, psychoanalysis may be one, 
if not the discipline, best equipped to point to ways out of the rationalistic 
impasse. As Brown and Lunt suggest, “there is something about psychoanalysis 
that is corrosive to the whole model of the subject built up by the social identity 
tradition” (2002: 8) – i.e. the very tradition to which implicit models of the 
subject in media and communication studies frequently default.
This special issue understands itself as a critical appreciation of this “cor-
rosiveness” of psychoanalytic theory as a productive potential for media and 
communication studies. With its diverse traditions – Freudian, Kleinian, La-
canian, Winnicottian, relational, etc. – foregrounding the conflicted, ambiva-
lent, defended, divided, desirous, wishful, multifaceted, layered and processual 
aspects of human beings in their relations with others, psychoanalysis shifts our 
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attention to contradiction, incoherence, ambiguity, resistance and enjoyment 
in media texts and mediums as well as in our responses to them.
While psychoanalysis is primarily a clinical field, the application of theoreti-
cal and methodological concepts outside the consulting room has shown that 
they can be immensely fruitful and productive if the specificity of the social 
context in which they are used is kept in view. Thus, instead of colonising 
the social with the psychical, which was one of the cardinal mistakes of early 
psychoanalytic research, the focus is now firmly on the kinds of connections 
between the psychic and the social, the co-constitution of the psychic and the 
social and/or their mutual implication in one another (Hollway & Jefferson, 
2000; Frosh, 2012).
As regards the in-depth study of this co-constitution, or mutual implica-
tion, of the psychic and the social, the media, media technologies and the user’s 
relationship to these play a key role. In Western societies at the onset of the 21st 
century, questions regarding socialisation, individualisation and subjectivation 
can only thoroughly and satisfactorily be answered when we take our relations 
in, through and with media into consideration. In this respect, what is most 
striking from a psychoanalytic (but also from other, e.g. post-human and new 
materialist) perspective(s), is the movement of information and communica-
tion technology ever closer to the human body and into each and every aspect 
of everyday life. With the steady increase in computing power and a significant 
rise in wireless transmission rates, with devices becoming smaller, lighter, more 
mobile and ever more able to merge with the human body, a media sphere has 
developed that is rapidly becoming a major, integral influence on the ways in 
which we relate to and interact with others - ways that psychoanalysis holds to 
be vital for subjective development.
While the articles collected in this issue of CM each inquire into specific sce-
narios of and challenges resulting from this proximity and integrality, what fol-
lows is a more general inquiry into the relationship between the psychoanalytic 
unconscious and the current media situation. This assessment is followed by 
the introduction of the articles collected in this issue in the context of existing 
currents of psychoanalytically oriented research on digital media. We end the 
introduction with an outlook on the future of psychoanalytic media research. 
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2. Digital Media and the Psychoanalytic Unconscious
As briefly broached above, psychoanalysis is, first of all, a clinical method 
of treating mental illnesses that arise from intra- and intersubjective dynamics. 
Advances in psychoanalytic theory have always been closely tied to what would 
emerge from the interactions between analysand and analyst in the consulting 
room. From the very beginning, however, this mode of theory production be-
came fertilised by analysts drawing on cultural materials and artefacts. When, 
in the decisive phase of the foundation of psychoanalysis, Freud reported to 
his friend, Wilhelm Fliess, that he had found in himself a strong love for his 
mother and jealousy towards his father, he immediately referred this finding 
to the “gripping power of Oedipus Rex” (Freud, 1962: 193), the antique stage 
drama by Sophocles (ca. 429–425 BC). Thereby, he connected a psychic insight 
with a literary character and, as Alfred Lorenzer (1986: 20) further pointed out, 
“implicitly equate[d] an unconscious experience with the impact of a literary 
work”. In this way, then, cultural artefacts penetrated psychoanalytic theory and 
practice and, consequently, it did not take long before psychoanalysis started 
to venture into the realm of culture in return, with the founding of Imago, the 
“journal for the application of psychoanalysis in the human sciences”, in 1912, 
giving these ventures a platform of their own. Subsequently, the psychoanalytic 
idiom began to sink into Western thinking, with people interpreting their own, 
as well as other’s, behaviour in terms of repression, resistance, “Freudian slips” 
etc. Therefore, when we, in this special issue, aim at an assessment and reassess-
ment of digital media from a psychoanalytic perspective, we position ourselves 
in the tradition of “psychoanalytic explorations” (Kris, 1952) in culture. How-
ever, due to the very penetration of psychoanalysis and its terminology into 
everyday life, this assessment must be done with a keen eye for the original 
theoretical formulations, the nuanced clinical uses of certain terms and the 
ongoing debates around them.3 
Additionally, this self-reflexive turn is suggested by research on psycho-
analytic concepts itself. As Drew Westen (1999) wrote in his overview of the 
scientific status of psychoanalytic concepts, “the most fundamental assumption 
of psychoanalytic theory and practice is no longer a matter of scientific debate. 
3  Furthermore, as Eli Zaretsky (2015) and others (e.g. Halpern, 2014) have pointed out, psychoanalysis is also in need 
of self-reflection since its paradigm has increasingly become intermixed with and contested by that of cybernetics. In 
other words, as our conceptions of subjectivity in its various contexts are in flux themselves, an assessment of digital 
media – a realm largely driven by cybernetic thinking – from a psychoanalytic perspective also needs to consider the 
implications of digital culture for psychoanalysis.
10
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[…] The clear experimental documentation of unconscious thought, feeling, 
and motivation supports many aspects of psychoanalytic theory and practice” 
(1999: 1063). Having thus secured a scientific grounding for psychoanalysis, 
Westen continues his overview by listing various kinds of unconscious processes 
that the experimental literature has identified. While many of them fall inside 
the traditional psychoanalytic field of interest, some of them serve functions 
that diverge from those on which psychoanalysis has focused (Westen, 1999: 
1063–1064). Westen therefore suggests a mutual opening of disciplines, so that 
academic disciplines become receptive of psychoanalytic insight, but also, vice 
versa, that psychoanalysis take on board the implications derived from findings 
made in other fields. 
For the purposes of the present article, while we cannot follow Westen’s 
appeal systematically, what we would like to take with us into our outline of 
psychoanalytic thinking in digital media studies are the following two points: 
While it is necessary (A) to think the unconscious and to think with the un-
conscious in media and communication studies, it is just as necessary to (B) 
approach and use traditional psychoanalytical terminology as a heuristic device 
and in a way that is committed, but never uncritically bound to this terminol-
ogy. Thus, as indicated above, we want to conceive of the concepts and elements 
of psychoanalysis as open and malleable to the demands and implications of 
the field of digital media. In this spirit, we will now first give an outline of the 
psychoanalytic unconscious in order to then bring it in touch with the study of 
digital, online media. 
2.1. The Psychoanalytic Unconscious
Without doubt, the most central aspect of psychoanalysis is the psychical 
conflict upon which the unconscious as well as the whole of psychoanalytic 
theory is based. In his definition, Stephen Frosh points out that the psychoana-
lytic unconscious
“refers to the existence of ideas which are not just not being thought about 
(hence not just ‘not in consciousness’) but which are also radically unavail-
able to thought - they cannot be brought to awareness even if the person 
tries really hard, or at least it is more of a struggle than one person can 
manage on her or his own. These hidden ideas, however, have a profound 
influence on psychological life.” (Frosh, 2002: 12–13)
11
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Whereas experimental evidence refers us to the existence of various kinds of 
unconscious processes that are unconscious simply because they are not thought 
about but are otherwise unproblematically available to consciousness, the speci-
ficity of the psychoanalytic unconscious is that it cannot simply be activated and 
drawn into conscious, rational thinking. Instead, it is actively kept away from 
consciousness, because its contents are too toxic for the individual and too pain-
ful to bear and engage with. 
At the same time, unconscious ideas by no means disappear or become 
entirely forgotten. Rather, as Frosh writes, although they are “hidden from 
awareness”, they still remain “active (‘dynamic’), pushing for release” (2002: 
13). The process of repression, which becomes constitutive for the psychoanalytic 
unconscious, has to be an ongoing, continuous one. Not only must intolerable 
ideas be withdrawn from consciousness, they also have to be kept away from it 
“by continuing pressure” (2002: 15). As with a taboo that ties prohibition and 
attraction together in a tense relationship, the forbidden and forbidding nature 
of unconscious ideas exerts a strong attraction and it is the dialectical, conflictual 
relation between the desirable and the intolerable in one and the same idea that 
is constitutive of the psychoanalytic unconscious. 
In his second topography, Freud captured the tense dynamic between desire 
and prohibition in a tripartite structure, namely, between the Id, i.e. the drives 
and their representations, and the Superego, i.e. the conscience function, with 
the Ego attempting to negotiate and strike a balance between the two with a 
view to remaining adapted to the demands of (social) reality. As the conflictual 
nature of the relationship between these three agencies suggests, the qualities and 
quantities by which adaptedness might be measured are open to negotiation and 
change. On the intrapsychical plane, these changes occur because we are neither 
always able to put in the effort that it takes to keep the unconscious in check nor 
always willing to do so – e.g. because we are mentally exhausted, under stress, 
in an overwhelming life situation, drunk or otherwise intoxicated, or simply, 
asleep. In these situations, the repressed unconscious can easily return to us 
and announce its existence in an abundance of ways, e.g. in dreams, parapraxes 
(characteristically called “Freudian slips”) and in faulty, or even bizarre acts that, 
in social situations, create scenes about which we later might simply shake our 
heads. The frequently heard excuse of “I don’t know what came over me”, or “I 
wasn’t myself in that moment” are typical ways of dissociating from the break-
ing through of aspects or traits that one might have been attempting to disown. 
12
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It is when looking back on embarrassing situations, such as those implied 
above, that we might obtain an insight into the existence of an afterlife of infan-
tile thinking and acting – an afterlife that is part of the unconscious, since many 
of those ideas and scenes that we experience as so intolerable that they have to 
be repressed either stem from, or follow relational patterns, the foundations of 
which were laid in early childhood. As grown-ups, while we never encounter 
our unconscious – i.e. that which intolerably, unbearably belongs to us – in 
a completely unfiltered, undiminished way, our confrontations with it are of 
varied intensity. As Frosh writes, 
“there is, for example, sufficient censorship remaining in dreams to mean 
that little damage is usually done by them. But sometimes a crisis occurs, 
for example when the only way in which a tumultuous energy of uncon-
scious life can be contained is to allow some of it expression in the form of 
neurotic symptoms.” (2002: 23)
Similar to dreams, such symptomatic expressions function as openings into 
a person’s unconscious. However, it is important not to understand them as 
pure and straightforward expressions of it; what is breaking through in symp-
toms is not a voice speaking directly from the “depths” of the unconscious. 
Rather, symptoms can be understood as compromise formations that organ-
ise and regulate psychic life by creating provisional outlets. The unconscious 
manifests itself, then, in expressions that are riddled with metaphors and me-
tonymies, as well as the Ego’s defensive attempts at keeping these expressions 
within the conventions of the normal. Anna Freud (1936/1984), in particular, 
devoted a significant part of her theoretical work to identifying and differentiat-
ing these defence mechanisms and naming them according to their functions, 
e.g. projection, identification, rationalisation etc. But other traditions, first and 
foremost that based on the works of Melanie Klein, have also identified mecha-
nisms that have immense value for understanding psychic dynamics, such as 
splitting and projective identification (see e.g. Hinshelwood, 1991). 
Due to these theoretical developments, the concept of repression is now be-
ing used in two different ways. On the one hand – and in its more general usage 
– it has become an umbrella term for the various mechanisms with which peo-
ple attempt to fend off the anxiety that announces the breaking-through of the 
unconscious. After all, as Frosh (2002) states, “once the workings of repression 
are fully described, it becomes apparent that all defences have a similar func-
13
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tion, which is to keep unconscious impulses at bay. So, every defence involves 
repression, and repression in the general language sense is what every defence 
does.” (Frosh, 2002: 21) On the other hand – and in its more specific usage – 
repression becomes one defence mechanism amongst others, with all of them 
serving the Ego to retain homeostasis and a relatively workable and endurable 
mode of functioning. Yet, they achieve this in a way that is not completely 
harmless. The more established the defences against the threatening “return of 
the repressed” (Freud, 1915) become, the more the subject becomes caught up 
in the anxious abating of its conflicts, in a precarious, highly inhibiting manage-
ment of unthinkable desires and life threatening prohibitions.
The clinical process of psychoanalysis is geared towards the analysand, in 
small steps taken in dialogue with the analyst, developing an awareness of 
exactly those patterns of thinking, feeling, relating to and interacting with oth-
ers that continuously re-enact and reproduce the conflicts upon which his/her 
unconscious and its ensuing dynamics thrive. The ultimate aim is to make these 
patterns lose their efficacy and binding power. However, since the unconscious 
is a dynamic of thinking that is principally outside language, with unconscious 
ideas behaving more like things than words, and since psychoanalysis is a 
process in which language and speech are central for the acknowledgement of 
inner states, the unconscious can never be wholly captured, understood and 
explained in and through its efforts. Furthermore, analysands can never be 
completely ‘healed’ of the symptoms from which they suffer, nor should we 
hope for such a healing. After all, since it is also our unconscious that makes us 
who we are, a complete recovery would also mean a total change of personality. 
Summarising our account so far: What distinguishes psychoanalytic from 
other kinds of unconscious processes is its dynamism – a dynamism that is 
based on a tense, conflicted relation between various psychic agencies, in the 
classic Freudian conception between the It, the Superego and the Ego, which 
might be translated as desire, duty and reality. The psychoanalytic unconscious 
is not so much a realm or place, but rather, should be conceived of as a process 
in which intolerable ideas and imaginations become withdrawn from con-
sciousness. Becoming repressed, these imaginations then become constitutive 
of the unconscious, (a) because they need to be kept from becoming conscious 
on a continuous basis. And since this is not always possible or even desirable, 
unconscious ideas (b) make their presence known as symptoms that emerge in 
14
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different situations, ways and intensities. In this way, writes Frosh, unconscious 
ideas are also causal – they make us who we are and produce “much of the weft 
and warp of psychic life, its richness and its confusion” (Frosh, 2002: 13–15). 
2.2. Thinking (with) the Unconscious in Digital Media
Arguably, continuing from the above, it is by no means obvious how the 
psychoanalytic unconscious in its dynamic complexity can be brought into play 
in the study of media content and form. That which is brought to the fore in 
clinical psychoanalysis, in the relation between analyst and analysand, seems to 
entail far too personal and intimate a knowledge as to pertain to the study of in-
stitutional and sociocultural practices. Since the psychoanalytic unconscious is 
constituted by that which is too painful for the individual to associate with and 
through the very act of keeping these thoughts, imaginations and experiences 
away from consciousness and from expression in the social, how could they 
ever have an impact upon the sociocultural at all? By the same token, however, 
the above question can also be turned on its head. Since our unconscious plays 
a vital part in who and what we are, not only in symptomatic expressions, but 
also by pushing our personal development into directions that emerge from the 
necessity to respond to and manage our conflicted and conflictual needs, it is 
indeed highly improbable that this unconscious, as it is shaped by the social, 
does not also play a vital role in shaping the social in return. 
Questions regarding the exact relationship between the psychic and the so-
cial have been vexing researchers throughout the 20th century. Since the early 
attempts of the Frankfurt School, critical theorists have sought to combine so-
ciological accounts of the workings of the social with psychoanalytic accounts 
of the workings of the human psyche. However, while straightforward attempts 
at coordinating these two poles have hardly ever been convincing – e.g. Herbert 
Marcuse’s terms, such as “surplus-repression” (Marcuse, 1955), suggest to us 
somewhat too clear-cut equivalences – recent times have seen some far more 
sophisticated advances in mediating between the psychic and the social and we 
will touch upon them in our overview of the traditions of psychoanalytic think-
ing within media and communication below. 
However, a limitation of many of these approaches is that their focus is 
very much on media content and its potential effects – a focus that comes at the 
expense of the media’s forms of mediation themselves. In view of the ubiquity 
of digital media, shifting our attention to the specific ways of mediation and 
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their impact becomes increasingly important. With media technologies becom-
ing ever more mobile and moving ever closer to the body as well as into things 
(which are thus turned into non-human actors), our interest in unconscious 
processes needs to be opened out to the question of how far and in what ways 
do these media themselves come to play a part in their audiences’ subjectivities 
and, vice versa, how far and in what ways do audiences themselves come to 
play a part in the media’s agency. Therefore, as the next step in this subchapter, 
we want to turn to the question of how we might describe a process of media 
socialisation (or even subjectivation) from the point of psychoanalytic theory. 
2.2.1.  “Online Disinhibition” - An Exemplary Case of 
Understanding the Digital Psychoanalytically
One scenario in which a process of ‘media subjectivation’ can be unfolded 
is offered by John Suler’s now classic article on the “Online Disinhibition Ef-
fect” (2004). Suler presents six characteristic factors that shape the behaviour of 
users engaged in communicative practices facilitated by online environments. 
While some of these factors (they are: “anonymity”, “invisibility”, “asynchronic-
ity”, “solipsistic introjection”, “dissociative imagination” and “minimisation of 
authority”) are more promptly understandable than others, Suler’s main drift 
is that all of them must be seen in relation to the loosening of ties with signifi-
cant others in online interactions – a socio-technological tendency that Sherry 
Turkle unfolded in her seminal Alone Together (2011) and in subsequent pub-
lications (2015). In the scenarios that Suler describes, people act and interact 
without being burdened by the weight of their social identity and reputation 
and/or with significantly less consideration for tact and the emotional well-
being of others. As Suler observes, these situations, although typical of specific 
online contexts, are also reminiscent of other social situations, particularly that 
of the psychoanalytic hour itself, to which Suler refers explicitly. Apropos the 
factor of “invisibility” he writes: 
“According to traditional psychoanalytic theory, the analyst sits behind the 
patient in order to remain a physically ambiguous figure, revealing no body 
language or facial expression, so that the patient has free range to discuss 
whatever he or she wants without feeling inhibited by how the analyst is 
physically reacting.” (Suler, 2004: 322)
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Suler holds that in many online environments, too, the absence of bodily 
signs in response to a user’s actions allows this user to push his/her actions ever 
more into the direction of his/her prior dispositions and proclivities. Further-
more, when he claims that “people say and do things in cyberspace that they 
wouldn’t ordinarily say and do in the face-to-face world”, that “they loosen 
up, feel less restrained, and express themselves more openly” (2004: 321), this 
shows interesting correspondences with the most basic requirement in psy-
choanalysis, namely, that the analysand freely associate and give expression to 
whatever comes to mind (Freud, 1978). 
We could continue our playful comparison of Suler’s conception of online 
disinhibition with the psychoanalytic situation here. However, if we take seri-
ously the correspondences between the two situations, then, the more interest-
ing question to consider is what these correspondences imply for the psycho-
analytic conception of the subject in these contexts of online disinhibition. 
Thus, when we take disinhibition to mean the loosening of repression and the 
emergence of freely associative modes of interaction, must we not expect to find 
a kind of subjectivity facilitated in these online environments that externalises 
its unconscious to a far greater extent than psychoanalytic theory could foresee? 
And, consequently, must we not expect to be confronted there with displays of 
the unconscious in a decisively rawer form than the concept of repression sug-
gests? 
Answering these questions for the specific cases of online disinhibition, it is 
worth returning to the differentiation between the two uses of the term repres-
sion. As stated above, whereas its narrower use points to the specific defence 
mechanism of repression by which an idea is withdrawn and kept away from 
consciousness, its more general use points to repression as an umbrella term 
for various kinds of mechanisms by which unconscious ideas are kept from an 
individual’s awareness. With a view to incidences of online disinhibition, then, 
repression in the general sense can no longer be seen as performed by repression 
in the specific sense. Rather, Suler’s text suggests that more regressive4 forms of 
interaction will become commonplace, with less restrained and, indeed, less 
inhibiting defence mechanisms coming to the fore, e.g. projection, acting out, 
splitting, idealisation etc.
4  We use “regressive” here in its non-pejorative, psychoanalytic sense of a return to less structured and differentiated 
modes of expression and interaction (see Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973: 436).
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These changes at the interactional level have implications for our overall 
conception of subjectivity in these contexts, too. After all, if people change 
the ways in which they cope with anxiety, conflict and desire, this will have 
consequences for their whole way of being. Thus, in an attempt to capture the 
potential impact of online disinhibition on subjectivity, it becomes clear from 
our perspective that online subjectivity is now frequently less guarded and, as 
a consequence, more vulnerable to fragmentation, with the means to defend 
against such vulnerability having become more archaic and loud.
Yet, as regards this potential impact on subjectivity, we have to be careful 
not to colonise all online environments with the above theoretical speculations. 
Suggesting a vastly sceptical outlook on culture, the online disinhibition ef-
fect, as Suler conceives of it, finds an echo in Freud’s bleak societal diagnosis in 
Civilization and its Discontents (1981) and its main thesis that natural human 
proclivities must be bound by a repressive culture so as to make coexistence at 
all possible. Along these lines, the introduction of the Internet in general would 
have to be seen as a dangerous step in a development leading to the loosening 
of repression on a global scale and to a general re-aggressivisation and re-sexual-
isation of social ties. To use this conception indiscriminately for all online prac-
tices and all relational cultures emerging from them would be a grave mistake. 
Rather, while the phenomenon of online disinhibition finds most resonance 
in social media, online discussion forums and news boards, it seems just as pos-
sible to identify practices and environments with markedly different structures 
of feeling and with cultures in which users’ relations to their media call for dif-
ferent theoretical reflections – as well as inflections. The vast field of fandoms 
and online fan cultures (e.g. Saito, 2011), for example, suggests cooperative and 
mutually supportive relationships in which ties to significant others are all but 
loosened and where different kinds of sexualities and, ultimately, subjectivities 
are being imagined and performed that have the potential to challenge set psy-
choanalytic expectations in ways that are different from the above. 
In turn, when it comes to the field of corporate social networking sites, we 
can see that they afford forms of interaction that are disinhibiting and highly 
inhibiting at the same time. While the corporate desire for user-generated con-
tent brings forth ever new possibilities for the users to, in Suler’s words, “loosen 
up […] and express themselves more openly” (2004: 321), this drive towards 
freely-associative material is countered and contradicted by the desire to attach 
these associations to the users’ true identities (Hogan, 2013). What is being 
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suggested in this conflicted mixture of affordances is a form of subjectivity that 
comes with a strong orientation towards self-marketing and self-commodifica-
tion and can well be seen as the fulfilment of what Adorno, with a view to the 
cultural industry, termed “psychoanalysis in reverse” (1954: 223).5 However, 
whether or not users comply with this mode of self-fashioning and subjectiva-
tion is another matter. Clearly, a significant number of them are keenly aware 
of the corporate modes of surveillance in place on the sites. And while many 
users feel either increasingly inhibited to share information there (Marwick & 
boyd, 2011, 2014; Stutzman, Gross & Acquisti, 2012), or use ironic modes of 
compliance, there is also a proud tradition of subverting, or even sabotaging, 
the corporate interest in user creativity (e.g. Saco, 2002; boyd, 2014; Karppi, 
2015; Phillips, 2015; Krüger, 2016). This tradition again holds potential for 
identification and subjectivation and goes to show that even those mechanisms 
that, at the relational level, have a defensive function, might have a sublimating, 
“progressive” effect at the sociocultural level. 
Now, turning to the next subchapter of this introductory article, we will 
present this issue’s contributions in the context of the broader currents of psy-
choanalytic media research from which they derive. 
3.  Mapping Psychoanalytic Research into 
Media and Communication
While it is safe to say that psychoanalysis leads a niche existence within most 
media and communication departments across the world today, with the authors 
discussed in this section representing a minority in the field, it is nevertheless 
possible to point to genealogies, or tentative lineages, of psychoanalytic media 
research. However, the following presentation of these lineages has been made 
for the sake of summary rather than to canonise authors into set traditions.
3.1. Critical Theory, Cultural Studies and Psychoanalysis
As briefly touched upon above, some of the first attempts to combine psy-
choanalytic and sociological thinking can be traced back to members of the 
Frankfurt School who sought to combine readings of Marx with Freud in order 
to critique capitalism and its inherent modes of domination, commodification 
5  Marcuse (1964/1991) points in a similar direction with his concept of “repressive desublimation”. Also, in this 
respect, Žižek’s critical reading of “cyberspace” as “the suspension of the master” (1997: 193ff) is still very current.
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and exploitation, which they came to see as both grounded in structural forces 
as well as entangled in subjective processes (e.g. Fromm, 1941/1994); Marcuse, 
1955; Horkheimer & Adorno, 1972; Adorno, 1975). All of them touched 
upon the media in their works to an extent. Perhaps it was Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s chapter on the culture industry, in The Dialectic of Enlightenment 
(1972), that most famously conceptualised mass media as a form of affirmative 
pleasure – a pleasure that not only reproduced capitalism’s relations of produc-
tion but was also able to manipulate and shape audiences’ tastes and desires. 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s account of the media was received rather sceptically 
in Anglo-American academic circles where they were accused of conceptualis-
ing audiences as too uncritical, passive and pacified. It was British cultural stud-
ies in particular that argued for empirical investigations into audiences and how 
they made sense of the media. In the process, however, the discipline started to 
lose sight of and turned away from psychoanalysis (Hall, 1980; Morley, 1986; 
Grossberg, 1987; Couldry, 2000).
By contrast, in post-war Germany, the link between critical theory and psy-
choanalysis was revitalised by the second generation of the Frankfurt School. 
Major impulses came from the works of Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich 
(1967/2007), the early Habermas (1972) and Alfred Lorenzer (e.g. 1970a, b). 
The latter in particular, through his works on depth-hermeneutics, offered a 
viable theoretical and methodological approach to cultural research from a psy-
choanalytic perspective that still exerts a strong influence on social and cultural 
research in Germany (see, e.g., König, 2006; Löchel, 2002). From a pragmatic, 
historical-materialist orientation, depth-hermeneutics conceives of the psy-
choanalytic concepts of the conscious and unconscious in terms of evolving 
forms of interaction that are either granted or not granted access to language 
and conscious modes of thinking. Since these forms evolve from earliest child-
hood, in repeated interactions between infant and caregiver, the social comes 
into the picture from the very beginning. As the caregiver is always already a 
social being, the interactional patterns that take shape in the infant through its 
encounters with her/him inevitably come to carry a psychic as well as a social 
dimension. 
Vera King’s article on the “Transformations of Shame in Digitalized Rela-
tionships” is rooted in this tradition. Based on open, unstructured interviews 
with mobile media users, her analysis captures the sociocultural implications 
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of the evolving media practices in dialogue with psychoanalytic and sociologi-
cal theories of shame. What she finds in her article are “changes in the quality 
of relationships to physically present – yet communicatively absent – others” 
(p. 72). Specifically, the absence of shame from situations in which people use 
digital media while others are physically present points to a shift in relational 
practices on a sociocultural scale. 
3.2. Feminist Media Studies 
A number of feminist thinkers have and continue to engage with psycho-
analytic ideas (Mulvey, 1975; de Lauretis, 1984; Doane, 1987; Copjec, 1989; 
Cowie, 1990; Silverman 1992). This tradition has primarily been connected 
to the medium of film and has often drawn on Lacanian theory to describe 
the ideological (unconscious) effects of cinema on spectators. Lacan posits that 
our first encounters with ourselves and others are pre-symbolic and of a visual 
nature. The baby sees herself in a mirror and mirrored through others’ reactions 
towards her and, as a result, mis-perceives herself as a coherent, unified and 
rational being. The very act of perceiving the self as self is marked by a funda-
mental break between the I who perceives itself and the self that is perceived as 
an other. This relationship between the individual and his/her (imagined) other 
lies at the heart of Lacan’s thinking. Laura Mulvey (1975), in turn, adapted 
Lacan’s notion of the mirror stage and coupled it with his theory of the gaze. 
In her work on Hollywood cinema, she argued that cinema, in its ideological 
function to reproduce patriarchy, invariably presents female bodies from the 
perspective of the gaze of the film’s male protagonist, so that the audience will 
unconsciously identify with this gaze and become interpellated by it.
Another tradition of media analysis that has become revitalised over the past 
decades and which builds strongly on Lacanian psychoanalysis is a version of 
discourse analysis. For this tradition Lacan’s conceptualisations of the symbolic 
and of discourse are crucial. In his reinterpretation of Freud’s unconscious as 
outside language, Lacan holds that the unconscious is actually a (side)product 
of our entry into language and the symbolic. Specifically, he ventures that from 
our first attempts at symbolising experience and desire, and articulating (sig-
nifying) these in language, there is something that must become excluded and 
remain unsaid. In fact, that which remains unsaid only comes into existence as 
the unsaid through our attempts at articulating ‘it’ as part of a signifying chain 
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in the first place. This unsaid – i.e. that which eludes symbolisation and only 
comes about through symbolisation – is the unconscious – an unconscious 
that, enigmatically, is outside and, at the same time, inside language.
The basic dependency of the Lacanian unconscious on language and the 
symbolic suggests a mode of analysing unconscious aspects in texts without 
necessarily relating these aspects to individual life-histories. Rather, each lin-
guistic statement in its particular sociocultural context is seen here to evoke a 
realm of that which cannot be said, which comes to hover over a given scene, 
and it is this realm that Lacanian discourse analysis is geared to shed light 
upon. Ian Parker, the main proponent of this research direction, explicitly sug-
gests “ready-made” media texts (Parker, 2010: 157) as a fertile material for this 
approach. In this way, one can say, the Lacanian analysis of media discourse 
manages to bypass the narrower biographical dimensions of the psychoanalytic 
unconscious by focusing on the more general workings of the symbolic. Argu-
ably, this makes this approach less prone to speculations at the level of intimate, 
personal meanings. At the same time, however, its predominantly social interest 
makes it debatable as to whether its object of analysis still falls within the realm 
of the stricter psychoanalytic definition of the repressed unconscious. 
Alison Horbury can be seen as being affiliated with this tradition. Her 
analysis of feminist discourses online is based on Lacan’s (2007) conception of 
the four discourses and their structures. In her article, “Digital Feminisms and 
the Split Subject”, she argues that digital feminist discourse most often takes the 
form of “the discourse of the hysteric” – a discourse that is inevitably directed 
towards the Other as “master”. As Horbury shows, while this is a necessary 
discursive position, it also gets stuck in the power relations it seeks to attack. 
Since the Other is addressed as both the oppressor, but also, unconsciously, as 
the authority that is to acknowledge the struggle of the hysteric (for example 
in discourses touching upon patriarchy, toxic masculinity, or anti-feminism), 
this discourse conserves what it seeks to do away with. Moreover, the more 
established a given feminist position becomes, the more one can observe a shift 
in online discussions: the “discourse of the hysteric” becomes replaced by the 
“discourse of the university”. Consecutively, the rhetoric of power shifts from 
the oppressed protesting against her oppression to a voice claiming authority 
through knowledge. However, this shift leads to further rifts in and between 
feminist groups. Since the knowledge that is granted authority is knowledge 
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about oppression, hysteric positions now emerge in response to this new feminist 
authority and in contestation over what kind of feminism shall be given a privi-
leged epistemological position. 
3.3. Queer Theory and Intersectional Studies
The fields of queer theory and intersectionality studies have also drawn 
on psychoanalysis when theorising the (queer) body. While there has been 
resistance to and critique of psychoanalysis, several scholars have made use of 
psychoanalytic concepts (e.g. Butler, 1990; Dean, 2000; Edelman, 2004; Wat-
son, 2009; Ahmed, 2014). However, not many publications have specifically 
addressed the media through the prism of queer theory and psychoanalysis. 
An exception seems to be the evolving field of porn studies, which has shown a 
tendency to take psychoanalytic concepts into account, as various articles in the 
recently launched journal of the same title attest (Neville, 2015; Ryberg, 2015; 
Varghese, 2016). 
In a way, Diego Semerene’s article criss-crosses the field of queer, porn and 
media studies. Drawing ethnographically on sexual encounters in group set-
tings, Semerene states that the “digitally assisted gangbang” (through hookup 
apps and websites) emerges at a particular point in time in which the male body 
is increasingly made visible online. This constant demand of digital represen-
tation puts this body at risk of phallic failure. The gangbang may be read as a 
cultural symptom where men unite in order to ward off this risk of fragility and 
(symbolic) impotence through engaging in sexual practices that put an other 
– primarily women as the gangbanged subjects – in the place of utter inferior-
ity and victimhood. Ultimately, Semerene links these practices to the Freud-
ian narrative of the “great misdeed” (Freud, 1981). Freud saw the initial act 
of civilisation in the primal horde killing the archfather – a collective act that 
initiated the sense of kinship among the group members and contained feelings 
of guilt. By inserting herself into the constellation of the gangbang as a t[rans]-
girl, Semenere manages to subvert the phallocentrism of this descendant of the 
“great misdeed” and its socialising dynamics. With the victim’s gender rendered 
ambiguous, the homoerotic and homosocial implications of the act come to the 
fore. By the same token, the t-girl becomes legitimated as female in this archaic 
act by being referred to as “she” or “her” by the male collective. Through the 
insertion of the t-girl, then, the gangbang is shown to effectively destabilise a 
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system of binary gendered bodies. Facilitated through digital media, it opens 
up a space for acts that disrupt the idea that the body is individual, rational and 
privately owned. 
3.4. Studies of Networked and Mobile Media
Studies into mobile media (Elliott & Urry, 2010), gadgets (Krzych, 2010), 
as well as social media and subjectivity (Flisfeder, 2015; Zajc, 2015) have also 
shown an interest in psychoanalytic concepts. Again, many of these have drawn 
on the works of Jacques Lacan (often via the writings of Slavoj Žižek) in order 
to theorise Internet technology and the use of social media in general, as well 
as smartphones and applications in particular (Flisfeder & Willis, 2014). In 
her influential work on informational or communicative capitalism, Jodi Dean 
(2009, 2010) argues against the widely held belief that social media have con-
tributed to more open and participatory forms of communication. Following 
Žižek, Dean holds that in contemporary online culture, symbolic efficiency, 
i.e. the Lacanian (1977) notion of the Symbolic Order, has been diminished. 
Instead, digital culture is characterised by circuits of the drive. According to 
Lacan, a drive does not pursue a specific goal, but rather follows an aim as a 
means in itself, circling around an object without ever capturing it. Communi-
cative capitalism is being kept operative online through drive loops. Users are 
captured in networks of enjoyment, surveillance and production that do not 
satisfy a particular desire but merely capture and reproduce drive. “I enter. I 
click. I like. I poke. Drive circulates, round and round, producing satisfaction 
even as it misses its aim, even as it emerges in the plastic network of the decline 
of symbolic efficiency” (Dean, 2010: 60).
Christopher Gutierrez’s article, “The Other Self in Free Fall: Anxiety and 
Automated Tracking Applications”, in which he develops the Lacanian notions 
of affect and anxiety with regard to self-tracking applications, can be seen as a 
contribution to and continuation of Dean’s work. In particular, he considers 
“self-tracking applications [to] represent a particular affective loop […] which 
drives a never-ending anxious attempt” (p. 111) to reunite the subject with 
itself. As Gutierrez points out, however, anxiety does not emerge from a self as 
object that is lacking or missing, but from the shock of finding an object where 
there should not be one. In the case of digital tracking applications, while the 
subject expects to encounter a gap between itself and its data, the tracking apps 
constantly seek to close this gap. The embodied self and digital self are conflated 
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and the apps promise that we can indeed behold of ourselves through them. 
When this promise becomes plausible, however, desire becomes conflated with 
anxiety and that which we long for comes to haunt us. 
3.5. British Object Relations and Media Studies
The British psychoanalytic object relations school mostly revolves around 
the psychoanalysts Melanie Klein, D. W. Winnicott, Ronald Fairbairn and 
others who developed Freud’s ideas. Briefly put, object relations mark a de-
parture from Freud’s one-person psychology towards a more relational and 
intersubjective approach that aims to take account of the multitude of relations 
and attachments that make up our “inner worlds”. In relation to the media, 
it is Winnicott’s terms and concepts in particular that have been taken up by 
media scholars. His notions of the “transitional object” and “potential space” 
(Winnicott, 2002) have been adapted in fan studies (Hills, 2002, 2005, 2014; 
Sandvoss, 2005), for example, in order to explore fans’ relationships with their 
objects of fandom that often span decades and are of biographical as well as so-
ciocultural significance. Furthermore, Candida Yates and Caroline Bainbridge’s 
Media and the Inner World research network (e.g. Bainbridge & Yates, 2014) has 
been dedicated to interrogating the role of (object-relational) psychoanalysis 
in contemporary media cultures by bringing scholars, media practitioners and 
clinicians together. 
Winnicott’s concepts of the transitional object and potential space also 
take centre stage in Candida Yates and Iain MacRury’s article “Framing the 
Mobile Phone: The Psychopathologies of an everyday Object”. Reviewing the 
body of cultural research literature on the mobile phone as well as applications 
of the concept of “transitional object” in culture and media studies, Yates and 
MacRury work out how – and how far – the mobile phone can indeed be 
understood as “transitional” in Winnicott’s sense. With the mobile blurring 
boundaries between “me” and “not-me”, absence and presence, subject and ob-
ject, work and free time, control and surveillance, they argue that it can be legit-
imately identified as a transitional object and understood as a way of expressing, 
reflecting on and enacting states and feelings linked to the unconscious and the 
potential space. However, this potentiating, transitional function can never be 
entirely taken for granted as regards our various attachment styles. Drawing on 
the work of Thomas Ogden (1992), the authors explicate both the healthy and 
pathological ways in which the potential of the mobile can become unfolded. 
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3.6. Trauma Theory and Media Studies
Sigmund Freud defined trauma as “an experience which within a short pe-
riod of time presents the mind with an increase of stimulus too powerful to be 
dealt with or worked off in the normal way […]” (Freud, 1961: 275). Along 
this line, we can think of trauma as a rupture in the subject, as something so 
profoundly life changing and threatening to the subject’s coherence and well-
being that the ego blocks images, memories or thoughts touching upon that 
event from entering consciousness. While, throughout the past decades, the 
notion of trauma has been developed and modified in various ways (see e.g. 
Felman & Laub, 1992; Caruth, 1995; Kaplan, 2005; Radstone, 2007; Leys, 
2010; Meek, 2010; Pinchveski, 2012), the most recent development concerns 
work revolving around the idea of the “traumatic image” (Meek, 2010: 32). 
Specific events or images are either framed as traumatic by the media, or the 
media coverage itself is seen to have the potential to traumatise audiences. In 
his contribution, “Media Traumatization, Symbolic Wounds and Digital Cul-
ture”, Allen Meek inquires into this idea in detail. Departing from Bettelheim’s 
concept of the “symbolic wound” (1955), Meek explores the idea of collective 
trauma and how it manifests itself in contemporary digital culture. He traces 
the academic discussions of Geza Roheim’s film Subincision (1937), which 
depicts subincision rites amongst an Aboriginal tribe, as well as subsequent 
research that drew on it. Meek argues that images that have traditionally been 
associated with trauma and, thus, with overwhelming, anxiety-provoking and 
paralysing effects, can now be observed being circulated online for various po-
litical purposes and with radically different psychosocial effects. Images such as 
the broadcasting of police violence on Facebook may be proactively captured 
by specific groups and used to challenge hegemonic power structures. Even ISIS 
videos of beheadings can be expected to have an identificatory appeal. Meek 
grounds his observations in Bruno Bettelheim’s reading of Roheim’s Subinci-
sion. In contrast to all later uses of the film in experimental stress and empathy 
tests, Bettelheim argued that the shocking, ritualistic wounds that the members 
of the tribe inflicted on each other should be appreciated for their participa-
tory, self-transformative and collective dimensions of meaning. The idea of the 
symbolic wound that can be used for self-transformation, collective identifica-
tion and group participation may, according to Meek, act as a corrective to the 
dominant idea of trauma as necessarily rendering a subject passive and as being 
inherently negative, stressful and disempowering.
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3.7. Jungian and Post-Jungian Studies
While C. G. Jung started out in close collaboration with Freud, changes in 
his thinking led to him breaking away from the founding father of psychoanaly-
sis, with their fundamental disagreements revolving around the role of libido 
and sexuality in the individual subject. In his own approach to psychoanalysis, 
which he subsequently unfolded, Jung emphasised the existence of a collective 
unconscious made up of commonly held memories and ideas transmitted from 
generation to generation. The notion of the archetype as the basic form of those 
transmissions became central to Jung’s work and it is not surprising that film 
scholars over the years have drawn on Jungian ideas in their works (Hauke & 
Alister, 2000; Hockley, 2007; Singh, 2009, 2014; Hauke & Hockley, 2011; 
Izod & Dovalis, 2015). There are, however, few works on contemporary digital 
culture that make use of Jungian theory (Balick, 2014). A welcome exception 
is Greg Singh’s article “YouTubers, Online Selves and the Performance Princi-
ple: Notes from a post-Jungian Perspective”, which develops Jung’s concept of 
“persona” in relation to popular YouTube vloggers. As Singh points out, Jung 
(1953, 1971) defined persona as “a psychological archetype of social adapta-
tion” (p. 178) – something that can be understood as a fixed, routinised perfor-
mance based on expectations of what is socially acceptable in a given context 
and society at large. While Jung stressed the danger of over-identifying with 
one’s persona, Singh works out how such over-identification becomes inevita-
ble in the context of Youtube and social media in general, where mechanisms 
of commodification and exploitation continuously encourage users to identify 
with their persona instead of the less defended parts of their subjectivities. 
From a Jungian perspective, alienation in digital media thus approximates 
what Marcuse (1955) called the “performance principle”. Singh makes this 
evident in his discussion of successful YouTube stars and their audiences: “If 
YouTubers themselves are conforming to the needs of the apparatus [i.e. the on-
line platform, S.K. and J.J.] through content production and the performance 
of conventions associated with professional vlogging, YouTube end-users are 
also conforming to their own assigned roles as commodified objects.”  (p. 187).
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3.8. Media Philosophy and Psychoanalysis 
Coinciding with Singh’s work, Colin Campbell, in his article, “A Digital 
Death Drive? Hubris and Learning in Psychoanalysis and Cybernetics”, also 
draws on Herbert Marcuse’s writings for his confrontation of the digital. Camp-
bell approaches digital media from a perspective that results from his interest 
in both Freudian psychoanalysis and Batesonian cybernetics. Arguing that the 
idea of the digital has become a fetish in Western culture, he relates Bateson’s 
notion of “hubris” to Freud’s conceptualisation of the death drive. From the 
perspective of this comparison, he holds that the term “digital” now widely 
stands for – and, indeed, camouflages – a process of abstraction, cutting-up 
and fragmentation and an emptying out of a lived experience. “[T]he digital 
fetish numbs us to the profound relation between body and machine, technol-
ogy and nature” (p. 199). The moment of hubris lies in the act of mistaking 
digital representation as the whole of lived experience – an act that approxi-
mates the workings of the Freudian death drive in that it follows “a craving for 
stillness and order and the cessation of tensions” (p. 204). In opposition to this 
thanatotic tendency in contemporary culture, Campbell promotes a utopian 
approach to the understanding of our lifeworld that combines Bateson’s theory 
of learning with Marcuse’s conception of Eros. As Campbell writes, such an 
approach would involve “a profound analog-digital integration, a quantum leap 
forward in the capacity of language and consciousness to map social experience 
richly, without forgetting the traumatic cut digital language applies” (p. 211). 
Campbell’s argument points us in the direction of media philosophy as a 
field that has also put forth productive accounts of contemporary life in digital 
media in which psychoanalytic thinking is combined with questions of episte-
mology and the ontology of media technology. Mark B. Hansen (2000, 2004, 
2006), for example, has drawn on Sigmund Freud and Didier Anzieu in his 
writings on technology and new media, in which the use of psychoanalysis goes 
beyond questions of subjectivity and is deployed to reconceptualise technology 
itself. Similar questions have been explored in Bernard Stiegler’s work on phar-
macology that has made use of Freud and Winnicott, amongst others.
Related to the media philosophical approaches above, Mike Featherstone’s 
article on the “Chaosmic Spasm” combines Stiegler’s concern (2013) for forms 
of care and carefulness along Winnicott’s lines with Guattari’s (1995) and Be-
rardi’s (2015) conceptualisations of “chaosmosis” and the “chaosmic spasm”. 
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All of these authors diagnose a hyper-acceleration of globalised and mediatised 
lifeworlds that is seen to result in a process of disorientation and de-subjectiv-
isation. The individual subject is incapable of meaningfully situating itself in 
social, symbolic structures because of a symbolic order that has become com-
modified to a degree that reduces it to a carrier of quantitative value only. In the 
gradual intensification of this state, the notion of the spasm marks its climax 
as well a caesura, giving way to a utopian, hopeful moment of post-apocalyptic 
transformation and reparation.
4. The Future of Psychoanalytic Media Research
The notions of “transformation” and “reparation” give us our cues for the 
final part of this Introduction. On the basis of the above overview, we want to 
end here with a brief outlook on the future challenges for psychoanalytic explo-
rations of media culture. Broadly, we identify three such challenges that may 
(indeed, should) also be read as potentials for development. 
The first of these challenges concerns a shift in theories and methodologies 
that revolve around so-called “big data”. Emerging disciplines such as digital 
sociology, digital humanities, software studies, science and technology studies, 
and computational social sciences are symptomatic of a general drive towards 
quantification in academia: terms such as “digital methods” often signify quan-
titative methods for providing data analytics of large datasets that have been 
extracted from social media with the help of automated software. This “digital 
positivism” (Fuchs, 2017: 4) – an empiricist fetishisation of data, algorithms 
and structural processes – comes at the expense of a focus on subjectivity, micro 
processes, forms of interaction, engagement and agency that threatens any the-
oretical exploration of notions of the subject or the media user more specifically. 
While we do not wish to dispute the manifold roles that data now play in our 
lives, responses to it must continue to take account of both big and small data, 
i.e. quantitative and qualitative frameworks. This is especially pertinent in the 
light of the possible changes in the nature of the unconscious itself with regard 
to the subject’s situatedness within media in contemporary culture. If media 
are increasingly inhabiting all aspects of everyday life, the emerging question 
is how can we reconceptualise the conscious and unconscious relationalities 
between people and their evolving media technologies? We maintain that psy-
choanalysis is one of the disciplines that lends itself to researching such questions. 
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Thus, rather than merely arguing for a reconceptualisation of the social in the 
light of mediatisation processes, as Andreas Hepp and Nick Couldry (2016) have 
recently done, we argue for a reconceptualisation of the psychosocial dimensions 
that engulf, entangle and surround societies, individuals, structures and media 
spheres today. In this respect, turning our critique here into a positive call for 
future research, psychoanalytically-oriented researchers should be encouraged 
not to shy away from this drive towards the quantitative, but, on the contrary, 
to actively engage with it, interpret the data as well as the methods by which 
these data are gathered and processed and point towards the manifold ways in 
which our conceptions of subjectivity, relationality and sociality have bearings 
on the findings derived from the quantitative. 
The second challenge revolves around psychoanalytic theory itself and its 
often contested status within academia. Frequently, we find New Materialist, 
Deleuzian and Foucauldian approaches (amongst others) to be conceived in 
rather stereotypical opposition to psychoanalysis – an opposition that does jus-
tice to neither field. Large parts of contemporary affect theories, for example, 
have established themselves in opposition to psychoanalysis and its perceived 
over-individualising viewpoint. While this may have been a rather hasty and 
reductive attempt at establishing a new terrain – affect studies – the question 
remains as to whether there is not significant potential within the various psy-
choanalytic theories that have the power to critique, contest, modify and, ulti-
mately, further the above approaches. Offering the briefest of examples for this, 
our point is corroborated forcefully by Jacques Derrida (2001: 87), when he 
suggests in view of Foucault’s critique of psychoanalysis that we might find “al-
ready in Freud, to say nothing of those who followed, discussed, transformed, 
and displaced him, the very resources of the objection levelled against […] the 
father of psychoanalysis”. Again, turning this point of critique into a call for 
research, while there are many laudable impulses to be found in the present 
issue, further work is needed that criss-crosses theoretical fields and negoti-
ates between psychoanalysis and other theoretical approaches – not in order 
to create false harmonies, but to determine in detail where the differences and 
contradictions between the fields lie.
Thirdly, and most importantly, what is needed is more hands-on, empiri-
cal research from a psychoanalytic and/or psychosocial perspective. Generally, 
while psychoanalytic theories can offer profound insights into media-cultural 
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processes from the micro to the macro level, we still have to improve the ways 
in which we bring these theories and their insights to the reality we seek to un-
derstand. In this respect, a substantial part of psychoanalytic media scholarship 
risks overwhelming its audience with a dense theoretical discourse that remains 
on a decisively abstract level. If psychoanalysis is to secure a place within media 
research, it needs to open itself up to other paradigms and, fundamentally, to 
empirical research. Questions around methodology and the extent to which 
psychoanalysis can be a method in social and cultural research are important 
in this respect (Johanssen, 2016a, b; Krüger, 2016). We believe that this issue 
of CM both addresses and illuminates the challenges and potential of psychoa-
nalysis for digital media research today. 
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Framing the Mobile Phone:  






Abstract: This article proposes that the affective processes that shape our relation-
ship to the world of digital consumption and communication can be illuminated further 
when viewed through a lens of object relations psychoanalysis. We focus on the use of the 
mobile phone as both an object in the world and of the psyche in order to reflect upon its 
uses as an evocative object that shapes the psychosocial boundaries of experience in every-
day life. We argue that in contrast to the concepts of interpersonal communication that 
can be found in some domains of popular culture and in communication studies, object 
relations psychoanalysis can be usefully deployed in order to explore the unconscious at-
tachments that develop in relation to consumer objects, allowing for the complexity of 
feeling and reflection that may emerge in relation to them and the potential spaces of the 
mind. The mobile phone’s routine uses and characteristics are widely understood. At the 
same time, the mobile phone invites critical reflections that identify a paradoxical object 
of both creative and pathological use. Such reflexivity includes the mobile’s relationship 
to the complexity of psychosocial experience within the contemporary cultural moment. 
Applying the ideas of psychoanalysts Donald Winnicott, Thomas Ogden and Christopher 
Bollas, we argue that one explanation for why the mobile phone continues to attract not 
only enthusiastic cultural commentary but also a degree of apprehension across academic 
and popular-discursive settings can be found in its capacity to both disrupt and connect 
as an object of attachment and as a means of unconscious escape.
Keywords: transitional object, potential space, pathology, mobile phone, object 
relations psychoanalysis 
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1. Mobile Anxieties: Overview of a Psychosocial Object
The mobile phone3 is a complex cultural and technical object; singular, 
in that it can be held in the palm of the hand, but also multiple in scope, in 
terms of its functionality and in the personal and social significances attached 
to it. This technology forms at once a disruptive and containing intervention in 
contemporary psychosocial experience and a core component in shifts towards 
a more mobile society (Elliot & Urry, 2010). The mobile phone provides a ma-
jor vector for grasping contemporary experience (cognitively, emotionally and 
practically) and it provokes some disruptions in the patterning of psychosocial 
and cultural life. Such disruptions invite anxiety and commentary, producing 
thinking and reflective analyses across public discourses that we propose are 
inflected by the unconscious emotional-intimate properties of the mobile-as-
object. As we discuss, object relations psychoanalysis provides a highly evocative 
set of concepts to explore the contemporary experience of the mobile phone, 
which is bound up in the unconscious processes of object relating as a mode of 
experiencing the self and of engaging with the world. 
The mobile (as we shall call it from here on) remains in the cultural limelight, 
not just through promotions-driven marketing, with slogans such as, “This 
changes everything”, and “Inspire the World, Create the Future”, produced by 
major manufacturers such as, Apple, Samsung and Microsoft, LG and Huawei, 
and via network providing retailers such as Vodaphone, EE and “3”, but across 
news, comment and broader cultural conversations. The mobile provides an 
object for reflective and sometimes obsessive-seeming commentary across me-
dia. Recent headlines indicate typical preoccupations including: “Mobile phone 
addiction ruining relationships” (Alleyne, 2012), “How women love their mo-
bile phones... more than their boyfriends” (Daily Mail Reporter, 2009), “Just 
Thinking About Your Cell Phone Makes You More Selfish” (Garber, 2012), 
“Mobile phones have changed the world, for better or worse” (Clark, 2015), 
“Do you have a love/hate relationship with your phone?” (Kunst, 2012), “Mo-
bile addict parents guilty of child neglect” (Bingham, 2012) and “Nomophobia 
3  For this paper we have adopted the phrase “mobile phone” rather than the ostensibly more modern “smartphone” to 
refer to the devices under our investigation. Widespread usage of the term “smartphone” has largely been the result 
of journalistic and marketing rhetoric rather than clear demarcations between hardware and software platforms. As 
Kang & Son (2009: 919) note, “there is no clear industry-standard definition of smartphone”. Consumers them-
selves are unlikely to talk about ‘losing their smartphone’, whereas ‘where on earth did I leave my mobile?’ is a modern 
cri de cœur.
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affects majority of UK” (Royal Mail, 2008). These titles and their prevalence are 
partly a function of ‘clickbait’ culture, yet they also offer a sense that mobiles 
provide a recurrently anxious focus for lifestyle commentary, with the final one 
referencing a ‘syndrome’ called “nomophobia”, to capture the idea that people 
fear losing their mobile phones. 
2. Mobile Disruptions: Context and Critique
The mobile induces a more complex-seeming sociality, widening the com-
municative arrays and practical intersections that generate the global and local 
“networked individualism” that is characteristic of the contemporary period 
(Castells, 2007). In a more psychological register, the mobile is assertively 
individualistic in terms of its use. Connective as they are, mobiles are rarely 
shared, as such. An individual’s phone clusters and invites personal attention. It 
stands as both a conduit for and an object of excitement; a mirror and a lamp, 
projecting and receiving informatic and affective material; a stage and a screen 
for everyday engagements and emotional attachments. Personal in this sense, 
the mobile is highly personalised via account settings, passwords and fingerprint 
recognition. The phone is also personalising, in part via the evolving (mobile) 
digital footprints and signatures of users – data and surveillance-based algorith-
mic constructions, binding ‘persons’ to mobile personae. 
The symbolic and material significance is linked to wider power relations 
within the contemporary historical moment or “conjuncture”4 (Hjorth, Bur-
gess & Richardson, 2012). The mobile phone brings together key concerns that 
address notions of power and the construction of the subject in culture and it 
is helpful to think about the mobile as a “cultural formation” that shapes and is 
shaped by the affective experience of cultural life. Put simply, the mobile phone 
represents a developing inflection within contemporary structures of feeling. 
The mobile raises questions about identity and associated notions of agency, 
creativity and desire. Notably, the mobile opens up new capacities, facilitating 
modes of intimacy that are at once immediate and yet can seemingly transcend 
the limits of time and space (Díaz & Ekman, 2011; Hjorth & Lim, 2012). 
On the other hand, the impulse to keep checking one’s phone continues 
to be framed as a symptom of the anxious neoliberal subject of late modern 
capitalism (Giroux, 2015; Fisher, 2009, 2014; Elliot, 1996). Whilst contem-
4  As with earlier studies of the Sony Walkman as an object of cultural consumption (Du Gay et al., 2013).
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porary digital culture creates opportunities for privatised modes of escape and 
self-experience, it also contributes to the process of emotional governance and 
the unpaid labour of the neoliberal workplace, where one is continually avail-
able online (Serrano-Puche, 2015). So just as the mobile facilitates complex and 
fluid relationships it can also be viewed as an object that is used defensively in 
order to retreat into regressive psychological positions in which communication 
with the outside world can feel curtailed or surveilled, structured by globalised 
software companies such as Google and Microsoft. 
3. An Evocative Object
We propose that one explanation for why the mobile retains its place as 
an object of fascination and as a continuing focus for thinking (as well as a 
source of worry) across academic and popular-discursive settings can be found 
in a psychoanalytically informed examination of the uses of the mobile as an 
object in everyday life and its role in shaping subjectivity. Beyond its cultural 
and practical-functional significance, the mobile carries powerful unconscious 
importance. Specifically, as an object, the mobile often serves as an index for the 
work (and play) of social, emotional and personal attachment (Bowlby, 2008; 
Winnicott, 1971). The mobile is a unique intervention in the endeavours of 
human relating and not (just) a disruptive new communications technology. 
The mobile forms for us, we suggest, a powerful unconscious representation 
of connection and disconnection, one that evokes thinking, analysis and com-
mentary and conveys feelings that are redolent of the Zeitgeist.
We argue that object relations psychoanalysis has a useful role to play in 
helping to contextualise some of the concerns about the specific “problems” 
that have emerged around mobile phone consumption and use. As we have 
seen, in popular discourse, the enthusiastic and creative use of the mobile 
phone is also often shadowed by discourses identifying addiction, relation-
ship breakdown, illiteracy, solipsistic mobile privatism and related, emergent 
psychosocial problems. We propose that the mobile has become, culturally, 
a particular kind of “evocative object”, following Christopher Bollas’s (2009) 
phraseology, also echoed in the work of Sherry Turkle (2011b). As we discuss, 
the mobile has become uniquely evocative of the present conjuncture in such a 
way as to inflect elements in the public discourse, but also in the sense that, as 
Bollas puts it, it forces us “to think and think again” (Bollas, 2009: 85–6) about 
psychosocial experience.
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4. An Object for Psychoanalysis
Psychoanalytical ideas offer perspectives to enrich some of the main theoret-
ical framings through which academic analysis seeks to understand and evaluate 
mobile cultures and human relations. There has of late been a turn to object 
relations psychoanalysis (Bainbridge & Yates, 2014) that emphasises the realm 
of maternal phantasy within a relational paradigm that places the processes of 
relating to objects at its heart and therefore offers a relevant set of emphases 
for thinking about one’s relationship to the mobile phone. The ‘object rela-
tions’ approaches developed by, amongst others, Melanie Klein (1937, 1946) 
and Donald Winnicott (1971), and further extended and explored by Thomas 
Ogden (1992) offer a useful idiom for thinking about the mobile. Winnicott, 
in particular, stressed the importance of attachments,5 and of the first relation-
ship between the infant and its mother for the shaping of selfhood and identity. 
Object relations perspectives help to capture the complexities of networked 
intersubjective life whilst holding on to an account of interior experience in a 
unique way. As Ogden argues:
“Object relations theory, often erroneously thought to be an exclusively in-
terpersonal theory that diverts attention from the unconscious, [is] in fact 
fundamentally a theory of unconscious internal object relations in dynamic 
interplay with current interpersonal experience.” (Ogden, 1986: 131) 
This strand of psychoanalytic thinking offers an understanding of ‘objects’ 
and ‘spaces’ that is well equipped for grasping the instability and paradoxical 
qualities of the mobile and its uses, specifically, as we will now propose, via 
Winnicott’s conceptions of potential space and transitional objects. 
5. Paradoxes and “Transitional Objects”
Frequently identified as “paradoxical” (Eco, 2014; Fortunati, 2002; For-
tunati & Taipale, 2014; Elliot & Urry, 2010), the mobile’s phenomenological 
presence nags at functional analytical categories. The mobile is so frequently 
identified as “paradoxical” because it plays at boundaries. At the levels of prac-
tice and the imagination, the mobile mixes up presence and absence, me/not-
5  Despite some tensions in their relationship, Winnicott was influenced by Bowlby’s attachment theory, developed 
in the early 1950s (Kahr, 2016; Bowlby, 2008) – an approach that has continuing relevance and which in turn has 
influenced Didier Anzieu and other non-Lacanian psychoanalytic theorists.
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me, subject and object; and it seems to mix these things up in us. Such mixing 
can provoke anxieties. As observed, the mobile is continuous with us, precious, 
and, in some sense a McLuhanesque “extension” (McLuhan, 1964). At the 
same time, it also stands as a distinct “object”. 
 After exploring and clarifying the meanings and uses of D. W. Winnicott’s 
concepts of the “transitional object” and the “potential space”, we will identify 
some of the varieties of pathological distortion experienced in them – distor-
tions also frequently evoked in discourses around the mobile phone. 
5.1. The “Transitional Object” 
Typically working by analogy with Winnicott’s (1971) approach (one that 
is based on nursery and clinical work, (Kahr, 2016)), the mobile can be seen 
as having some similarities with the “special” objects found and, in an impor-
tant sense, “created” (Winnicott, 1971: 96) by young children in the play of 
development and becoming, the fabled favourited toy or piece of material. As 
Winnicott sets it out, for the baby, the physical object concerned in this work 
hardly matters: “perhaps a bundle of wool or the corner of a blanket or eider-
down, or a word or tune, or a mannerism,” but (nevertheless) the transitional 
object “becomes vitally important to the infant” (Winnicott, 1971:2; see also 
Kahr, 20166). The object is important in the formation of the self and in the 
separation and connection between the object-world and the world of internal 
objects, a “third part of the life of a human being, a part that we cannot ignore 
…an intermediate area of experiencing, to which inner reality and external life 
both contribute” (Winnicott, 1971: 2). 
The transitional object indexes a prefiguring ground for some of the work of 
separation and attachment (Bowlby, 2008), but also for an enduring existential 
frame stretching beyond infancy. “The use of an object symbolises the union of 
two now separate things, baby and mother, at the point in time and space of the 
initiation of their state of separateness” (Winnicott, 1971: 97, Italics in original). 
The transitional object, and the developmental achievements entailed in the use 
made of this object7 are, subsequently, vitally important to human development 
– to living. As Winnicott outlines:
6  Kahr refers to Arthur Miller’s children’s story Jane’s Blanket as a well rendered account of the transitional object. 
Winnicott himself mentions Charles M Schultz’s Peanuts cartoons and A. A Milne’s Winnie the Pooh as helpful 
cultural reference points.
7  As Winnicott tries to clarify: “what I am referring to in this part of my work is not the cloth or the teddy bear that 
the baby uses – not so much the object used as the use of the object” (Winnicott, 1971: xi).
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“I have introduced the terms “transitional objects” and “transitional phe-
nomena” for designation of the intermediate area of experience, between 
the thumb and the teddy bear, between the oral erotism and the true ob-
ject-relationship, between primary creative activity and projection of what 
has already been introjected, between primary unawareness of indebtedness 
and the acknowledgement of indebtedness.” (Winnicott, 1971: 2)
The transitional object, and the use made of that object,8 is the beginning 
of “cultural experience” (Winnicott 1971: 100) but, also, an opening up of a 
space for highly valued, developmental achievements, that include: reciprocity, 
creativity and what he describes as “a capacity for concern” (Winnicott, 1963).
A final developmental element in this narrative is that the transitional ob-
ject prefigures the attainment of another significant and paradoxical achieve-
ment: the capacity to be alone in the presence of the mother. This “capacity to be 
alone” (Winnicott, 1958) marks a subtle specification for creative, independ-
ent and engaged living. In the intensively connected mobile world the fragile 
link between creative aloneness and psychosocial belonging remains a peren-
nial theme, which is explored, for instance, in Sherry Turkle’s Alone Together 
(2011), an echoic reframing of Riesman’s classic The Lonely Crowd (1950) for 
a mobile-digital age. We suggest that, because of this ongoing thematic, there 
is a renewed resonance of “transitional objects” in the analytical conversation 
regarding mobiles within the frame of the present conjuncture.
We propose that the mobile phone is a kind of objectual9 realization of this 
conception of a “transitional object”, a practical figuration of this “special”, 
“first” object. As a major part of thinking about “culture” and experience, the 
mobile is also a prop in individuals’ continuing dramatic enactment of another 
key idea: “potential space”. The mobile phone enacts and dramatizes “potential 
space” and (as such) it invites interpretations that seek to analyse the (paradoxi-
cal) “potential space” spoken of in object relations psychoanalysis. As Ogden 
puts it:
“The transitional object is a symbol for this separateness in unity, unity in 
separateness. The transitional object is at the same time the infant (the om-
8  To underline, emphasis is given to, “not so much the object used as the use of the object” (Winnicott, 1971).
9  “Objectual” is a term deployed see Knorr (2008) and see also Woodward’s highly relevant (2011) conception-
definition: “Objectual things are handled and used, powerfully combining embodied pragmatics with emotion, 
cultural myth and symbolism…” (Woodward, 2011: 367).
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nipotently created extension of himself ) and not the infant (an object he 
has discovered that is outside of his omnipotent control). The appearance 
of a relationship with a transitional object is not simply a milestone in the 
process of separation-individuation. The relationship with the transitional 
object is as significantly a reflection of the development of the capacity to 
maintain a psychological dialectical process.” (Ogden, 1992: 228)
What we propose is that when people talk about mobile phones, they are 
exploring psychological processes entailed in potential space. The discourse 
around mobiles is indexical to a deeper set of anxieties adumbrating experiences 
of, and capacities to experience, potential space. 
6. Exploring Mobile Transitions
Some applications of the idea of “transitional objects” have set out to help 
think about media, material and cultural consumption (see, for example, Tur-
kle 2011; 2013; Silverstone & Hirsh, 1992; Hills, 2007; Woodward, 2011; 
Whitty & Carr, 2003; Kuhn, 2013; Johnson, 2010). However, sometimes, 
the accounts that focus on the mobile phone underemphasise the unconscious 
dimension in favour of a more interpersonal conception of the use of mobiles 
as objects that focus on the here and now rather than evoking resonances with 
early infant experiences (Ling, 2007, drawing on Silverstone & Hirsh, 1992; 
Ribak, 2009; Kullman, 2010; Johnson, 2010). These studies have applied the 
notion of the “transitional object” within an ethnographic framework that seeks 
to understand the place of technology within the delicate nexus of attachments, 
separations, and entanglements characteristic of specific social contemporary 
domains such as love (Johnson, 2010), family life (Ribak, 2009), school jour-
neys (Kullman, 2010) and “adolescent emancipation” (Ling, 2007). In these 
cases, the mobile becomes a means in the practical and emotional management 
of separation and development. For example, Ling examines 
“the dialectic nature of mobile phone use by teens. On the one hand it 
serves as a greatly extended umbilical cord or in the phrase of Roger Sil-
verstone, a “transitional object” (Silverstone, Hirsch, & Morley, 1991), but 
on the other hand it plays into the emancipation process of adolescents.” 
(Ling, 2007: 61).
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Ribak (2009) extends the umbilical cord metaphor, but adds in the idea 
of “remote control”, and situates the mobile in a set of triangular relationships 
marking the parent, technology and the child. Ribak makes a detailed and 
convincing analogy with the transitional object and yet ultimately rejects a too 
direct comparison on a number of practical grounds. Kullman’s (2010) geo-
graphic approach adds a helpful Latourian twist, recognising that the mobile is 
but one component in an assemblage of transitional objects (bags, books, toys) 
used by tween children nervously navigating early journeys in third spaces be-
tween home and school and depending on flexible adaption between adult and 
child. She notes that “essential for this flexibility is the most common technol-
ogy among children – the mobile phone” (Kullman, 2010: 837).
The conception of the mobile as a “transitional object” now colours con-
temporary popular discourse. For instance, business guru, Margaret Heffernan 
(2013) writes:
“The cell phone has become the adult’s transitional object, replacing the 
toddler’s teddy bear for comfort and a sense of belonging. We clutch 
phones to show that we do know at least one other person – that we might 
look solitary but we have connections. We are important because we might 
get called about something crucial – or, at least, non-trivial. We count in 
the world. Our insecurity may be laughable but our response isn’t.” (Hef-
fernan, 2013)
Aaron Balick (2016), who has written extensively on digital cultures from 
an object relations perspective (2013), writes in his insightful blog, in more 
nuanced terms, that, as a culture, we, “have re-invented the transitional object 
– only rather than a furry blanket or a teddy bear, it’s a smartphone”. He adds 
some thought-provoking advice for his readers:
“So next time you absentmindedly reach into your pocket for your smart-
phone – pause for a second and think. What am I actually searching for? 
You may find that at bottom there’s a niggling sense of insecurity – and you 
just want to check to make sure someone else on the planet is thinking of 
you.” (Balick, 2016)10
10 http://www.aaronbalick.com/blog/checking-your-smartphone-again-its-an-object-of-emotional-supply/, accessed 
10 December, 2016.
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7.  Potential Space: The Psychosomatic Underpinning 
for Attachment, Culture and Communication
The idea of a transitional object is clearly an appealing one in the various 
contexts identified above. It offers an insight in ethnographic analyses (Ling, 
2007; Kullman, 2010), even when important reservations are set down (Ribak, 
2009).11 The observation of the transitional object typically highlights its char-
acter as an “intermediary” part of real world usage – correlating neatly with the 
phone’s practical-communications functions. However, this vision can occlude 
the unconscious underpinning identified in the original literature and the psy-
choanalytic observation of transitional objects. It also understates the peculiar 
place of the object, its location in a fluid nexus of related conceptions, most 
notably Winnicott’s ideas of transitional phenomena and potential space. As a 
result, when the metaphor is transplanted into everyday scenarios, some aspects 
of things identified as “transitional objects” suffer a diminution in meaning. 
The “transitional object” becomes, more straightforwardly, an intermediary ob-
ject, either marking developmental stages (a prop in the transition to independ-
ence) or a point of connection in interpersonal relationships. 
The unconscious component of experience in respect of the transitional 
object is at risk of being forgotten about. Sometimes, the transitional object 
becomes identified as a “regressive” object because it is associated with infancy 
but is used by adults. Yet, in Winnicott’s conceptions, the transitional object is a 
component in normal, ongoing healthy development and is linked with lifelong 
“cultural” capacities and creative object relations. Furthermore, focusing on the 
object and its intermediary function, rather than on the (unconscious) use of 
the object, can occlude recognition of the pathological meanings and uses that 
may underlie the activities of intermediation. These misconceptions can arise if 
the object – as in the example of the mobile – is thought about independently 
of the connected ideas of transitional phenomena and potential spaces.
11  Ribak qualifies the metaphor in a number of ways, partly linked to her focus on teenagers and parents, and con-
cludes: “the mobile phone is not ‘transitional’ in the way teddy bears and blankets are, since it provides an actual link 
to the mother: it is less of a symbolic object and more, a means of communication” (Ribak, 2009: 192).
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8. From Transitional Object to Potential Space
In the object relations view, the transitional object’s intermediary role is 
linked to and embedded within an interplay of both external and inner spaces 
of the self – so here we propose an attentiveness to psychoanalytical uses of the 
term that seek to acknowledge more fully the unconscious aspects of (transi-
tional) experience. Winnicott indicates what he means by this:
“Of every individual who has reached the stage of being a unit with a limit-
ing membrane and an outside and an inside, it can be said that there is an 
inner reality to that individual, an inner world that can be rich or poor and 
can be at peace or in a state of war.” (Winnicott, 1971: 2)
To think about “inner and outer experiences”, and “me-not-me experi-
ences,” an “area” is invoked (as it were) between inner (First) and outer (Second) 
areas:
“the third part of the life of a human being, a part that we cannot ignore, 
is an intermediate area of experiencing, to which inner reality and external 
life both contribute. It is an area that is not challenged, because no claim 
is made on its behalf except that it shall exist as a resting-place for the in-
dividual engaged in the perpetual human task of keeping inner and outer 
reality separate yet interrelated.” (Winnicott, 1971: 2)
He continues:
“I am concerned with the first possession”, [i.e. the “transitional object” 
and, also and at the same time], “with the intermediate area between the 
subjective and that which is objectively perceived.” (1971: 3 italics added)
The term, “area” is important here, as it underlines that the transitional 
object (and its use) represent and enact an incidence of and within a “space”. 
Winnicott talks about this idea of an existential “resting place” within “being” 
and of the idea of “potential space”, thereby indicating something of the basic-
ontological value of experience in and of this space. Psychoanalyst, Robert 
Rodman clarifies:
“Experiences in the area of potential space allow us to have periods of rest 
from the struggle to draw lines between ourselves and others. …There is 
a built-in strain in human life caused by the need to maintain a line that 
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defines us as separate from others. This line need not confuse and exhaust 
the baby in possession of a transitional object, and a mother who under-
stands his or her need for a particular kind of comfort. The resting place 
thus given continues to play the same role in the successive stages of human 
development.” (Rodman, in Winnicott, 2005: xiv)
We propose that the mobile’s capacity to represent and to index this “resting 
place” and the disruptions entailed to it is a notable component in our ongo-
ing experience of neoliberal subjectivities, cultures and social milieus and the 
negotiation of meanings in these contexts.
Winnicott underlines that the transitional object cannot be, exclusively, the 
focus within this conceptual framing. It has a part to play, one that in terms of 
the object itself, recedes into the past, but which includes and is included in 
a legacy of capacities and dispositions linked to “transitional phenomena” and 
“potential space”. As the child develops,
“the transitional object loses meaning, and this is because the transitional 
phenomena have become diffused, have become spread out over the whole 
intermediate territory between ‘inner psychic reality’ and ‘the external 
world as perceived by two persons in common’, that is to say, over the 
whole cultural field.” (Winnicott 1971: 5)
Highly abstract (and “hypothetical”) as it is, “potential space” allows us to 
apprehend a somatic inter-and intra-subjective achievement linked to the earli-
est phases of development (Ogden, 1986: 131). Its place in infancy does not 
relegate “potential space” to “the past”. Nor does its origin in neonatal devel-
opment render its contribution to experience, infantile or regressive. Instead, 
“potential space” remains a generative pre-condition that continues in growth, 
going on framing present (adult and maturational) psychosocial capacities and 
experiences – creative and re-creative, “ordinary” (Winnicott, 1971) and “hu-
man” (Ogden, 1992).        
Potential space is always-already preliminary to development, yet it is also 
necessary to any future generativity. Its formation engenders within the devel-
opment of any individual, a pre-forming within the emerging relationship that 
occurs “between the baby and the object (mother or part of mother)” (Win-
nicott, 1971:107). What we grasp, in “potential space”, is something of the 
dynamic conditionality imbricating the emergence of subjective experience; 
one whose (primitive) legacy continues into and throughout the future life of 
the subject. 
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It is both intermediation and the intimation of a frame for relationality. It 
opens up the ground against which any subjectivity that might become, must 
initially, be figured (out). This emergence is a core component of the experience 
of separation, the “phase of the repudiation of the object as not me, that is, at 
the end of being merged with the object” (Winnicott, 1971: 107). As such, 
“potential space” forms and informs the matrix-template through which experi-
ence (thoughts, feelings and symbols) become articulated (see Ogden, 1992). It 
is part of processes of detachment, setting the tone for future dialogic achieve-
ments: attachments and separations. It becomes, for Winnicott, the basis for 
our most valued capacities: playing, concentration, creativity, and “cultural” 
living (Winnicott, 1971: 95–110). 
“Potential space” evokes an interstice and an interlude; peculiarly empty 
and full and linking being to becoming. As Winnicott puts it: “Potential space” 
is an “intermediate area of experiencing” (1971: 2) that lies between the inner 
world, “inner psychic reality” (1971: 5), and “actual or external reality” (1971: 
41). This conception offers a grasp of a subtle unconscious dynamic, paradoxi-
cal connection-disconnection: “Potential space both joins and separates the in-
fant (child, or adult) and the mother (object), it lies in the paradoxical moment 
where “continuity is giving place to contiguity” (Winnicott, 1971: 101). 
Potential space can be understood, then, as a psychosomatic, unconscious 
underpinning for attachment, culture and communication – with, we suggest, 
the mobile functioning as a powerful enactor of, and vector for and within 
such capacities. This change of emphasis from primary attention upon the 
transitional object itself, places it within the nexus of unconscious experiencing 
facilitated as well as represented by the potential space. This shift of perspec-
tive also helps us to understand the discourse around mobile phones more 
fully. We propose that the prevalent conversation across a number of discursive 
areas about the mobile is not just to do with its characteristic similarity to the 
transitional object alone, but, instead is due to its taking a place in the cultural 
imagination that is unconsciously and practically evocative of the transitional 
object and potential space. As such, the mobile affords and can be understood 
as a means to reflect on, express and occasionally act out feelings and emotions 
linked to unconscious experience in these terms. 
Put simply, the mobile phone becomes emblematic of and a useful way to 
think about our ongoing experience of connection and disconnection within 
the social world. As has been well documented, this social experience, which is 
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characterised by risk (Beck, 1992) and the flux and change of liquid modernity 
(Bauman, 2007), also includes anxiety and anomie.
9. Pathologies of Potential Space
Alongside what might be called the “healthy”, “life-enhancing” uses of 
transitional objects and potential space, there is also a recognition of obverses: 
an inhibition or seduction connoting either the under or exaggerated use of the 
object (Winnicott, 1971: 15–25). The pathological use of transitional phenom-
ena may be expressed in relation to the emergence or non-emergence of creative 
capacities, failures in separation and the various instabilities that also character-
ise this “space” (Kahr, 1996, 2016; Spelman & Thomson-Salo, 2014; Ogden, 
1992). Winnicott (1971: 15–20) offers a valuable clinical vignette that helps to 
grasp the unconscious anxieties underpinning exaggerated or pathological use 
of a seeming-transitional object. 
Following “a short clinical example of a boy’s use of string”,12 Winnicott 
(1971: 16) describes a 7-year-old boy who played obsessively with string. He 
discerned deep-seated concerns linked to anxiety about separation and a de-
pressed mother. Winnicott concludes:
“String can be looked upon as an extension of all other techniques of com-
munication. String joins, just as it also helps in the wrapping up of objects 
and in the holding of unintegrated material. In this respect string has a 
symbolic meaning for everyone; an exaggeration of the use of string can 
easily belong to the beginnings of a sense of insecurity or the idea of a lack 
of communication. In this particular case it is possible to detect abnormal-
ity creeping into the boy’s use of string, and it is important to find a way of 
stating the change which might lead to its use becoming perverted.” (Win-
nicott, 1971: 19)
We might say the same about mobiles – they invite us to look at them and 
they seem to evoke a sense of (all) other techniques of communication. As 
such, and in the face of, say, exaggerated use, we might recognise some aspect 
of perversion creeping into the use of this object, too. Winnicott’s intimation 
(above) of such “perversion” is, we propose, connected to cultural concerns 
about psychosocial experience. As we argue, the mobile affords a means to ex-
press existential and unconscious anxieties. 
12  And here, we cannot but recall the old-fashioned telephone games played with cans and string.
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10. Pathologies Examined and Exemplified 
Thomas Ogden has outlined ways of thinking about specific “pathologies 
of potential space” (Ogden, 1992). Healthy potential space can be fragile. It 
can even “collapse”. Ogden’s (1992) contribution is useful, then, in articulat-
ing something of the vicissitudes of such “collapses” and seeking to specify the 
characteristic dynamics of such pathologies. Ogden (1992) carefully articulates 
the ways that potential space can fail to fully sustain dialogical capacities for 
(object) relating between inner and outer experience. He describes the various 
disruptions in potential space, seeking to clarify Winnicott’s account of poten-
tial space, and to examine patients’ difficulties, while at the same time provid-
ing a useful proto-typology of disruptions in the formation and experience of 
transitional objects and potential spaces. This can be represented in a diagram 
(Fig 1.0), although, necessarily, any such representation simplifies the experi-
ences being explored.
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We suggest that the mobile, and critical reflection upon its meaning and use 
can be framed within the terms of these characteristic pathologies, which we 
will present and discuss in detail below. 
10. 1. Disturbance: Collapse into Fantasy
Ogden’s first “disturbance” is set out as follows: “The dialectic of reality and 
fantasy collapses in the direction of fantasy (i.e. reality is subsumed by fantasy) 
so that fantasy becomes a thing in itself ” (Ogden, 1992: 229). 
By way of illustrating this disturbance in relation to the mobile, we might 
think of the use of the phone as a kind of cocoon, as identified by Mizuko Ito 
et al. (2009). 
“Cocoons are micro-places built through private, individually controlled 
infrastructures, temporarily appropriating public space for personal use. 
[…] These cocoons also have specific temporal features, functioning as 
mechanisms for ‘filling’ or ‘killing’ in-between time when people are inhab-
iting or moving through places within where they are not interested in fully 
engaging.” (Ito et al., in Ling, 2009: 74)
This idea of the phone affording a fantasy “cocoon” or fantasy bubble is a 
frequent feature within discourses around mobility – the mobile virtual bubble 
‘becoming’ the “real” world and amplifying solipsistic involvements. In contrast 
to engagements with other materialities, the mobile, because of its intimate 
proximity and animate character, can be experienced in a more seamless fashion 
as being, in some sense, part of the self. It can be viewed as facilitating the crea-
tive entanglement of subject and object and of inner and outer worlds. And yet, 
this merging with the object is sometimes viewed negatively as creating or am-
plifying a privatised, self-obsessed mode of existence (Music, 2014; Abraham, 
Pocheptsova & Ferraro, 2012). This seems to be affirmed by Konrath, O’Brien, 
and Hsing (2016), who note that declines in college students’ empathy coin-
cided with the rise of social media and mobile phone usage. 
The above accounts propose a form of “digital narcissism” (Bainbridge & 
Yates, 2014) and affirm Sherry Turkle’s (2011a) well known suggestion that in 
a digital age, we are all “alone together”. The superficial and narcissistic dimen-
sions of one’s relationship to the mobile phone in this context is anticipated in 
Frederic Jameson’s (1991) work, which highlights superficial and “depthless” 
aspects of postmodern culture, a critique, which as we discuss below, remains 
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influential within cultural studies’ approaches to the mobile phone and digital 
culture more widely.
10. 2. Disturbance: Collapse into Reality
Ogden’s second disturbance is characterised in these terms: “The dialectic 
of reality and fantasy may become limited or collapse in the direction of reality 
when reality is used predominantly as a defense against fantasy… Imagination 
is foreclosed” (Ogden, 1992: 229).
This disturbance finds its actualization in relation to the mobile in scenarios 
when its use becomes radically instrumental. Thinking about and experiencing 
the array of communicative possibilities afforded by the mobile is then sup-
planted by a restricted and restricting sense of its rational functionality. There 
is a closing down or an inhibition in the use of some mobile potentials. Here, 
we may think, also, of the self-critique, or censorships, that become attached to 
some forms of mobile use, those that restrict the desire to explore new spaces or 
“dangerous’” uses – and are defended against by an appeal to “real” communi-
cations or environments. The phone is apprehended primarily as a functional 
thing in itself rather than a means of connection and human communication 
or intimacy. The mobile phone becomes (in imagination or reflecting real ar-
rangements in some cases) overwhelmingly a “work” object rather than a space 
for “playful” engagement. Anxieties about mixing work and leisure-play related 
usage can become exaggerated. Owning dual or multiple mobiles is a means to 
manage such anxiety, with some practical developments designed to institute 
a formal division between the playful-expansive as opposed to the work-a-day-
instrumental aspects of the phone (Metz, 2015). Such anxieties are sometimes 
expressed in terms of phone security (Abrahams, 2014).
We might also think here of non-use – as in the distrust of phones and ap-
prehensions about “going mobile” in respect of intimate aspects of life (David-
son, 2013). For some, mobiles stand simply as practical objects, transactional in 
use, and thought about, primarily in the frames of data plans and call charges. 
But the mobile is placed within boundaries set, to a degree, against intimacy 
and with suspicions about the quality or authenticity of mobile intersubjec-
tive life. In extreme instances, the mobile becomes implicated in a feeling of 
“switching off” and, in psychosocial terms, becomes the objective correlative of 
a sense of disconnection.
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10. 3. Disturbance: Avoiding Specific Meanings
A third disturbance in the dynamics of potential space is described by 
Ogden as follows: “The dialectic of reality and fantasy becomes restricted when 
reality and fantasy are disassociated in such a way as to avoid a specific set of 
meanings, e.g., the ‘splitting of the ego’ in fetishism” (Ogden, 1992: 230).
Again, mobiles, and talk about mobiles, can remind us of such patterns, 
for instance in the recognition and misrecognition of intimacy, within which 
the mobile can become implicated. Jukka Jouhki (2009) notes the blend of 
psychological and somatic attachment and its fetishistic character, highlighting 
the ‘haptic’ aspects of mobile experience. If we continue to further analyse the 
haptic quality of the bond, the device could be viewed as a modern day magical 
fetish. The mobile in all its rewarding tactility and controlled aesthetic frames 
becomes the place where excitation and apprehension (erotic and intimate) can 
be experienced and shared (e.g. via sexting and photography (Drouin & Land-
graff, 2012)) at the expense of other connections and channels. The risk evoked 
is that some degree of the experience of real, intimate, messy and risky human 
relating is foreclosed in favour of a fixation privileging the mobile screen. 
In a more technical form of fetishism that echoes Menzies-Lyth’s (1988) 
work on social defences against anxiety, research on medics’ use of mobiles 
indicates the powerful-extensional role the mobile can play, becoming a reposi-
tory for medical knowledge and, as an extension of medical training, a support 
for medical decision-making. It is even a convenient instrument for medical 
testing. In the same way that the stethoscope has traditionally been both an 
extension of the doctor’s ear and a symbol of the doctor’s knowledge (of data 
gathering and interpretation), the mobile phone represents a far more potent 
extension of the physician’s senses and learning. It becomes a new interface 
with the world under investigation at the same time as it helps to establish a 
relationship with the dynamic storehouse of medical knowledge and protocol. 
The risk is that the mobile interface dehumanises the matrix of care afforded by 
the doctor, rather than enhancing it. 
What connects these evaluations of the mobile as pathological is that they 
propose and seek to help clarify a variety of forms of disturbed psychosocial 
attachment. Ogden (1992: 224–232) draws on Hannah Segal’s (1957/1990) 
notion of “Symbolic Equation”, which implies the negation of “thirdness” and 
a capacity to experience psychological complexity that such pathologies of po-
59
Framing the Mobile Phone: 
The Psychopathologies of an Everyday Object
Iain MacRury 
Candida Yates
CM : Communication and Media  XI(38) 41–70 © 2016 CDI
tential space entail.13 In commentary and casual reflection the mobile serves as 
a powerful metaphor and metonym for thinking about wider and more deep-
seated anxieties derived from emergent, complex and disruptive socialities. 
However, in some instances the metaphor or metonym becomes overpowering 
– and the mobile is not held in mind but demonised as a cultural ‘bad object’.
“With limited capacity to distinguish symbol and symbolized, that which 
is perceived is unmediated by subjectivity (a sense of oneself as creator of 
meanings). The upshot is that perceptions carry with them an impersonal 
imperative for action and must be gotten rid of, clung to, concealed, hid-
den from, put into someone else, worshipped, shattered, etc. What the 
person cannot do is understand.” (Ogden 1992: 217)
Cultural reflections on the mobile certainly include and open up insight-
ful analysis. These analyses are energised to varying degrees by more primitive 
anxiousness. Such reflections reframe the mobile, as we seek to understand its 
complex materiality and significance and re-produce it as an object, variously, 
for “worship”, “clinging”, “rejection” and “concealment”. 
11. Discussion: Mobile Objects in Culture
From an object relations perspective, many of the negative readings of the 
mobile phone’s cultural effects that we have presented, evoke a state of mind 
that is unable to mourn and think about the losses of late modernity associated 
with the rapid transformations that have accompanied the evolution of new 
technologies and the greater mobility and also instability that such techno-
logical change represents. It is easy to see the mobile at the vanguard of such 
changes and it is not surprising, therefore, that it becomes framed as both a 
catalyst and cause of increasing disturbance.
The unthinking repetitive use of the mobile, which is often referred to as an 
“addiction” in popular discourse and which is echoed in the pathologies of at-
tachment discussed above, is also alluded to in Cultural Studies literature about 
the mobile, although it is not referred to explicitly in psychoanalytic terms. And 
13  Segal (1990) distinguishes between “symbol formation proper” and “symbolic equation”, noting the distinction 
between relations to symbols as supporting interpretive meaning-making (i.e. understanding that this symbol might 
stand for that referent in this context), versus an experience of symbolism that concretely equates the symbol with 
the thing it seems to stand for, i.e. this symbol is the thing referred to. For instance, one might reasonably say my 
mobile is a representation of my friendships, but, in a (mad) panic, feel, when a phone is lost, that we have (actually) 
lost all our friends.
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yet, descriptions of the obsessional attraction and repeated use of the mobile 
by some cultural studies commentators seem to describe an unmediated need 
rather than an active desire for the object. For example, Mark Fisher describes 
the “demands of the digital” and links the mobile phone’s appeal to the he-
donistic world of internet pornography and Viagra as the related modern drug 
of choice, because “they dispense with seduction and aim directly at pleasure” 
(2009: 178). 14 Citing Fredric Jameson’s (1991) critique of postmodernism as 
characterised by a vacuous recycling of the past, Fisher says that the communi-
cational intrusions of 21st century digital media and the smart technology of 
mobile phones demand that we “remain in constant touch” (Agar, 2004). Fisher 
looks back at the Walkman, which was once used as an object of escape and he 
contrasts it with the all-consuming digitally induced instant pleasures of the 
mobile. Fisher says that we experience a “digital realm”, representing a “super-
ficial ….newness” (2009: 229). At the same time, we use the phone as a way to 
forget that we are stuck within a temporary zone in which culture recycles the 
past, always engaged but never connected.  
Cultural Studies privileges an account of contemporary digital culture that 
cannot process the past and move on. Instead, it perpetuates a culture of pas-
tiche and a faux mode of “nostalgia”, as Jameson (1991) once said, and the cur-
rent newest digital technology becomes a way of “refurbishing the old” (Fisher, 
2014: 13). Here, it is argued that the digital realm of the mobile and our 
relationship to it articulates a mode of pathology that manifests a sense of rep-
etition and alienation. In contrast to the relational possibilities of smart phone 
technology, the mobile is viewed here negatively as a symptom of neoliberal-
ism, which as a cultural formation is also bound up with the end of history as a 
potential space for meaningful change. The repetitive use of the mobile echoes 
the stuckness of that wider cultural system and its use becomes a way to shore 
up a self that cannot mourn or let go of the past. The pathologies of potential 
space in this context are thus related to fetishism, obsession and a wish to revisit 
a version of the past that functions as a means to ward off that which cannot be 
let go or symbolised. 
14  We learnt of the sad news of Mark Fisher’s recent death after this article had gone to press, The authors wish to 
acknowledge the valuable thought-provoking contributions of Mark Fisher to the field of Cultural Studies and to the 
analysis of shifting technological and cultural formations. His insights into the social and political costs of cultural 
disruption have influenced and inspired many important interventions in the study of the contemporary moment 
– not least in relation to understanding the mobile phone.
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12. Finding New Spaces for Intimacy and Connection 
There is a recurrent tendency in the analyses of mobile culture to articulate 
concerns in which the mobile becomes an indexical symbol of deeper anxieties 
about the experience of disconnection and loss within the late modern world. 
Such an account is a legitimate response to the mobile phone in a neoliberal age 
where the practices and values of instrumentalism disembed and redistribute 
affective and intimate relationships in both space and time and where the mo-
bile seems to offer an insufficient substitute for other intimacies that have been 
lost or re-routed. Nevertheless, such a response risks overstating the negative 
impact of mobile technology in the contemporary era. The tantalising qualities 
of the mobile evoke desires for meaningful connection as represented in those 
discursive domains where more optimistic accounts of the mobile connote a 
more complex, multi-layered relationship between self, object and the outside 
world. In such contexts, it seems that the mobile enables an experience of in-
timacy to emerge that escapes the narcissistic impulse for mastery that is often 
said to shape communication today (Turkle, 2011). Instead, the new modes of 
intimacy that are implied here sit well with Winnicott’s (1971) relational para-
digm of transitional phenomena, which emphasises the process of meaningful 
and life-enhancing interaction with an/other. Ogden’s theoretical assumptions 
regarding the dialectics of potential space can be applied in this context insofar 
that the mobile functions as a bridge between Ogden’s notion of “the interpret-
ing subject” and the M/other in which the triangular dynamics of symbolisa-
tion operate and occur (1992: 213).  
This relational model of communication taps into an alternative notion of 
the mobile subject where the negotiation of time and space are said to play a key 
role in reflexive subjectivity and in forming relationships with others (Tachi, 
Kitner & Crawford, 2012). From this perspective, the experience of the mobile 
opens up new spaces for creativity and the extension of the self, in which the old 
boundaries of time, space and otherness can be transcended in order to create 
new intimacies and discover new ways of relating with one another across me-
dia platforms. This more nuanced account of subjectivity and communication 
is, in part, analogous to Ogden’s developmental schema of the child’s “transfor-
mation of unity into thirdness” (Ogden, 1992: 216) whereby the child moves 
from a state of being merged with the mother into one of separation, when the 
experience of thirdness emerges. Yet, as Ogden says, the experience of separa-
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tion is not a fixed state but rather an on-going, dialectic process, in which the 
child (and later the adult) never separates completely from the first object but 
instead reworks that relationship in different contexts. 
The temporal and spatial aspects of using the mobile in a fast-moving glo-
balised world thus allow the development of new conceptions of the reflexive, 
“mobile self ” (Elliott & Urry, 2010). From this perspective, the mobile phone 
functions as a portable extension of that self, shaped by a “technological uncon-
scious” that enables the subject to negotiate “the productive possibilities” of an 
international “networked world” (Elliott & Urry, 2010). In this scenario, the 
“productive possibilities” of a networked environment can be seen as analogous 
to Winnicott and Ogden’s model of the facilitating good mother. Here, one can 
argue that when internalising the possibilities that she (the mother) represents, 
the interpreting subject (the user of the mobile) moves in a fluid fashion be-
tween oedipal and pre-oedipal modes of being, thereby challenging the duality 
that has hitherto sustained a split gendered mode of relating to the world. The 
mobile can thus been seen as both contributing to and functioning within a 
nexus of psychosocial and technological relations that unsettle older, vertical 
structures of selfhood and communication and instead enable horizontal modes 
of relating where the dialectic of potential space can operate.
13. Conclusion
Throughout this article, we have argued that Winnicott’s theories of tran-
sitional phenomena take on new meaning in a networked society where the 
experience of mediatisation and the fluid processes of communication that 
stem from it become bound up with the relational dynamics of everyday life. 
The mobile stands as a useful figuration of the “transitional object” – a specific 
instantiation of the idea of transitional phenomena. Winnicott’s writings bring 
to life the significance of play for the early development of subjectivity and also 
for the capacity to play with objects and ideas in later life. The deformations 
and difficulties associated with transitional objects and potential spaces allow 
us to extend the analogy with mobiles to incorporate an understanding of the 
vicissitudes of mobile cultures, which include: addictions, anxieties about sur-
veillance, cultural distraction, and the seductions and dangers of the “exposure” 
of self through the use of the mobile-as-subjective-object. Taking an object 
63
Framing the Mobile Phone: 
The Psychopathologies of an Everyday Object
Iain MacRury 
Candida Yates
CM : Communication and Media  XI(38) 41–70 © 2016 CDI
relations perspective allows us to draw on such ideas in order to unpack the 
relational dynamics of the mobile phone and its uses.  
Our relationship to external objects such as the mobile is always psychologi-
cal, always psychosocial (Bainbridge & Yates, 2012, 2014). In other words, our 
relationship to the mobile is shaped continually by the experience of potential 
space and of coming into being and the processes of imagination, fantasy, 
emotion and identification. As an object of both pleasure and frustration, the 
symbolism of the mobile phone is significant because it is evocative of a deeply 
held wish for meaningful connection within the precarious setting of the late 
modern world.
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Abstract: This essay examines the significance and transformation of shame in the 
context of digitalization, in particular, the psychosocial and psychological consequences 
of shifts in the boundaries between public and private manifest in the contemporary dig-
ital world. Moreover, it will examine the dynamic relationships of shame, humiliation 
and shamelessness as they develop in digital environments characterized by the dissolu-
tion of physical and communicative presence, as well as the, in turn, changing functions, 
ambivalences and affective pitfalls of self-presentation. On the basis of descriptions and 
commentaries by contemporary adolescents on the significance of social networks and 
on their own digital self-presentation, it will identify mechanisms for dealing with the 
imagined, projected or abnegated gaze of the other in the net.
Keywords: digitalization, shame, transformation of shame in digitalized relation-
ships, gaze of the other, digital shame
The consequences of digitalization for the development of the psyche and 
the construction of subjectivity are a matter of intense debate. While some 
emphasize the dangers of digitalization with incisive metaphors like “digital 
dementia” (Spitzer, 2012), others, such as Altmeyer (2016), make the argument 
that the contemporary digital age offers the opportunity to “present yourself to 




Accepted for publication: 01.12.2016.
72
“If you show your real face, you’ll lose 10 000 followers” Vera King
CM : Communication and Media  XI(38) 71–90 © 2016 CDI
others in order to receive more attention … and affirmation” (14). The Inter-
net, Altmeyer maintains, has turned out to be “a social resonance system” (15). 
This essay is less concerned with normative observations than with the 
analysis of the psychic significance of self-presentation and communication 
in digital worlds, and the associated transformations of shame in digitalized 
relationships. The latter refers not to the frequently discussed phenomenon of 
lowering thresholds of shame, i.e. revealing oneself and sharing the intimate 
details of one’s life publically on the net. Rather, the focus, here, is on the more 
crucial transformations in configurations of shame brought about by changes 
in the meaning of the gaze of the other in the context of the digitalization of 
communication and life practices, as well as associated changes to the relations 
between the self and other.2 Thus this essay will examine changes in the relation 
to others, as well as to the self, in a communicative context in which the gaze 
of the other is directed, concretely and figuratively, towards an image of the self 
generated through the use of media. The article will further discuss changes in 
the quality of relationships to physically present – yet communicatively absent 
– others.3 For example, children often experience primary caretakers, who share 
the same physical space, but whose attention is frequently directed towards 
mobile and digital devices, or third-persons, resulting in greater fragmentation 
of the parent-child interaction and the relationship, as a whole. Psychoana-
lytic concepts regarding the construction of subjectivity and the significance of 
shame in the development of the psyche provide insightful tools for the analysis 
of the transformations now common to growing up in the wake of digitaliza-
tion. 
The essay will, first, sketch some thoughts on the particular situation on the 
net, wherein the other is both omnipresent and ephemeral (1), before turning 
2  In a broad sense, the self constitutes itself in the mirror and through the resonance of the other. Experiences with 
the other are fundamental to the development of the psyche, for self-image and identity. As a result, the (type and 
quality of ) interactions of the self and other are at the centre of various social and psychological theories that concep-
tualize the constitution of subjectivity, psychological,  social and mental development (see section 2 of this article). 
“We are what we are through our relationship to others”, maintains G. H. Mead (1934/1973: 430). “What the 
individual is for himself is not something that he invented. It is what his significant others have come to ...treat him 
as being”, as Goffman (1972: 327) writes, as an extension of Mead.  For the understanding of shame, experience of 
the self with significant others plays an essential role. Compare Seidler’s theory of shame (2000; 2014), which refer-
ences the prominent theory laid out in self-psychology (e.g. Broucek, 1991 or Goldberg, 1991), as well as to Sartre’s 
notion of the “Gaze of the Other” in L´etre et le néant (1943). The relationships of self and other are central for the 
constitution of subjectivity and shame (as well as for the transformations in the scope of digital relationships).
3  On the relationship between presence and absence in communication, see also Turkle (2011), Baym (2010), Gergen 
(2002). 
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in the next section to a discussion of the psychoanalytic (development-theoret-
ical), social-psychological and sociological aspects of shame and the gaze of the 
other (2). Thereafter, it will look at practical examples of changed constellations 
in the relation of self and other in the context of digitalization (3). These will 
illuminate the effects of what media theorists refer to as POPC, the state of be-
ing “permanently online, permanently connected” (Vorderer et al., 2016) and of 
subsequent alterations in face-to-face communication on a.) parent-child inter-
action, and b.) interaction with members of the adolescent peer group. This dis-
cussion will be used as the basis for examining the changed form, practice and 
significance of the phenomenon of “see and be seen,” and of self-presentation 
and being observed in social networks. Particular attention will be paid to the 
explicit orientation of this behaviour towards success, efficiency and profit, in 
the broader sense of the “entrepreneurial logic” (Bröckling, 2016) of self-pres-
entation on the net (4): Excerpts from interviews conducted with adolescents, 
in which young men and women explain their methods of, and motivations for, 
posting images of themselves on social networks, illustrate the “entrepreneurial” 
and psychic significance of being-seen and not-being seen or not being-‘liked’. 
The essay concludes with the identification of emerging variants of shame in 
digitalized relational contexts and shifts in the meaning of shame. 
1.  The Other in the Vastness of the Net – Omnipresent, 
Yet Physically Absent and Uncertain
For the majority of adolescents, but not only adolescents, communication 
takes place largely through digital networks, with others or an other, who is not 
physically present, yet whose physical absence is tied to a virtual permanence. 
In a peculiar way, the other is always and never there. There is a permanent 
connection to physically distant people, whose perpetual medial presence is a 
virtual precondition of the connection, though it is not necessarily or, in fact, 
continually guaranteed – like a person lurking in the background, who may 
or may not be watching. For, at some point, he or she, or the others, will, per-
haps, read the message, look at the posted photos, the selfies and posts, or the 
text messages and emails, or follow the Twitter messages, hashtags and endless 
stream of communications in the various Whatsapp groups – all the things that 
happened while you slept or had to ‘tune out’ for a second to watch for cars 
as you crossed the street. But, sometimes the other(s) might be looking at the 
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very moment “I” am writing. “Are you there?” is the typical call, as we enter the 
vague and uncertain space of the net, appealing to an echo, we might say, the 
call of the always-present-yet-never-unequivocally-there other of digital com-
munication. 
Correspondingly, the significance of the real, physically present other vacil-
lates and declines; behaviour towards physically present others and the gaze of 
the other transform in a physically immediate and symbolic sense. Face-to-face 
communication is partially supplemented and partially replaced by net-based 
or medial communication, whereby, on the whole – that is, through the in-
crease in digital communication – relationships take on different forms. For 
example, face-to-face communication is often accompanied by parallel medial 
communication, so that, one might say, the inner, mental representation and 
relationship of presence and absence, of separateness and relatedness, as well as 
the various meanings of the gaze of the other, transform in very fundamental 
ways. So, too, does the significance of seeing and being seen, of self-presenta-
tion and being observed in social networks. There, the gaze of the other takes 
on a different quality, generating new constellations of shame. In this regard, 
selected psychoanalytic, social-psychological and sociological aspects of shame 
will be outlined below. 
2.  Shame and the Gaze of the Other – Psychoanalytic, 
Social-Psychological and Sociological Approaches
The self is constructed through the gaze of the other. Shame derives from 
the awareness of this relation. Sartre describes this experience pointedly in Being 
and Nothingness (1943), where he writes, “[S]hame is a unitary apprehension 
with three dimensions: “I am ashamed of myself before the Other” (289). G. 
H. Seidler (2000) extends Sartre’s constellation of shame in his book on the 
analysis and psychoanalysis of shame, entitled In Others’ Eyes. An Analysis of 
Shame. In his conception of shame and alterity, Seidler distinguishes between 
three structural levels of shame: Whether someone a.) “is able to be genuinely 
self-reflective”, or b.) if self-reflection “requires the real presence of an external 
observer”, or c.) is “shamelessly ‘naïve’ vis-à-vis” the gaze of the other (Seidler, 
2014: 827). The capacity for shame also reflects the level of structural devel-
opment of the psyche. While shame may be a response to the experience of 
objectification, or take on a distressing or even pathological character, in this 
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perspective it is not merely a negative phenomenon, nor merely a potent and 
meaningful intrapsychic affect impacting our sense of self-worth. It also serves 
to protect us from and bind us to the other (Scheff, 2010).  
Shame, in other words, performs two operations simultaneously. Like the 
two sides of a coin, it is both a model of psychological development and the con-
struction of subjectivity. For in the gaze of the other, the I recognizes itself, its 
value, and becomes aware of its self. This fundamental constellation of self-evo-
lution in the mirror and through the resonance of the other (Winnicott, 1965) 
can be formulated in various theoretical positions emphasizing different aspects 
of the process – object relations theory, or the findings of infant research, as well 
as attachment and mentalization theory, intersubjective and recognition theory. 
According to Kohut (1971), the self delineates itself, in the best case, within the 
shine of the mother’s eyes (141). The gaze of the other, then, is a mirror of the 
self, but more than simply a reflection, as new meaning is continually produced 
in the interaction and mutual relation. Shame is a developmental-psychological 
aspect of this process. It points to the dialectic of successfully proving oneself 
and the potential for failure in the gaze of the significant other. At the same 
time, it reveals the self ’s dependence on the related and affirming other and on 
the constructive relational experiences out of which the developing childhood 
self emerges and the adult self draws its psychic energy. 
The possibility of shame, the potential to feel ashamed, then, is a constitu-
tive and indispensable part of this constellation of dependency from which 
we cannot escape. For without the gaze of the other, the child’s world remains 
empty and their psychological development is impeded. This is how the Subject 
affirms itself in the eye and gaze of the other, the one who “sees and recognizes”, 
who gives affection and affirmation. For the self, this gaze of the other bears 
important emotional consequences. Love and appreciation produce a balanced 
satisfaction with oneself and pride, while indifference and rejection produce 
insecurity and a fearful, unstable sense of self, resulting, in some cases, in the 
compensatory attempt to make oneself independent through increased self-
centredness or exaggerated feelings of grandiosity. Like pride, shame is an affect 
closely connected to narcissism, to the sense of self and self-esteem at a basal 
level (Hilgers, 2012).4 
4  Development theoretical and psychoanalytic approaches often understand shame as an indication of a discrepancy 
between the I and the Ideal-I, and guilt as a discrepancy between the I and the Super-ego (Piers & Singer, 1953). 
Following Steiner (1985), shame becomes meaningful in relation to the observing object, guilt in relation to the 
desired object. 
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Sociological approaches point out that the experience of shame is related 
to social conditions: When, why and how shame is experienced or triggered 
is dependent upon a number of different cultural and historical circumstances 
(Neckel, 1991), as well as on the social and psychological constellations of self 
and others.  As M. Lewis (1992) maintains, guilt is characteristic of a competi-
tive, individualistic, capitalist society, while shame takes on a particular, even 
regulatory function in precapitalist, ethnic and traditional societies. Losing 
one’s credibility or honour, or falling into disgrace can mean social death.5 More 
recent scholarship, however, argues that shame has become more significant in 
late Modernity, as a result of the pressure on the individual to perform, opti-
mize and continually push boundaries. Consequently, we see an ever greater 
discrepancy between the I and the Ideal-I, which, as A. Ehrenberg (2009) sug-
gests, can increase the tendency toward depression.6  
As this essay contends, the idea and meaning of (the gaze of ) the other 
changes in the wake of digitalization, lending a different quality to the phenom-
enon of shame. Furthermore, it will provide a selection of descriptions of the 
various constellations of shame, humiliation and shamelessness, as they emerge 
through forms of digital communication characterized by the dissolution of 
physical and communicative presence. On the one hand, there is the digitally-
absorbed gaze of the physically present other and, in consequence, the thinned 
out and fragile communication and attention to physically co-present persons; 
on the other, there is the greater significance of the gaze of the physically absent 
other onto the medially-constructed image of the self.
5  Norbert Elias' theses (2000) on the civilization process have been most commonly understood that in this process 
the thresholds of shame increase and shame is increasingly internalized. As Wouters (1999) determined, for example, 
a contrary tendency developed, by the end of the 19th century at the latest, in which the public demonstration and 
presentation of things once painstakingly concealed (especially those of a sexual nature) were no longer taboo. There 
is an evident shift in the boundaries of shame. It almost goes without saying that this shift has experienced greater 
expansion through the World Wide Web. This essay is not concerned, however, with questions of sexuality and taboo 
in the public space of the net. 
6  An overview of psychoanalytic theories of shame is available in Seidler (2000, 2014), Hilgers (2012); on the history 
and discussion of a sociology of shame, see Scheff (2010), who defines shame as “the premier social emotion” (84), 
as well as Neckel (1991) and Greiner (2015).
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3.  The Digitally Absorbed Gaze of the 
Physically Present Other 
3.1. The Gaze of Father and Mother at the Smartphone 
In a society shaped by digitalization, communication with physically absent 
people has grown increasingly significant, so that, meanwhile, physical presence 
is no guarantee of communicative attention. The spaces of secure, undisturbed 
face-to-face exchange have become more seldom and fragile. Such spaces can 
only be created with a concerted effort to keep our permanent availability from 
interrupting the conversation, distracting our attention from one another. In 
the German state of Hessen, billboards remind parents to talk to their children 
rather than “chat” with others while with their kids.7
Digitalization creates the expectation and the illusion of omnipresence in 
digital communication. Yet, our permanent availability in the private sphere 
leads to the fragmentation of our face-to-face, immediately connected interac-
tion and, in turn, the tendency toward shifts in significance, which are unin-
tentional and often go unnoticed. Guilt and shame can be the consequences, 
for example, when, despite self-expectations and good intentions, we still do 
not manage to sustain our attention towards our children and avoid digital 
“distraction”: 
“Sunday morning, any given amateur football field in Germany. Football 
with fathers and their children. Your own son has been looking forward to 
this all week. So have you. Then, you stand on the field and somehow play 
football, but you are an empty shell, not really there, because your thoughts 
are somewhere else. You are thinking of the email you got from your super-
visor at work just before the game started… Then you go back home and 
ask yourself why, once again, at least this time, you weren’t completely into 
the game. Why you weren’t able to relax. And then you see the Smartphone 
lying there, its red light blinking incessantly, and reach for it. You read and 
begin to type. You don’t hear your son ask if you saw the goal he made. 
Every mail, every quick SMS is a little betrayal: another minute sacrificed 
for work, even though you had promised this weekend to really spend time 
with your family…” (Borst & Wefing, 2014: 2)
7  The motto and central message of the billboard campaign in Frankfurt a. M. 2015, showing images of mothers and 
fathers looking at their smartphones or talking on their cellphone while with their children, read: “Talk to your child 
instead”; cf. also Turkle (2011).
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The father describes his regret for betraying his son but cannot change the 
situation: A moment later, he is already digitally distracted once again. F. Opitz 
(2012) describes a similar situation in his film Speed and his book by the same 
name. Opitz interviewed a journalist after the latter had prescribed himself a 
period of “rehab” from the Internet and his Blackberry, because his behaviour 
with these technologies “had become creepy” and he was ashamed of it: “If my 
phone vibrated and I was with other people … and it was embarrassing to look 
at it …, I would go the bathroom quickly to look at the message” (Optiz, 2012: 
64). Similar situations occurred more and more frequently within the family: 
When I came home at night, the first thing I did was turn on the computer.” Or, 
“the Blackberry – a devil’s tool (63). My kids were furious at the thing. Rightfully so 
… ‘cause I was always looking at the screen while talking to them, at the same time, 
real quick, just to check my emails (74). 
While feelings of shame predominate in these examples, in some cases, the 
blurring of lines between work and private life is not experienced as burden-
some or as a shameful communicative shortcoming vis-à-vis one’s children. 
On the contrary, the feeling of being or needing to be permanently available is 
accompanied by a sense of importance, of being irreplaceable, by the desire for 
self-superiority that admits no feelings of shame: 
Florian K.,8 for example, an enthusiastic self-optimizer, explains how he 
keeps a log, so he knows …down to the minute precisely how much of his day 
is free-time and how much is work time … though, at the end of the day, it’s not 
that accurate, because … well, when I am … at home sitting in my son’s room 
playing with him and my cellphone is within reach and it somehow buzzes … 
and I pick it up to glance at it … or I … write a quick message … it is actually 
difficult to distinguish what is work and what is explicitly leisure time.
Florian K. describes a scene in which he reads and replies to mails and SMSs 
while playing with his child, something not unique to him. What concerns 
him in the narrative, however, is not the idea that repeatedly interrupting play 
with his son might be a problem but rather his not knowing how to categorize 
the time he spends in his son’s room. His interest is limited to his own self-
observation and the perfection of his digital diary entries on how he spends 
8  The case samples of Florian K. and Andrea W. derive from the APAS project by King, Gerisch, Rosa. For more 
details on the project, see: King (2013), King et al. (2014), Schreiber et al. (2015).
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his time. His son’s needs are secondary. A similar constellation can be seen in 
Andrea W.’s narrative:
I think that was when Rafi was – older, well, relatively speaking older, I mean, 
he wasn’t, wasn’t a baby anymore, but a bit older, a toddler – and then, sud-
denly, uh, started a little bit to, uh, uh, to demand things: I want to play Duplo 
with you. I would be like: oh, ok, here is someone who wants you to have time 
for him right now – and who is not a baby anymore that you can lay down 
somewhere and (takes a deep breath) say (in a high voice) ‘looky here, look at 
this awesome toy, now lay here under it, see the little bell, super!’ (in a normal 
voice). Now, uh, there is someone who says, ‘I want to play Duplo with you now 
and you just picked me up from daycare and now do something with me – I 
want to go to the playground with you, uh, Mama, put your cellphone down’ 
… Well, I think I really needed someone, ‘cause I actually really like what I do? 
Eh – someone who really calls it like it is and says, ‘Hey, now, take a bit of time 
off and relax and stop thinking about your job the whole time’. 
Here, too, the needs of the child are secondary. The mother’s reflections on 
the episode are focused on herself. Comparing the four narratives, each depicts 
parents, fathers or mothers, working in the presence of their children and keep-
ing a steady eye on the more or less irresistible cellphone. The fathers in the first 
narratives (still) experience shame and guilt for their lack or lapses of attention, 
escaping to the bathroom with their smartphones. Florian K., however, is most 
preoccupied with how to categorize the time he spends in his son’s room – work 
or leisure? Andrea does not say, “my child needs me” but “I needed someone to 
say to me, ‘Stop working for once’ – ‘Put your cellphone down’”. 
 Each of these narratives makes clear in its own way how the gaze of 
parental others for their children can be absorbed elsewhere. Children com-
pete for attention with the (smartphone or computer) screen towards which 
their parents focus their attention with great interest – and, often, they come 
up short. In the face of the increasingly common, even normalized practice of 
withdrawing from immediate communication with those physically present to 
devote attention to digital activities, the lack of shame visible in the narratives 
of Florian and Andrea might be understood as an expression of an emerging 
cultural transformation of values: When the majority behaves similarly it be-
comes ever more natural – despite the costs and disadvantages –  to turn away 
without shame from others, even a child in need of communication. In this 
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sense, what can be seen here is a historically new variety of shamelessness. For 
the development of the psyche, the result may be a deficiency of affection and 
affirmation that, in turn, affects the child’s development of the capacity for 
shame. As explained in the opening segments of this essay, to an extent, taking 
up Seidler, to fully develop this capacity, the child must have adequate experi-
ence of being seen and affirmed by the significant other, that is, their primary 
caretaker. 
3.2. Multiplied and Fragmented Communication among Adolescents 
The boundarylessness of medial consumption affects not only parental 
practice but that of adolescents themselves as well (Kammerl et al., 2012; King, 
2014). The JIM study, focusing on the use of media by children and adolescents 
in Germany, emphasized as early as 2013 that “a marked transformation … in 
the length of use-time had taken place” (JIM-Study 2013: 28). The findings 
were summarized in 2015 as follows, “At 97%, nearly all adolescents use the 
Internet. Among these, 80% of 12 to 19 year olds are online daily (...) While 
12 to 13 year olds spend an average of 156 minutes online, this value increases 
to 260 minutes by the ages of 18 to 19 years” (JIM-Study 2015: 56). Given 
these numbers, it is reasonable “to assume that, in addition to the increasing 
duration of use of the various options in the net (…) the permanent, very much 
desired, availability allows for the (subjectively experienced) increase in use-
time” (JIM-Study 2013: 7). Correspondingly, there are changes in the forms of 
adolescent communication – even among peers there are similar constellations 
of disrupted attentiveness or communicative withdrawal as a result of digital 
practices. As can be seen in an interview with a young man in Grosser’s study 
(2014), when he is out with friends or a friend, “and then he’s on the cellphone 
the whole time, [it’s] really annoying, because he only listens with one ear and just 
messes around with his phone” (4). A 22 year old describes a typical scene, when 
“she is out in the evening with friends, e.g. at a bar, then they all sit down and 
‘the first thing that happens, they all put their cellphones on the table’ and it has 
become normal that ‘someone writes real quick, although we are all sitting there 
together’” (4). “When she is with someone alone ‘and he spends the entire time 
on the phone, I could scream, because that’s just something I can’t stand’. She thinks 
to herself, ‘You don’t even have to be here talking to me’ and she speaks about it 
directly. She does it herself, she admits self-reflectively. Yet she finds it ‘not very 
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pretty or entirely polite’” (5). Michael “uses his smartphone during conversations 
with others, too … ‘but you try to avoid it, but it just happens again and again. 
It’s really already a part of you” (7).
These descriptions, too, suggest that, though contrasting norms are brought 
into play, the physical, analog presence, i.e. the gaze of the other in its physical 
immediacy, is becoming less significant. Physical, “real presence” grows ever 
more similar to a kind of ornament or background in relation to what is really 
important, like the temporary and inconsequential presence or insignificant 
gaze of passengers in the train, who are co-present for a certain period of time, 
but who remain insignificant and the majority of the time ultimately disappear 
without trace. This logic of being absent in the presence of others penetrates ever 
deeper into our intimate relationships that require sensual attentive presence. In 
other words, as ever, adolescents meet up with their peers and spend a good deal 
of time with other “physically present” adolescents. This does not mean, how-
ever, that they engage in actual face-to-face communication. For even when to-
gether in the same physical space, their gaze and attention are repeatedly turned 
to the digital, i.e. messages, information, communication partners or sources 
of entertainment, which affect the quality of communication, relationships and 
forms and relevancy of exchange with present and absent others. 
It can also be assumed that the more the shine in the eye of the other is sought in 
digital social networks – especially for those who experience the eye of the moth-
er or father (or other significant other) shining brighter when she or he looks 
at the smartphone than at his or her child’s face, or those who must compete 
with the smartphone or screen of another device for their mother or father’s 
attention – the more likely it is that the search for this “shine” in the mother’s 
eye will be displaced onto the number of Likes, the affirmations and attention 
received in the social network. Granted, one possible response to the childhood 
experience of competing with the Smartphone for the mother’s attention might 
be to reject the smartphone. However, in a social environment in which digital 
communication plays such a significant role, this response grows increasingly 
improbable. The more likely outcome – precisely in the case of insufficient at-
tention from the primary caretakers – is greater conformity and the desire or 
hope to at least gain control over the gaze of the digital other. 
The process of proving oneself in relationships in the classical sense – 
through an always risky exposure of the self, in which failure is also a possi-
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ble outcome – in a form of communication in which individuals experience 
themselves in speech and response, in direct exchange with one another (i.e. 
dialogue, gestures and actions) not only loses significance but even appears sub-
jectively obsolete in the end. The experience of the self in the gaze of the other 
is, thus, one might say, from the start, fragile, erratic, wavering and flickering, 
like the screen itself. The greater the dependence on the diffuse recognition of 
the digital generalized other, who replaces intimate experience, the more press-
ing the shame resulting from disregard, from feelings of falling short: Pressing 
and yet directionless, for ultimately it is only ever about the next round of seek-
ing attention and affection or acclamation, from whomever it may be. 
4. The Self in Digital Worlds – Entrepreneurial
Like – Test
... you get notified on your phone or through Facebook – Because of – eh – mes-
sages – um – you know how many Likes you get – a message for a Like or a 
Comment – eh – and, of course, you follow that … so … ‘cause you just always 
go to Messages and, well … of course you look at the photo to see how many 
Likes it has (Tom, 16). 
Bröckling (2016) describes the categorical imperative of our times as a 
maxim with the invocation “Be entrepreneurial!” Every single person is called 
upon equally to think in the logic of the “entrepreneurial self ” (ibid.), to focus 
on lifelong profit, customer satisfaction and success, and to act flexibly and be 
prepared to take risks. This way of life is the result of permanent competition 
and continually demands further and enhanced, ultimately never-ending ef-
forts at optimization. In this context, optimization generally means the con-
tinual orientation towards improvement and extending or crossing boundaries, 
the creation of relationships (with others and with oneself ) within the logic 
of investment and anticipated returns, and keeping our options open (in case 
returns might be higher elsewhere) (King et al., 2014). Yet no amount of effort 
is able to quell the fear of failure: “Because one can assert one’s position only 
for the moment and only in relation to one’s competitors, no one can simply 
rest on their achievements. Today’s recipe for success is tomorrow’s path to ruin” 
(Bröckling, 2015: 10). 
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Self-presentation, then, must always be focused on drawing maximal at-
tention to oneself and showing oneself in the best possible light, and this is all 
the more true, we might add, in digital contexts: ‘Successful’ digital self-pres-
entation must be permanently controlled and renewed. In a teaching research 
project within the scope of a seminar at the University of Hamburg, interviews 
with adolescents were conducted about what it means to them to post images 
of themselves on social networks. The results of these explorations underscore 
the degree to which precisely this logic of optimization and the figure of the 
entrepreneurial self were implemented in the youths’ digital self-presentation 
practices. 
The adolescents maintain, organize and balance their self-presentations 
with painstaking attention to detail, like an entrepreneur monitoring his profits 
daily. They look precisely at which images are received by viewers and how, 
through using particular hashtags and technical possibilities and finesse, they 
can manage to artificially raise the number of Likes (if you like me, I’ll like you) 
and new ‘products’, i.e. images of themselves are tested and evaluated constant-
ly. There was also a continual process of optimization in their self-presentation, 
designed to sustain an audience, i.e. the attention and gaze of others, to increase 
their numbers and win their loyalty. 
Interviewer: What do you think would happen if you were to suddenly stop 
posting photos? 
Bianca: Well, if I suddenly don’t post, eh, any more photos at all, the first thing 
that would happen is I would lose all of my followers (laughs) 
I: Oh no (laughs)
B: No – that’s bad – I’d lose all of my followers right off the bat. 
…




B: I don’t know, I mean, I don’t really know. …most followers aren’t even people 
I know. They aren’t even friends of mine. Yeah, I like, actually I only think the 
followers are important so, well, so they just see what kind of photos I have and 
so and I don’t know.
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I: But you would probably be sad if, let’s say, half of your followers would cancel 
their subscription suddenly, right? 
B: I would be really sad! …yeah, that would be really stupid, eh, all that hard 
work. I say hard work, but – 
I: Yeah
B: - It’s really hard work to get that many followers. 
These responses illustrate the extent to which the efforts of the “entrepre-
neurial self ” to optimize must be permanently sustained in a very concrete and 
practical sense. While this entrepreneurial logic is by no means limited to the 
digital sphere, it is strikingly clear how much this work in the digital network 
epitomizes the entrepreneurial ductus, the imperative of constant improvement 
and performance – and how, precisely by this means, adolescents are trained 
and socialized, almost to perfection, in the relevant forms of entrepreneurial 
behaviour. 
At the same time – the focus is on adolescents, here – their fragility is pal-
pable, the neediness, even the self-doubt, which can hardly be hidden in this 
presentation market place, for example, with the question, “What would hap-
pen if the other saw the real me?”
Some of the interviewed teens state that they regulate their feelings of self-
worth through posting images of themselves: When I’m not doing well, I post 
a nice photo on Facebook and if it gets a good response and lots of people like 
it, it makes me feel better – of course, the opposite is also true if something goes 
wrong. Here are some excerpts from the interviews with the young men and 
women:
Anna responds to the interviewer’s question, “What do you think most peo-
ple, in general, or when you think of friends, want to achieve by posting images 
in social networks?” 
Anna (18): Well, that other people have some kind of idea who they are. And 
somehow you make an impression on them or something. And I think lots of 
people…when they post a photo, most likely want to show how good they look – 
I mean, no one actually posts a photo they look terrible in. I think that would 
be cool, but no one does that. I think they more want to achieve, that they want 
to create an image of themselves, what the others then think …
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Jule (18): Lots of people pretend to be something maybe to feel better about 
themselves or edit [the photos] a lot. I mean, I know a few people who really do 
a lot of that … 
Tom (16): Every day a new photo – just to get those Likes… 
At the same time, there is shame about the dependence of self-worth on 
these practices, wherein – in the majority of cases – it is clear we are dealing 
with the creation of appearances, a construction. 
Tony: And that’s just somehow, in some way, totally stupid and I think, too, that 
there is too much of that… I mean…I just don’t think it’s good that…well, on 
Facebook everything is just so extremely faked and extremely … embellished, 
and that… I just don’t like it. 
Insecurity creates a new need, or rather neediness continually reproduces 
itself. The unambiguous experience of successfully proving oneself before the 
other, before the gaze of the other, is lost in the digital vagueness, virtuality and 
uncertainty of the relationship between self and other. The functions of failure 
and success lose their foundation, as it were. Failure is not failure; it was only 
the wrong image of my self, perhaps. Confirmation is not confirmation; it is 
not recognition, since it was only an image and not my real face, as we see in 
the thoughts of the young woman whose words form the title of this essay, “If 
you show your real face, you’ll lose 10 000 followers”. 
5. Conclusions – Shame in Digitalized Relationships
This essay has examined the psychosocial and psychic ramifications of new 
digital boundaries and constellations of shame, humiliation and shamelessness, 
as they develop out of the disjunction of physical, communicative presence in 
the wake of digitalized forms of communication. In particular, it has examined 
the associated changes in functions and affective pitfalls of self-presentation. 
Selected descriptions and statements from adolescents of the meaning of social 
networks and their digital self-presentation illustrated mechanisms that are 
operative in their practices with the gaze of the other on the net. Psychoana-
lytic concepts regarding the construction of subjectivity and the significance of 
shame in the development of the psyche pointed to changes in developmental 
processes in digitalized worlds. 
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In summary, the following conclusions can be drawn: Transformed constel-
lations intensify shame and fear of humiliation through social exclusion and 
inadequacy (in the sense of loss of status or marginalization). Changed forms of 
communication and the associated forms of relationships can increase the pres-
sure to conform and intensify the fear of marginalization. Those who do not 
succeed at drawing the attention of others are always the ones who are ashamed 
– at the same time, the competition for attention in the digital world necessarily 
grows ever greater. 
The analysis further identified the dynamic of an often proclaimed, but 
actually rather minimized, shame with regard to the virtual negation of the 
significance of the physically present other, the gaze of the other, in the im-
mediacy of shared physical space (as the basis of self-reassurance). Put another 
way, it is growing ever more acceptable, as it were, to ‘shamelessly’ turn away 
or withdraw from communication with – or to never even turn towards – the 
physically present other.
Though often indirectly thematized by pointing to behavior of others, new 
variants of shame for one’s own dependence on attention from the digital, 
physically absent other emerge, reflecting the urgent and simultaneously disap-
pointed hope to establish connections on the net in order to find confirmation 
and feel a sense of belonging there.
Lastly, the essay turned its focus to the phenomenon of shame for the in-
adequacies of the virtual self – a variant of shame arising in awareness of the 
fact that neither the gaze of the other nor the digitally presented self has with-
stood a direct process of proving themselves. The gaze of the other in digital 
communication is fleeting and wavering, while the self present on the net is a 
constructed, in the best case, playful version of the self, but often enough a very 
seriously considered construct with an eye to the significance of one’s own posi-
tion and status in social groups, instrumentalized to regulate one’s feelings of 
self-worth. As such, it bears great potential for humiliation should the number 
of Likes be too low, lower than for other people.
 In keeping with Seidler’s differentiation among various structural levels of 
shame, this would concern a psychic constellation in which the self remains 
concretistically dependent on affection and affirmation in order to avoid feeling 
ashamed. Because these ‘concrete’ attentions are, at the same time, volatile, the 
fear of shame remains and continually grows. 
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Loss of status and shame related to exclusion, thus, takes on greater signifi-
cance the more the gaze of the digital other assumes responsibility for functions 
or has this responsibility projected onto it (recognition, affirmation, the desire 
for a sense of belonging) – functions no longer fulfilled by the digitally-ab-
sorbed though physically present other, in particular, the primary care provider 
in the process of growing up. 
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Abstract: Do media images really traumatize the public?  If they do not, then why 
do so many commentators – from those commemorating the Holocaust to those analys-
ing the impact of 9/11 – claim that trauma can be transmitted to specific ethnic groups 
or entire societies?  While these claims can be based on empirical data or used to justify 
political agendas, psychoanalysis also continues to influence conceptions of collective 
trauma and to offer important perspectives for evaluating these conceptions. This paper 
explores these questions of mediated trauma and collective identity by tracing a neglected 
historical trajectory back to the work of psychoanalyst and anthropologist Geza Roheim. 
Roheim produced studies of Australian Aboriginal culture that applied the theory of col-
lective trauma outlined in Freud’s Totem and Taboo. He also produced an ethnographic 
film, Subincision, documenting an initiation rite, that was subsequently used in psycho-
logical studies of so-called “stress films”. Putting aside Roheim’s psychoanalytic interpreta-
tions of indigenous culture, psychologists used his film to measure the impact of images 
of violence and pain. These studies from the 1960s have recently been rediscovered by 
scholars of Holocaust film and video testimony. This paper seeks to recover the concept of 
“symbolic wounds” developed in psychoanalyst Bruno Bettelheim’s later commentary on 
Roheim’s work. The mass media of newspapers, film and television have supported the 
idea of cultural trauma shared by large societies. The concept of symbolic wounds that 
enhance group membership and mobilize collective action may be more useful for under-
standing how violent and shocking images are put to more diverse uses in digital culture.
Keywords: trauma, stress film, symbolic wounds, September 11, ISIS, Black Lives 
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1. Introduction
Research on media traumatization has attempted to explain the psycho-
logical impact of images showing violent and catastrophic events (Holmes & 
Bourne, 2008). Images that show pain and suffering can be understood to cause 
pain and suffering for viewers, even if the experience shown and the experience 
of seeing are understood as qualitatively different. Psychoanalysis has made an 
important contribution to this area of research by explaining how identification 
with “traumatic” images is driven by unconscious fears and desires, and how 
the psyche protects or “numbs” itself against the impact of shock (Freud, 1920; 
Lifton, 1967). Psychoanalytic accounts that emphasize the role of interior pro-
cesses of identification, however, have tended to be discounted in research that 
focuses on the traumatic impact of media images as external stimuli. In order 
to address this neglected perspective the following discussion seeks to recover 
a conception of “symbolic wounds” from the works of psychoanalysts Geza 
Roheim and Bruno Bettelheim (Roheim, 1950; Bettelheim, 1955). Roheim 
and Bettelheim both argued, in different ways, that violence can have symbolic 
value that enables social participation and group membership. The following 
discussion proposes that media images can function as symbolic wounds invit-
ing active identification. I propose that discourses about media traumatization 
have been dominated by the idea of cultural trauma, which depends on a one-
source-to-many-viewers model of mass media. The idea of symbolic wounds 
better describes the situation made possible by digital media, where new com-
munities emerge in relation to images of violence and suffering, revealing how 
such images can not only distress or desensitize but also enhance and empower 
those who look at them.
Claims that media images can induce or transmit traumatic experience 
have been made about photographs, documentary films, television news and 
video testimony (Sontag, 1977; Felman & Laub, 1992; Hirsch, 2004; Neria, 
Di Grande & Adams, 2011). These claims have been associated with the mass 
media of print, cinema and television because they assume that a single source 
of information is being received by potentially very large audiences. When 
entire societies are likely to encounter particular images of violence and catas-
trophe then public figures, intellectuals and media professionals engage in the 
discursive construction of cultural traumas (Alexander, 2012): when everyone 
sees the same images they can be said to experience similar emotional responses. 
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Probably the most widely known example of this construction of a cultural 
trauma is the narrative about Americans’ shocked response to witnessing the 
events of September 11, 2001. The possibility that there has never actually been 
such uniformity of feeling becomes more evident with the greater multiplicity 
of images and narratives available on the Internet, showing that violent im-
ages invite a range of responses that include not only dismay and rage but also 
“inappropriate” ones such as fascination and amusement. The shift to digital 
technologies has allowed media users to navigate almost limitless amounts of 
information, develop individual user profiles and participate in social networks. 
The proliferation of media images and texts potentially available at any time or 
place, along with the intensification of explicit violence and horror, make this 
less predictable encounter with the “traumatic” image a significant feature of 
media use today (Meek, 2010; Morpurgo, 2016).
Psychoanalysis can help us to understand how the social and cultural value 
of symbolic wounds has changed in response to historical developments in 
modern media. Freud understood identity formation in terms of the child’s 
relation to his/her parents in the private domestic space: the child internalized 
parental authority in the form of the super-ego, which was understood by Freud 
as specifically patriarchal and middle-class. In Freud’s time parental authority 
over the child’s auto-erotic tendencies was commonly expressed through threats 
of castration (Poster, 2006: 165–168), a symbolic wound that structured cul-
tural identity through sexual repression. Mark Poster argues that because child-
hood development today is strongly shaped by media technologies, the private 
relationship between a child and his/her parents has been displaced by the child 
as a consumer and member of specific target markets. Young people now use 
a diverse range of media, over which parents exercise limited control (Poster, 
2006: 171–173). This situation developed gradually in the second half of the 
twentieth century, when private life was increasingly characterized by the con-
sumption of newspapers, magazines, television and movies. During this period 
mass media assumed the role of constructing narratives about national identity 
and collective traumas. The televisual nature of these traumas can be seen in 
examples such as the 1961 Eichmann trial, the assassination of John F. Kennedy 
and the 9/11 attacks. New traumatic images of war, famine and death became 
available but remained centrally controlled and censored by corporate media. 
In psychoanalytic terms these traumatic images could be understood as induc-
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ing castration anxiety and thereby prompting identification with a national or 
ethnic superego.  
In the mid-1990s trauma studies suggested new approaches to the question 
of media traumatization by bringing together psychoanalysis, psychotherapy 
with Holocaust survivors, and recorded testimony in film and video. The influ-
ential work of Cathy Caruth and Shoshana Felman sought to recover forgotten 
historical experience through the transmission of traumatic shock in literary, 
film and video texts (Felman & Laub, 1992; Caruth, 1996). Psychoanalysis 
explains traumatic experiences as overwhelming conscious understanding, al-
lowing the unconscious memory of the event to return in symptoms such as 
nightmares, compulsive behaviours, and other neuroses and pathologies. By 
analogy, these trauma theorists argued that extreme events resist understand-
ing at the time of their occurrence and reappear as symptomatic disruptions 
in later representations of history.  The emphasis on the collective experience 
of catastrophe, however, implicitly leads us back to the question of media as 
an apparatus of power. The political implications of identification with trau-
matic histories became clearer after the “live” transmission of the 9/11 attacks 
on television, when many media commentators almost immediately made 
claims about collective trauma for Americans (Trimarco & Depret, 2005: 30). 
The “superego” effect of the state and mass media was revealed in subsequent 
military interventions and intensified national security and social surveillance. 
The televisual replay of numerous different video recordings made by private 
citizens appeared to act out the experience of the events as an intrusive memory. 
National surveys conducted after the 9/11 attacks led to claims of substantial 
levels of stress and PTSD among the general population (Young, 2007: 28). In 
this case psychological research appeared to directly serve the interests of a nar-
rative of national trauma. 
Both these theoretical and empirical accounts of the psychological impact 
of ‘traumatic’ images assumed a single-source-to-multiple-viewer model. At-
tempts to understand the impact of traumatic images tend to assign roles of 
perpetrator and victim, using actions in real life events to define a relation be-
tween media and viewer. Psychoanalysis, however, includes more complicated 
accounts of relationships between perpetrator and victim, including fantasy and 
guilt. Nevertheless, as Ruth Leys (2000, 2007) has shown, both trauma theory 
and psychological studies of traumatic images have tended to reproduce the 
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model of impact from an external source and to discount the ways in which 
trauma is also shaped by interior processes of imaginative investment and iden-
tification (which may not be limited to a single position or role). One way to 
address this imbalance is to consider how viewers can make their identification 
with images of pain and suffering the basis of socially transformative acts.  
Cultural trauma narratives attempt to capture mass identification, but digi-
tal media are allowing and revealing a greater diversity of identifications with 
symbolic wounds. For example, according to W. J. T. Mitchell, the 9/11 attacks 
initiated a ‘war of images’ that included the torture of detainees in Abu Ghraib 
prison, the execution of Saddam Hussein, and the decapitation of hostages by 
radical Islamists. But Mitchell’s account of this war of images, which he claims 
is “designed to shock and traumatize the enemy” (Mitchell, 2011: 2), remains 
within the logic of perpetrator and victim transferred onto media image and 
viewer. In Mitchell’s analysis, the word “trauma” tends to connote an external 
force or event impacting on a body or psyche and leaving an injury or wound. 
Examples of more complex interactions with digital images as symbolic wounds 
can be seen in political struggles such as the Arab Spring (Wallace, 2016: 80) 
and Black Lives Matter. Images of violence and death that have been rapidly 
disseminated through digital networks have provoked communities to engage 
in political protest and resistance.
Concerns about the psychological effects of media violence need to be 
understood in the larger context of modern experience. Walter Benjamin’s 
adaptation of Freud’s account of trauma in Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
(1920) stressed that shock had become the “norm” (Benjamin, 2003: 318) 
in metropolitan culture. Freud proposed that the perceptual apparatus devel-
ops a “protective shield” (Freud, 1920: 27) to insulate it from the potentially 
damaging effects of intrusive stimuli.  Only the experience of fright (a sudden 
and unexpected disturbance) is able to pierce the stimulus shield and thereby 
cause trauma. Benjamin made a parallel between the protective shield and the 
camera, which mediates shock and thereby deflects any deeper psychological 
impact. Ever since the invention of photography viewers have been adjusting 
their perceptual apparatus to cope with visual shock, leading to an ever-increas-
ing intensity of media effects to capture viewers’ attention. The experience of 
mediated shock in modern consumer societies has accelerated the destruction 
of earlier cultural taboos and traditional values: what was shocking yesterday 
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may be just boring today or next week. Whereas the media-saturated viewer in 
technologically advanced societies is often assumed to be morally jaded and un-
responsive to shock, digital technologies are allowing individuals and groups to 
transmit and circulate images that can help to re-invigorate community belong-
ing and collective action. Images of police violence against African Americans, 
for example, may be ‘old news’ but recent events captured on mobile-phone 
cameras and posted on the Internet have prompted acts of protest, mourning 
and retaliatory violence.
2. Subincision
In the following discussion I want to reconsider debates about media trau-
matization by focusing on a specific film that has been used in research on stress 
films: Subincision Rites of the Arunta, made by psychoanalyst Geza Roheim in 
1937 while conducting fieldwork with the Aboriginal tribe in Australia. This 
film has been repeatedly used in research studies for the purpose of deliberately 
causing distress to American viewers (Lazarus et al., 1962; Horowitz, 1969). 
None of these studies has considered the cultural significance of the ritual 
shown in the film, which Roheim interpreted using Freud’s theory of the primal 
horde: the violence acted out the collective guilt for the murder of the primal 
father by the younger males (Freud, 1913). In the 1950s, psychoanalyst Bruno 
Bettelheim discussed the cultural practice of subincision in terms of “sym-
bolic wounds” allowing for self-transformations that enhanced social status 
and group membership. What such psychoanalytic theories stressed, which was 
discounted in later laboratory-based research on media traumatization, was the 
ways in which violence could enable individual self-transformation and group 
participation.
Digital culture has provided new evidence to suggest that symbolic wounds 
can be seen as functioning in new technologically-mediated forms. Those who 
required audiences to watch Subincision expected them to be disturbed by what 
they saw. Today, however, a quick google videos search of ‘subincision’ reveals 
a sub-genre of pornography in which genital mutilation is presented to induce 
sexual excitement and pleasure, even if for others it may be the object of horror 
or disgust. Viewers may now use the Internet to access the decapitation videos 
produced by ISIS, for example, and engage in a range of possible identifications 
with this violent scenario. These videos are designed, as indeed were the 9/11 
97
Media Traumatization, Symbolic 
Wounds and Digital Culture
Allen Meek
CM : Communication and Media  XI(38) 91–110 © 2016 CDI
attacks, not only to shock but also to recruit. The Internet allows us to see this 
range of different negotiations articulated in videos and commentaries posted 
by non-professional users. For example, counter to the televisual narrative 
depicting America as the innocent victim of a terrorist attack, the Internet has 
helped to foster new political communities, such as the 9/11 Truth Movement, 
that challenge the dominant account.  
Jeffrey Alexander has described cultural traumas as “wounds to social iden-
tity” (Alexander, 2012: 2). In Subincision the wounds inflicted by genital muti-
lation define group membership. Psychological studies showed that the viewing 
of Subincision also produced effects that suggested a shared experience of stress 
in an entirely different cultural context. Today individuals interact with com-
munication technologies and information networks that allow more private 
negotiations of thresholds of shock and potential psychological disturbance. 
The wounds that serve as a basis of identity in tribal communities suggest that 
violence may continue to define social belonging in more ‘advanced’ societies, 
if only in the increasingly dislocated and disembodied forms made possible by 
technological media. In traditional societies ritual defines social membership; 
in modern mass societies, mass media construct narratives about collective 
memory and identity; in networked societies, images can prompt the forma-
tion of less centrally-controlled political communities. In each case symbolic 
wounds play a role in mobilizing and managing group membership. Symbolic 
wounds now perform an important function in alternative, subcultural and 
counter-hegemonic narratives about identity in digital culture. 
In the study that he led at the University of California observing the psy-
chological stress caused by watching a film, Richard Lazarus selected Subinci-
sion. Lazarus describes the contents of the film:
“It depicts one of the important ceremonials of this tribe and very vividly 
presents a sequence of crude operations performed with a piece of flint on 
the penis and scrotum of several adolescent boys. The running length is 17 
minutes and the film is silent.” (Lazarus et al., 1962: 4)
Evaluating the effects of watching this film, Lazarus and his team used 
personality assessment and measured skin resistance and heart rate and ana-
lysed urine samples to assess biochemical response (Lazarus et al., 1962: 4). 
The screening was followed by a questionnaire-interview asking the subjects to 
describe their responses to the film and recall what they saw. The participants 
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were recruited from psychology courses at the University of California. In their 
concluding remarks Lazarus et al. suggest that further research might consider 
“what types of content produce stress in a given amount and pattern and in 
particular classes of people,” given the “nudity of the natives” and “the homo-
sexual implications of their behaviour”, and also “what might happen if the 
same subject watched the film over and over again” (Lazarus et al., 1962: 30). 
These directions for further research point to questions of cultural meaning and 
social identity and of technological effects (possibly inducing desensitization) 
that were excluded from consideration in this initial study.
In his 1969 study, Mardi Horowitz used Subincision again because of its 
previous use in such experiments. He provides a more detailed description of 
the film’s content:
“The film setting is the Australian bush, and it depicts naked natives en-
gaged in a harsh puberty rite. Scenes of extensive penile surgery, bleeding 
wounds, and adolescents writhing and wincing with pain are repeated sev-
eral times. The boys appear to volunteer for this painful procedure, which 
is conducted by older men.” (Horowitz, 1969: 554)
Both Lazarus and Horowitz mention the explicit visibility of the boys’ 
genitals – something that was taboo in television and Hollywood cinema in the 
early 1960s (and indeed remains largely so today). 
Fifty years later (perhaps due to the cultural impact of the 9/11 attacks) this 
research was reconsidered in the new context of trauma theory. For example, 
in his study of Holocaust films, Joshua Hirsch refers to the research by Lazarus 
and Horowitz that uses Subincision as evidence that “film viewing can lead to 
symptoms of posttraumatic stress” (Hirsch, 2004: 17). Hirsch combines this 
proposition with the psychotherapeutic concept of “vicarious trauma” trans-
mitted from a traumatized person to a witness, loved one or family member. 
Whereas he acknowledges that watching a film can be more emotionally re-
moved than a direct experience of trauma or contact with one who has had such 
an experience, he nevertheless proposes that the effects of film viewing might 
include “shock, intrusive imagery, grief, depression, numbing, guilt feelings, 
and loss of faith in humanity” (Hirsch, 2004: 17). Hirsch’s own example of 
film causing vicarious trauma is the footage taken during the liberation of the 
Nazi death camps. Hirsch uses earlier research, in which visually taboo mate-
rial was used to disturb an American audience, to explain how these images of 
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emaciated, naked corpses and mass death were traumatic. Psychological studies 
in which the cultural context was discounted are used by Hirsch to make much 
larger claims about the cultural trauma of the Holocaust. These broader claims, 
however, remain within the perpetrator-victim/media-viewer analogy.  
Ruth Leys also refers to Horowitz’s research in the context of discussing 
the Holocaust. According to Leys, Horowitz distinguished between different 
types of images, including “memory fragments, reconstructions, reinterpreta-
tions, and symbols” (Leys, 2007: 106). Traumatic images, therefore, need not 
be understood as the literal trace of an event but can involve role-playing, 
imagination and fantasy shaped by “unconscious wishes, fears, and memories” 
(Leys, 2007: 108). Leys argues that the studies by Lazarus and Horowitz that 
used Subincision also tended towards a literal conception of the image and em-
phasized the impact of external stimuli, thereby excluding from consideration 
more complex models of identification (Leys, 2007: 11–112). This argument 
could also be applied to Hirsch’s claims, which do not adequately address how 
viewers see the Holocaust as part of their cultural identity. These arguments by 
Hirsch and Leys draw out some of the wider implications of the research on 
stress films and how it raises questions about historical context and unconscious 
motivation.
In his discussion of the studies by Lazarus and Horowitz and the later 
commentary by Leys, Amit Pinchevski emphasizes the central role of media 
technologies, which tends to be downplayed in all of this research. Pinchevski 
argues that the understanding of traumatic memories as intrusive images “must 
owe something to the film apparatus” and “presupposes the technical ability 
both to record stressful events and to replay these events so as to reproduce 
stressful effects” (Pinchevski, 2015: 10). Pinchevski then moves from this 
proposition to pose the question: “Is it possible to be traumatized by watching 
a catastrophic event on television?” (2015: 10). Pinchevski’s emphasis on the 
role of media is important, but he tends to return to the problem of external 
stimuli rather than internal identification. Both the psychological research of 
the 1960s and more recent research in trauma studies has repeatedly returned to 
Subincision. The following section considers how this film might also prompt us 
to reconsider the notion of symbolic wounds as a way of understanding media 
traumatization in digital culture.
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3. Roheim, Bettelheim and the Symbolic Wound
The psychological studies of the effects of Subincision did not consider cul-
tural factors as a defining influence on viewers’ response. Nor did they acknowl-
edge that the man who produced the film, Geza Roheim, was a close associate 
of Freud and that his study of initiation rituals in a tribal society was framed 
by Freudian theories of group identity. Roheim did his clinical training at the 
Budapest Institute of Psychoanalysis. His conception of “psychoanalytic an-
thropology” initially involved interpretations of folklore and mythologies, but 
his ethnographic fieldwork in the South Pacific between 1929 and 1931 led to 
specific studies of totemism in Australian Aboriginal culture. Roheim was heav-
ily influenced by Freud’s theory that the totem animal used in sacrificial ritual 
was a substitute for the primal father who had been murdered by the young 
males in the tribe, who were envious of his sexual power over women (Le Barre, 
1966: 272–281; Robinson, 1969: 74–146). The sense of shared guilt for this 
crime led to the establishment of the incest taboo (Freud, 1913). Without at-
tempting to resuscitate Freud’s theories of the primal horde, we must neverthe-
less acknowledge that the repeated use of this film opens up a range of questions 
about cultural identity, cross-cultural understanding and social belonging that 
have often been excluded from research on the media transmission of trauma. 
Mediated trauma is intrinsically bound to these questions.
Roheim’s psychoanalytic interpretations of myth and ritual were completely 
out of favour in the academic environment that later used his film of the sub-
incision rite to induce stress in viewers. An important difference between Ro-
heim’s interpretation and the psychological research that uses his film was that 
he sought to understand Aboriginal ritual (if only from a Eurocentric, evolu-
tionist perspective) whereas for these researchers in the 1960s both the cultural 
context and symbolic meaning were discounted in the research findings. The 
historical context for research on stress films would have to include the mass 
media of television and newspapers that, especially after the revelations of the 
Nazi death camps in 1945, made available more shocking and disturbing im-
ages that pre-war censorship did not allow. This media exposure to violence and 
catastrophe would further intensify as the 1960s progressed. This was also the 
era of Cold War ideology and propaganda, with its campaigns of fear about the 
bomb and mass destruction.  
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In his study of initiation rituals, Symbolic Wounds, Bruno Bettelheim dis-
cusses the use of subincision by the Arunta with specific reference to Roheim’s 
research. He argues against Roheim’s interpretation of the ritual as sadistically 
imposed by the male elders (as embodiments of the tribal superego) and argues 
instead that symbolic wounds also enhance cultural identity and empower the 
participant (Bettelheim, 1955: 124–125, 173–180). To support his argument 
Bettelheim cites an example from 1950s America:
“The contention that these physical traumata may be felt as painful but not 
as cruel, and hence not as traumata in the psychological sense, seems sup-
ported by the experience of persons undergoing cosmetic plastic surgery. 
Nobody I know has regarded such surgery as “cruel”; even the pain seems 
reduced by the desire with which the operations are approached.” (Bettel-
heim, 1955: 83)
Following the logic of Bettelheim’s argument one could also argue that the 
emphasis on the subincision ritual being distressing for Americans to watch fails 
to acknowledge the positive, enhancing value that the physical transformation 
has for its participants. As Bettelheim explained, initiation is not only endured 
and demanded by social hierarchies but is also invested with desire (1955: 93).
Bettelheim suggested an important perspective on the subincision ritual 
that has been ignored in the subsequent research that uses Roheim’s film. If 
the violence and pain shown in the film could be used to induce discomfort 
for viewers, then the affirmative value of the ritual for the participants in the 
film could also potentially be transferred onto the viewing experience. The 
viewer might endure the stress provoked by a film or media image as a means 
of self-transformation and group participation. This possibility is implied but 
not directly acknowledged in Hirsch’s discussion of Holocaust films: such visual 
documents can be used not only to transmit trauma but also in new contexts to 
affirm Jewish identity through collective acts of grieving (Hirsch, 2004: 17) (or 
to support more sinister identifications with the perpetrators). As viewers ne-
gotiate shocking images on the Internet or disseminated through social media, 
they can choose to engage with the image in ways that are no longer framed by 
the discourses of academic researchers, media professionals or politicians.
The second half of the twentieth century was characterized by the emer-
gence of narratives about collective identity linked with media images of war, 
atrocity, genocide and terror. The breakdown of visual taboos and the political 
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uses of fear and terror have been accompanied by the refashioning of national 
narratives around extreme events such as the Holocaust and 9/11 (Alexander, 
2012). In the twenty-first century digital technologies are reconfiguring this use 
of images and showing how smaller groups and communities can be empow-
ered rather than positioned as passive victims and docile subjects by corporate 
media or the state.
4. Digital Wounds: After 9/11
Digital media allow a proliferation of traumatic images that generate a mul-
tiplicity of competing discourses and identifications. Newspapers and network 
television are losing some of their monopoly on cultural trauma narratives. This 
development is not all good news. For example, although television and cinema 
have popularized the Holocaust as a cultural trauma, Internet users can more 
freely engage with ‘alternative’ narratives, such as Holocaust denial. A substan-
tial archive of video material on YouTube expounds conspiracy theories related 
to national traumas such as the assassination of J.F.K. or the 9/11 attacks. 
Universalizing claims about media traumatization are becoming less convinc-
ing due to growing evidence online that media images invite a wider range of 
responses and interpretations. 
When specific events, such as the 9/11 attacks, are given the status of 
‘traumatic’ for large populations, they are elevated from ‘just another’ image of 
death and suffering to a cause of psychological stress or a cultural and political 
crisis. The numerous video recordings made by ordinary citizens of the attacks 
were subsequently ‘captured’ by network television and orchestrated into a nar-
rative of national trauma.  Images of the attacks were re-played obsessively on 
television in the hours and weeks that followed them. This repetition helped to 
establish the events as a social wound inviting collective identification. These 
recordings, nevertheless, continue to have an afterlife on YouTube, revealing a 
range of responses to the unfolding events that includes not only distress but 
also conspiracy theorizing and even amusement.
Mitchell describes 9/11 as an attack on the collective nervous system, 
producing “a state of panic, anxiety, or depression, or even worse, in a psy-
chotic state, generating hallucinations and paranoid fantasies” (2011: 52). Here 
Mitchell ascribes a collective psychological state to the American people. But it 
would be more accurate to see what he calls a “war of images” as conforming to 
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a logic that is a long established feature of technologically mediated societies. 
The ISIS decapitation videos are a clear example of this logic: they present an 
image of otherness or barbarism, a kind of absolute threat to Western “civilized” 
values. Yet in their presentation styles, their use of digital cameras and editing, 
their production of high definition images and musical soundtracks etc., they 
participate in a visual language that is also used in advertising, music videos 
and numerous other audio-visual genres. They do not necessarily pose a trau-
matic intrusion into the collective nervous system or a penetration of collective 
psychological defences. Rather they participate in a cultural system of image 
consumption attracted and repelled by shock and voyeuristic fascination.  ISIS 
decapitation videos use ritual slaughter to make a symbolic challenge to West-
ern hegemony. The ‘correct’ response to these videos in the West is outrage and 
disgust. But these executions of hostages are performed in the name of many 
innocent victims of Western military interventions in the Middle East. The 
videos act out the traditional sovereign power of God and state and in doing so 
invite others to dedicate their lives to a political struggle. These images, deemed 
“traumatic” for Western viewers, can also be understood as symbolic wounds 
inviting positive identification for those who support physical violence as a 
challenge to Western interests and interventions in the Middle East. 
Images of violence and catastrophe are consumed, self-censored and ne-
gotiated as a regular occurrence for the contemporary media user. For most 
media users psychological defences are relatively secure unless the violence or 
catastrophe poses some immediate threat to their lives or loved ones. Discourses 
about the psychological vulnerability of large populations can be seen as part 
of the apparatus of surveillance (Meek, 2016: 145) but they also invite viewers 
to self-examine and regulate their consumption of stress-inducing images. In 
a neoliberal society where individuals are required to manage higher levels of 
risk and therefore also higher levels of fear and anxiety, the media user learns to 
monitor his/her own resilience, coping mechanisms and levels of distress. The 
assumption of research on media traumatization appears to be that it measures 
psychological damage and social cost. But shock and trauma can also be a ‘gain’, 
marking a transition into a new identity and increasing the power of the body 
and the group to sustain itself despite experiencing physical or psychological 
distress. 
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This potential for traumatic images to function as symbolic wounds mobi-
lizing political action became clear in the Arab Spring. In June 2009 Nedā Āghā 
Soltān was shot during election protests in Iran and her subsequent death, two 
minutes later, was recorded and posted on the Internet. She became an icon 
of the political struggle in Iran. In 2010 Khaled Said was beaten to death by 
police in Egypt. The image of his battered face was recorded on a mobile-phone 
camera by his brother and circulated to thousands of other phones. A Facebook 
group “We are all Khaled Said” was also established (Howard & Hussain, 2011: 
38). The new digital image-producing technologies and social networks allowed 
traumatic images to challenge the authority of the Arab states. The violence per-
petrated by the state against the people could be transformed by digital media 
into symbolic wounds mobilizing struggles for democracy. Established media, 
particularly the Al Jazeera television network, also played important roles in 
these political movements. But it was mobile cameras that made it possible for 
ordinary citizens to capture and circulate traumatic images in ways that eluded 
the control of the state (Khondker, 2011: 678).
Distinctions between victim, perpetrator, witness and bystander remain 
important for understanding the shifting subject positions of traumatic identi-
fication (Kaplan, 2005: 2), but the relations between these different positions 
can be complex. To support acts of violence and their technological recording 
and transmission for political purposes requires identification not only with the 
perpetrators, but also with those other victims in whose name the violence is 
perpetrated. Recording and transmitting images of suffering and death may be 
done out of sympathy with the victims, but can also be used to justify further 
acts of violence. Looking at any image of violence and suffering may be driven 
by mere curiosity or voyeuristic desire. What the term “symbolic wound” po-
tentially contributes to our understanding of this shifting dynamic of suffering, 
perpetrating and witnessing is that wounds have symbolic currency, transmit-
ting cultural meanings about social membership. The meaning of pain is not 
‘traumatic’ in any single sense but is unstable and transformative. To under-
stand mediated trauma we need to move beyond the fundamental distinction 
between who induces and who suffers pain. Once violence and suffering are 
recorded and transmitted to viewers the images enter a new symbolic economy 
that allows for various positions of identification, interpretation and responsive 
action.
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In America digital media have also made more visible the violence perpe-
trated by the state against African Americans. In 2016, the shooting and killing 
by police of Alton Sterling in Louisiana and Philando Castile in Minnesota 
were both recorded on mobile-phone cameras and posted on social media, 
again leading to widespread protest and further violence. Castile’s actual death 
was streamed “live” on Facebook by his partner Diamond Reynolds. The pro-
tests against the killings of African Americans by police have become associated 
with the increasing public visibility of Black Lives Matter (BLM), a civil rights 
movement that began on Facebook in 2013. This use of communication tech-
nologies made visible to a potentially unlimited viewing public what many had 
known about for decades. The killing of African Americans by police, whether 
judged lawful or not, acts out the state’s power over life and death. The videos 
that show this exercise of state power provoke others to challenge the legitimacy 
of this violence. As a contemporary civil rights movement BLM is distinguished 
from its forerunners by its dissociation from established organizations like the 
church and Democratic Party and by its lack of reliance on charismatic leaders 
such as Martin Luther King or Jesse Jackson. BLM is a decentralized movement 
that emphasizes localized action but, as in the Arab Spring, it retains links with 
corporate media. Celebrity singer Beyoncé posted messages about the shootings 
of Sterling and Castile on her website and “Black Lives Matter” appears as graf-
fiti in her “Formation” music video. The movement has spread to other coun-
tries, for example Australia, where it addresses similar issues for Aborigines. 
5. Conclusions
The dominance of centrally controlled media such as newspapers, cinema 
and television made possible the wide dissemination of narratives about col-
lective trauma that were linked to specific images such as those of the Nazi 
death camps or the Vietnam War. The 9/11 attacks saw a transition to a new 
multiplicity of recordings of the event made by ordinary citizens that were later 
orchestrated in presentations by television news and documentary. More recent 
developments such as the Arab Spring, the emergence of Black Lives Matter 
as an international movement, and the propaganda videos produced by ISIS, 
show that ‘traumatic’ images can be captured by groups and used to mobilize 
political struggles that challenge hegemonic power.
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Psychological research on media traumatization involved deliberately in-
ducing stress by showing violent and taboo images to unprepared audiences. 
This research was extended to entire populations after the 9/11 attacks.  Psy-
choanalytic perspectives on the transmission of trauma using photographs 
and audio-visual media suggest a more complex understanding of cultural 
identification.  Academic developments informed by psychoanalysis in trauma 
and Holocaust studies, however, have often tended to reproduce the model of 
trauma as external stimuli impacting on viewers. Developments in digital cul-
ture allow us to see a more proactive production and mobilizing of traumatic 
images by a more diverse range of individuals and groups. The idea of ‘symbolic 
wounds’ as a means of self-transformation and group participation may offer a 
useful corrective to the dominant idea of cultural trauma.
Individual media users and social networks share potentially shocking or 
disturbing images as a means of constructing social identity. What research 
in the 1960s called stressful can now be seen as enhancing knowledge, social 
participation and pleasure. Modern visual media has played a significant role in 
redefining political identity through images of violence and catastrophe. Digital 
media technologies are enabling new modes of social and political participation 
in which ‘traumatic’ images define what constitutes a threat, what is permissible 
to look at, what can be endured and what can mobilize collective identification 
and political struggle. 
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The Other Self in Free Fall:  




Abstract: Recent scholarship on the rise of automated self-tracking has focused on 
how technologies such as the Fitbit and applications such as Nike+ demand that the 
user internalize the logic of contemporary surveillance. These studies emphasize the dis-
ciplinary structure of self-tracking – noting that these applications rely on logics of self-
control, flexibility and quantification to produce particular neoliberal subjects. Follow-
ing these readings, this paper considers the central role that anxiety plays in motivating, 
and maintaining, the subject’s desire to understand the self through automated tracking 
systems. I will elaborate on this anxiety in three defined sections. Firstly, I will provide a 
brief overview of the relationship between anxiety and affect developed in both Freud’s 
and Lacan’s work on anxiety. Secondly, I will consider how the particular aesthetic 
principles of two applications, the Nike+ running application and the Spire breath 
monitoring application, afford the production of anxious digital selves by drawing on 
the emerging digital aesthetic of the free-fall in order to create a simultaneous distancia-
tion and conflation of the embodied self and the digital self. Finally, I will consider how 
self-tracking applications represent a particular affective loop, fuelled by the subject’s 
insatiable jouissance, which drives a never-ending anxious attempt to reunite the subject 
and object. Ultimately, it is from within these practices of digital self-construction that 
we can most clearly identify both an everyday anxiety of the self and emergent subjectiv-
ity and aesthetic of the present.
Keywords: anxiety, affect theory, automation, self-tracking, quantified self, aesthetics
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‘That’s not it’ is the very cry by which the 
jouissance obtained is distinguished from the 
jouissance expected (Lacan, 1998: 111).
1. Introduction
The beginning of the Quantified Self movement is commonly attributed to 
the publication of a widely circulated 2010 editorial by Gary Wolf in The New 
York Times Magazine. In this article, “The Data-Driven Life”, Wolf sets out 
the general idea for a new form of living guided by the numeric possibilities of 
emerging tracking applications. These applications, he explains, allow for an in-
creasing quantification of our personal lives as, “Sleep, exercise, sex, food, mood, 
location, alertness, productivity, even spiritual well-being are being tracked and 
measured, shared and displayed” (Wolf, 2010). While Wolf was writing prior 
to the arrival of many of the most popular tracking applications available today, 
basic tools such as the FitBit, Nike+ and Garmin Running Trackers, and even 
rudimentary digital pedometers, would all be clear examples of the many tech-
nologies of the quantified self. From within this ever-increasing field of tracking 
applications and personal data, Wolf argues that the Quantified Self movement 
offers an opening for self-understanding: it transforms the banal everyday into 
a matrix of information and infographics, and it presents the subject with the 
visual means to apprehend the self. This chain – from data collection to visual 
representation – is what ultimately connects many diverse applications within 
the category of the Quantified Self. As Whitson explains, “The unifying meth-
odology of QS [the Quantified Self ] is data collection, followed by visualization 
of these data and cross referencing, in order to discover correlations and modify 
behavior” (Whitson, 2014: 346).
There is then a particular gap that is always-already proposed in the Quanti-
fied Self movement wherein the subject necessarily separates, and aestheticizes, 
an image of the self as an object. This gap is clearly articulated as a type of in-
scription – a movement where the self is written and reproduced as the object 
of inquiry. The practice of writing the self is not a particularly new one; rather, 
as Foucault explained, it can be seen in the journaling practices of first and 
second century Rome (Foucault, 1997: 207). From within these practices it be-
comes apparent that inscription functions in both the role of the Other for the 
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singular subject and as a mode of entry into the depths of the self, as Foucault 
makes clear how writing reveals “the practice of ascesis as work not just on ac-
tions but, more precisely, on thought: the constraint that the presence of others 
exerts in the domain of conduct, writing will exert in the domain of the inner 
impulses of the soul” (Foucault, 1997: 208). The space developed through in-
scription – whether it be created through the self-reflective practice of journal-
ing or through the automated writing of the tracking app – reveals an attempt 
to distance the self from the self, to transform the subject into an object, and to 
discipline, and aestheticize, our own selves. 
Importantly though, the difference between the journal and the tracking 
app is a profound one: the application is itself automated and self-producing. 
Where the journal involves a necessary step back, an ongoing negotiation be-
tween the subject and its imagined ideal self that might be best understood 
as the therapeutic construct of the subject as object, the tracking application 
does this work of distanciation and evaluation for the subject. In this way, the 
emergence of the quantified self involves new forms of subject production, new 
affective regimes of experience and new aesthetics to match our altering sense 
of ourselves. How, we might ask, does automation rewrite our experiences 
of therapy? How does affect circulate through automated asocial, and social, 
networks?2 How does it blur the lines between the subject and object? Between 
the self and other? How does the image of the self emerge when this image is 
tagged, tracked, circulated and reproduced on different screens? If, as Lacan has 
made clear in his work on the Mirror Stage, we find the image of our ideal self 
in the ambient experience of the world and the knowing gazes of the Other, 
how might these mechanisms be transformed by their digital and automated 
reconstruction? 
It is from within these questions that this paper finds its genesis. Put simply, 
I argue that what is revealed in the attempts to aestheticize the self through 
tracking applications is a novel anxious subjectivity of the digital era. If, as 
Lacan has argued in the recent English translation of his seminar on Anxiety, 
“There is no auto-analysis, even when one imagines there is. The Other is there” 
(Lacan, 2014: 22), then much of the power of self-tracking lies in its ability to 
blur the lines between subject and object, to allow the subject a sense of mastery 
of the self, and to create the illusion of auto-analysis. Inscription, as the mode 
2   For a discussion on the relationship between automaticy and affect theory, see Blackwell, 2014
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through which this sense of division is created, provides a conduit for the pro-
duction of anxious objects and, rather than quelling the subject’s uncertainty, 
it is in this perceived mastery of the self that anxiety develops further. In this 
way, the automated tracking application constructs a type of secondary self, a 
projected digital self that is both the object of anxiety and the object-cause of 
desire – one and the same in Lacan’s reading of anxiety (Lacan, 2014: 40). 
2. Anxiety’s Objects, or, Anxiety as Affect
In order to make sense of the particular contemporary moment, to try and 
tease out the illusory therapeutic logic of the self-tracking application that is 
couched in this larger history of writing, separating and mastering the self, it is 
worthwhile returning to another historic construct that blurs the lines between 
the self and its other, namely, psychoanalysis’ intertwined relationship with anx-
iety and affect. This relationship begins close to where it will end in this paper, 
with a declarative uncertainty that, as revealed in Sigmund Freud’s “The Prob-
lem of Anxiety”, explains that, “Anxiety, then, is in the first place something 
felt. We call it an affective state although we are equally ignorant of what an 
affect is” (Freud, 1936: 69). For Freud then, anxiety is necessarily affective, but 
the true meaning of this feeling, and of affects in general, remains almost pur-
posefully unclear. Likewise, Lacan’s 1962 seminar on anxiety offers little in the 
way of a taxonomy or rigid definition of affect and instead presents us with only 
an explanation of what affect is not: “It is not Being given in its immediacy, nor 
is it the subject in raw form either. It is in no respect protopathic. My occasional 
remarks on affect amount to nothing but that” (Lacan, 2014: 14). For Lacan, 
affect is felt but not experienced by the senses, it is necessarily unknown, and it 
is not tied clearly to the subject proper. This negative definition is paralleled in 
his reading of contemporaneous research on affect that he catalogues as being 
based either on analogy or categorization (Lacan, 2014: 19–20). Categorization 
lumps together varying affects within specific categories whereas analogical re-
search compares the function of affect across different levels of biology, sociality 
or psychology. Both, he argues, fail to grasp the nature of affect. 
Rather than categorizing or comparing, affect is best understood for Lacan 
as the function of the key in which “The key is the thing that unlocks and, in 
unlocking, functions.” (2014: 21). In his habitually paradoxical language here, 
Lacan’s argument is quite simply that affect reinforces itself by being generative; 
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affect is both a cause and effect, it circulates and regenerates through its circula-
tion. As such, Lacan understands affect as less specific, and more atmospheric, 
than categorical or analogical research would allow. Affect is something both 
within and without the subject; it is, he argues, “…unfastened, it drifts about. 
It can be found displaced, maddened, inverted, or metabolized, but it isn’t 
repressed” (2014: 14). Here Lacan is in agreement with much contemporary 
work; affect is found in the social, it affects us, it pushes us, it moves bodies 
and compels motion.3 Where he veers off course from much of the current 
thought on affect, and where the anxiety of affect theory (or anxiety in gener-
ally) actually emerges is in affect’s relationship with language. As he explains, if 
affect is unfastened and never repressed, “What are repressed are the signifiers 
that moor it” (2014: 14). Following Lacan’s work on the relationship between 
language and desire, we see here the emergence of a logic that will run through 
the remainder of his seminar on anxiety: if affects are unfastened, drifting and 
atmospheric, and the signifiers that we use to describe them are repressed, and 
if anxiety is an affect, then we cannot understand anxiety in the words we use 
to describe it. Rather, we must look to anxiety’s objects for a sense of direction.
In his own search for anxiety’s peculiar object, Freud’s final influential theo-
ry of anxiety, from Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926), makes explicit the 
connection between anxiety and affect.4 As an affect, Freud identifies anxiety 
as a signal and as a response from the ego to danger that produces particular 
symptoms and inhibitions. Importantly, the danger-situation to which anxiety 
responds is largely based on early childhood traumas, and for Freud, the help-
lessness of birth acts as a prototype for anxiety.5 The helplessness of being born, 
of being torn away from the mother and thrown into the air, initiates an undy-
ing desire for love in the subject. As Freud explains, “The biological factor of 
helplessness thus brings into being the first situations of danger and creates the 
need to be loved which the human being is destined never to renounce” (1926: 
3   In “Intensities of Feeling: Towards a Spatial Politics of Affect” Thrift outlines four major schools of affect theory 
– phenomenological/embodied, psychoanalytic, Spinozian/Deleuzian, and Darwinian – all united by the fact that 
each of them, “depends on a sense of push in the world.” (Thrift, 2004: 64).  
4   Freud offered two distinct theories of anxiety throughout his work. The first, from 1895, largely identifies anxiety 
with an accumulation of energy generated from failed sexual experience. The second, from 1921, posits that anxiety 
is a particular signal for the imminent arrival of a dangerous situation.
5  Freud is both rejecting, and building atop of, Otto Rank’s theory that anxiety is based fundamentally on birth. 
While Freud is sympathetic to this idea, he sees birth not as the initial anxious situation, but rather as prototypical 
affective state that changes over the life course. See Freud, 1926: 152 for a clear explanation.
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99). This desire for love that is initiated alongside a prototype for the anxious 
moment is ultimately opened up by, not so much the unknown of the world, 
but the absent. Corporeal, biological and psychic helplessness, all experienced 
at birth and repeated again and again throughout life, work in tandem with 
the absent object of desire to meld phobia/desire/anxiety into an inextricable 
knot. Freud isolates three particular early childhood phobias, “being left alone, 
being in the dark, and finding a strange person in place of the one in whom the 
child has confidence (the mother)” (1926: 75), as being key to anxiety, as they 
replicate this particular feeling of helplessness in tandem with a moment of loss. 
That is, each of these moments reveals the helplessness that is felt in the loss of 
the object of desire.6  Anxiety then is not just without an object, it is located in 
the very helplessness of this without-ness, in the very possibility of loss itself. 
Anxiety in this reading ultimately produces repression – it pushes back as 
a type of defence to the danger-situation of loss and represses these original 
traumas. Thus it works as a signal that invites investigation to locate the root 
cause of its origins. Lacan’s reading of anxiety follows Freud’s affective base 
but eschews Freud’s desire to unearth, through language, a solution to anxiety. 
Rather, Lacan looks towards anxiety’s particular inexpressible qualities to fur-
ther understand the equally inexpressible cause of desire. Here Lacan reverses 
one of Freud’s original ideas. Where Freud defines anxiety in opposition to fear, 
as it has “…a quality of indefiniteness and lack of object” (Freud, 1895: 100), 
Lacan declares that anxiety “…is not without an object” (Lacan, 2014: 89). This 
seemingly simple reversal makes use of a litote, a negation aimed to produce its 
inverse, to amplify the importance of anxiety’s object into something more than 
a simple object. As Lacan explains: 
“This relation of being not without having doesn’t mean that one knows 
which object is involved. When I say, He’s not without resources, He’s not 
without cunning, it means, at least for me, that his resources are obscure, his 
cunning isn’t run of the mill.” (2014: 89) 
6  The link between birth, helplessness and desire for the mother is, of course, well established within Freud’s psychic 
universe. The biological role played by the mother in maintaining sustenance is repeated in Freud’s psychic economy 
as a link between anxiety, helplessness and desire that is obviously reminiscent of Irigaray’s reading of Heidegger’s ab-
sent women and air. As Freud writes, “The striking coincidence that both birth anxiety and the anxiety of the infant 
alike claim separation from the mother as their prerequisite needs no psychological interpretation; it is simply that 
the mother, who in the beginning had satisfied all the needs of the foetus through her body mechanisms, continues 
after birth as well to exercise in some measure this same function, although by other means” (Freud, 1926: 77).
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To be not without an object reveals the object as something opaque and 
obscure; the object is there, but unknown and perhaps unknowable. The re-
lationship between anxiety, affect and language is made more clear here as it 
begins to line up with what Lacan calls the objet petit a – the object-cause of 
desire. Put simply, for Lacan the object of anxiety and the object of desire are 
one and the same. 
Throughout his seminar on anxiety, Lacan makes clear that the objet petit 
a is a type of trace, a remainder, from the subject’s encounters between the im-
aginary and symbolic realms (Lacan, 2014: 62–64). Just as the objet petit a is 
inscribed in the image of the whole self first encountered in the mirror stage – 
an image that Lacan poignantly reminds us is always confirmed by the Other in 
the infant’s quick sideways glance over its shoulder – its transition to the object 
of anxiety relies on this central location within the self. It is in this movement 
that the subject looks to the Other for confirmation that we can see the logic 
and structure of desire and anxiety where, as Lacan explains, “…with this nu-
tating movement of the head, which turns towards the adult as if to call upon 
his assent, and then back to the image, he seems to be asking the one support-
ing him, who here represents the big Other, to ratify the value of this image” 
(Lacan, 2014: 32). Ratifying the value of this image – seeing the whole self and 
then looking over at the Other to confirm this wholeness – instigates the cycle 
of desire and anxiety where the objet petit a, this remainder from the imaginary 
whole self that we can never realize, is displaced and thought to be found in 
the Other. Desire is transposed onto the Other, when ultimately the objet petit 
a is in fact the subject.  In this way, we are our own objects of desire, our own 
objects of anxiety, but we look towards the Other for satisfaction.7 
This chain is an endless one. The object of desire is the impossibly whole 
self, forever lost when the imaginary realm is drawn into the symbolic and at-
tached to the field of the Other. Anxiety enters into this chain as a different 
object, one that works:
“By the model of the cut, of the furrow, of the unary train, of the there it is, 
which in operating always remain tight-lipped – the tight lip or lips of the 
cut – which become a closed book on the subject, unopened letters sending 
him off again under closed seal to further traces.” (Lacan, 2014: 76). 
7   Lacan makes this relationship clear in the final lecture of this seminar, explaining that, “The sole path on which de-
sire can furnish us with that wherein we shall have to recognize our selves as object a – in so far as, at the end-point, 
an end-point that is doubtless never reached, it is our most radical existence – only opens up by situating the a as 
such in the field of the Other” (Lacan, 2014: 337).
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It is, in this sense, an object that emerges where there should be none. The 
uncertainty of the object is understood as a type of furrow of still closed lips; it 
is, as Renata Salecl has made clear, “not the lack, but rather the absence of lack, 
i.e. the fact that where there is supposed to be lack, some object is present” (Sa-
lecl, 2004: 14). The object is an opening in the liminal points of contact with 
the Other, where we encounter the furrowed lips of the Other and, expecting to 
see a lack that mirrors our own, we instead encounter a crack in the realm of the 
symbolic; we encounter something. Anxiety’s object becomes overwhelming in 
these moments precisely because it is a type of potentiality within the world of 
language where, “Signifiers turn the world into a network of traces in which the 
transition from one cycle to another is thenceforth possible” (Lacan, 2014: 76). 
 It is in this position of transition, as the furrow before the opening, as the 
cleave in the lips that opens to further language, that anxiety’s affective role is 
made clear. As Lacan further argues, anxiety is a type of presentiment, a before 
that opens up to a coming experience:  
“Anxiety is this cut – this clean cut without which the presence of the 
signifier, its functioning, its furrow in the real, is unthinkable – it’s the 
cut that opens up, affording a view of what now you can hear better, the 
unexpected, the visit, the piece of news, that which is so well expressed in 
the term presentiment, which isn’t simply to be heard as the premonition of 
something, but also as the pre-feeling, the pre-sentiment, that which stands 
prior to the first appearance of a feeling.” (2014: 76)
The formula at work here – that anxiety is a type of presentiment, a pre-
feeling felt before a feeling is known or describable – is clearly drawn from its 
status as an affect. As an affect, this sense lines up with much contemporary 
work where, for example, “…affect is what makes feelings feel. It is what deter-
mines the intensity (quantity) of a feeling (quality)…” (Shouse, 2005) and it is 
here that anxiety’s radical relationship to affect should be rethought as, what is 
revealed in the anxious moment is affect’s force as a type of predisposition, and 
further, affect’s force as that which structures our approach to an object. 
In particular, to return to Lacan’s equation of the object of anxiety with the 
object of desire, it is necessary to remind ourselves that the petit object a is, “…
to be conceived of as the cause of desire…the object [that] lies behind desire” 
(2014: 101). As the object of desire and the object of anxiety are one and the 
same in Lacan’s reading, what is revealed here is that both anxiety and desire 
are affects that emerge from within the space of the subject, and further, that 
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both anxiety and desire are affects that propel us forward into the world. We 
are pushed forward in pursuit of our desires and we experience anxiety precisely 
at the moment where we encounter the objects of this desire.8 The result is an 
affective loop, a continuous circle, an unending pursuit of jouissance and of das 
Ding.9 This pursuit is one that necessarily goes unfulfilled, as Adrian Johnstone 
has made clear:
“The ‘jouissance expected’ is an illusory, mythicized ‘full satisfaction,’ 
namely, the re-finding of das Ding, the decisive final quelling of the inces-
sant clamoring of the drives. However, what the subject always gets (i.e. the 
‘jouissance obtained’) is, at best, a pleasure that falls short of the idealized 
standard.” (Johnston, 2002)
In place of fulfillment, the pursuit of jouissance will always fail to satisfy 
us. As we approach the petit objet a, as we are propelled forward to what we 
imagine as our ideal selves revealed through the other, we are struck by anxiety. 
What, we might wonder, would it mean to encounter ourselves? What would it 
mean to finish the project of the self? In this possibility of lack fulfilled, in the 
possibility of a lack of lack, we encounter anxiety’s object. Like das ding itself, 
the centrality of anxiety’s object is also its very exclusion.10 In this way, anxiety 
is best understood as an affect, as that which guides and directs our approach 
to our selves and our objects of desire. Just as the satisfaction of jouissance is 
endlessly deferred for another object, anxiety endlessly defers its own object. 
Anxiety functions as both an opening and impediment then – it emerges along-
side desire to move the subject forward, but it equally emerges as this desire is 
necessarily impeded and unfulfilled. As we approach ourselves in writing and in 
language, as we begin to track ourselves and automate our writing, we consist-
ently fail to grasp that whole self and are left anxious and incomplete. 
8  A brief note to thank the anonymous reviewer who made this important distinction clear. In as much as the object of 
desire and the object of anxiety are equated in Lacan’s seminar on Anxiety, it is necessary to make explicit the role of 
jouissance in this relationship as it helps to understand the habitual drive of anxiety and, for my own work, it helps 
to understand the ongoing repetitions of digital technologies.
9  Lacan introduces his reading of das Ding as a particularly affective object in Seminar VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 
where he notes that this object is one that functions beyond the signified and is, “characterized by primary affect 
prior to any repression” (Lacan, 1992: 54). That is, like anxiety’s affective relationship, das Ding is necessarily outside 
of, or before, language. It is an affect prior to significations repression.
10  This paradoxical situation is made clear by Lacan when he notes of his own diagrams of das Ding, “Simply by writ-
ing it on the board and putting das Ding at the center, with the subjective world of the unconscious organized in a 
series of signifying relations around it, you can see the difficulty of topographical representation. The reason is that 
das Ding is at the center only in the sense  that it is excluded” (Lacan, 1992: 71).
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3. In Free Fall: Self-Tracking and Anxious Aesthetics
3.1. Case 1: The Nike+ Running App
Opening up the Nike+ Running App reveals a specific sociality to self-
tracking, an Other that is always projected onto the screen alongside the self. 
The launch screen is a top-down image of a pack of runners moving forward 
(See Image 1), the home screen gives a cumulative total of your statistics (num-
ber of runs, total miles run, Nike fuel consumed) and a list of the recent totals 
of any other contacts who use the app (See Image 2), and the menu screen fol-
Image 1: Opening Screen  
of Nike+
Image 2: Comparison  
with Other Users
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lowing any run offers a number of ways to 
share your statistics on social media.11 This 
sociality is both central to, and masked by, 
the app’s tracking functions: by using both 
the GPS monitors and the accelerometers 
and gyroscopes built into contemporary 
smart phones, the app is able to keep a con-
stant record of your movement; it is able to 
constantly and automatically write your self 
and to track that self against an Other.
From within the application, a couple 
of small taps will draw on this self-writing 
to give further visual details regarding the 
specifics of each run. Going over my own 
recent history, I click on a run from May 
13th, 2016 and I get to see a map of my 
route, a reminder of the too-many-miles 
run in the same old pair of shoes, and a 
smiley – in this case not quite smiling or 
frowning – that announces how I felt that 
day. (See Image 3). Like the launch screen 
that opens the app with an image of a pack 
of runners taken from above, in these visual representations of physical activity 
the experience is transformed from something corporeal to something top-
down and cartographic: the feeling of the street is replaced by the knowledge 
of the map. In this way, the Nike+ Running app splits the user into two parts: 
subject and object, user and data, self and other.  
In so doing, the app draws on an emergent aesthetic of urbanism and digital 
space. This aesthetic is not the one defined by De Certeau’s (1984) traditional 
binary of the street and the bird’s eye view, but rather it pulls on the surveil-
lance view from nowhere and everywhere, from satellite images and Google 
maps, and from the amorphous network of images consumed everyday on 
11  Within the larger logic of cross-platform synergy, Nike has developed a proprietary energy measuring unit - Nike-
Fuel - to replace calories across its many different applications. Nike fuel works then as a “universal way to measure 
all kinds of activity - from your morning workout to your big night out” (“What is Nike Fuel?”, 2016) that functions 
and syncs across multiple applications.
Image 3: Map of Recent Run
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smart phones and tablet screens.12 This new view and emerging aesthetic is most 
clearly defined in Hito Steyerl’s article “In Free Fall: A Thought Experiment on 
Vertical Perspective” wherein she follows the rise of new satellite and tracking 
imagery against the withering horizon of linear perspective to note that, “for 
many people today the simulated grounds of aerial imagery provide an illusion-
ary tool of orientation in a condition in which horizons have, in fact, been shat-
tered” (Steyerl, 2011). A sense of control and stability is given over to the user 
in these cartographic moments as they come to mask the fact that, “Time is out 
of joint and we no longer know whether we are objects or subjects as we spiral 
down in an imperceptive free fall” (Steyerl, 2011). This logic is clear in the mo-
ment when any given run is open on the Nike+ app. The cartographic image 
begins with a quick animation, a slow rotation and zoom in on the space of the 
map that mirrors the more familiar animation used by Google maps when a 
user shifts from street view back to a top down map. 
In this way, Nike+ capitalizes on both the free-fall of our contemporary mo-
ment and the sense of control given over to surveillant and top-down imaging. 
On the one hand, the app invites the user to move away from the embodied 
sensation of running by replicating the slide from the street to the satellite, a 
slide that has become a familiar sensation in the contemporary moment and 
thus draws on its users’ knowledge and comfort with their own digital selves. 
On the other hand, the application always necessarily conflates the subject-
on-the-screen with the subject-in-the-flesh through a combination of what 
Alexander Galloway has referred to as the diegetic and non-diegetic aspects of 
video game action where the diegetic action advances the first-person narrative 
of the game and the non-diegetic, off the screen action, of the user establishes 
the conditions of game play (Galloway, 2006: 6–8). Together then, it is in the 
embodied action of the runner that the narrative of Nike+ unfolds as each 
physical step taken and mile run allows the application to accumulate numeric 
values and, simultaneously, with each topographic representation of a previous 
step the application posits both a stable ground and a stable self over which the 
user has both distance and mastery. 
Thus, the Nike+ application blurs the line between the user and their image, 
between the self and its object, through a repeated conflation of the physicality 
of the subject and object alongside a repeated distanciation of these two forms. 
This repetition of conflation and distanciation of subject and object, of self and 
12   For De Certeau’s different views of the city, see De Certeau, 1984: 93–95.
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self-image, is itself mirrored in the affectivity of anxiety in psychoanalysis. Where 
Freud sees anxiety’s affective power located in the potential loss of an object, in 
the space of without-ness, we can see this anxiety within the separation of the self 
and its screen-based object. And where Lacan sees anxiety in the very presence of 
the anxious object, in the space filled by the Other where there should be none, 
we can see the anxiety produced through the repeated conflation of our digital-
self with our embodied self. That is, in the very moment where the application 
proposes the equivalency of the data produced on the screen and the embodied 
self, we encounter ourselves on the screen and we encounter the Other, in the 
form of automated writing that confirms our digital selves, in the data we have 
produced. The screen becomes a liminal space in this reading - it is the place of 
contact between two parallel selves and, in the vocabulary of the Mirror Stage, 
it is both the mirror and the glance over the shoulder. Anxiety emerges precisely 
in this moment where we expect to find a gap, a lack that is common to the self 
and the Other, but instead we encounter a confirmation of the relationship be-
tween the diegetic and the non-diegetic; we encounter an object, a complete self 
confirmed in data, where there should be none. 
3.2. Case 2: The Spire Breath
Equally though, we see this anxiety producing distanciation and conflation 
of the self repeated in the aesthetic constructions of a multitude of other self-
tracking applications. The Spire breath tracking application provides perhaps 
the clearest example of this automated anxiety as it uses a separate monitor to 
track the non-diegetic breaths of the subject-in-the-flesh for any symptoms of 
emotional discord in order to advance the diegetic imagery of the subject-on-
the-screen. Spire, an application that aims to help its users breathe better in or-
der to “unlock the ability to control our emotions, fears, and keep a clear mind” 
(“Spire”, 2016) works by having the user wear a small monitor that keeps real 
time statistics of their breathing rates and a log of all of their previous breathing 
habits (See Image 4). Under Spire’s guise, even habitual breathing can become 
a habit to work on and, when a user begins to speed up their breathing, the ap-
plication alerts them to their developing corporeal stress and invites a conscious 
intervention.13 In this way, Spire functions as a type of pre-sentiment; as a warn-
ing symbol of upcoming anxiety. 
13  Habit plays an important role here as the repetition sought by the user of self-tracking applications is, of course, 
essential to the collection of data for the producers of these applications. For more on the relationship between habit 
and data, see Chun (2016: 372). 
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In this space, anxiety takes on a spe-
cific form of futurity that mirrors Freud’s 
reading of a central symptom of anxiety, 
anxious expectation, which he describes 
in a series of gendered examples: 
“A woman, for instance, who suffers 
from anxious expectation will think of 
influenzal pneumonia every time her 
husband coughs when he has a cold, 
and, in her mind’s eye, will see his fu-
neral go past; if, when she is coming 
towards the house, she sees two people 
standing by her front door, she cannot 
avoid thinking that one of her children 
has fallen out of the window; when she 
hears the bell ring, it is someone bring-
ing news of a death, and so on – while 
on all these occasions there has been 
no particular ground for exaggerating a 
mere possibility.” (Freud, 1926: 92)
Just as Freud’s expectant subject invites anxiety through a specific orien-
tation – through a mode of apprehending the world that always opens to a 
catastrophic future – the Spire breathing app positions anxiety as an expectant 
state. That is, it posits the body as an alarm for arising anxiety that the subject 
can ultimately control. Spire’s claim to therapeutic power comes from a deeply 
cognitive understanding of the ability of the mind to control the body then, as 
their promotional website explains, “Respiration is the only autonomic func-
tion you have control over” (“Spire”, 2016), and it thus aims to transform anxi-
ety into actionable data for the subject. As anxiety emerges as data the subject is 
invited to address its habitual nature, to track out the patterns, similarities and 
geographies of their anxiety and to seize control of these habits. 
Curiously though, this cognitivist approach ultimately returns to the affec-
tive nature of anxiety. As Freud again makes clear, the slide between objects in 
Image 4: Spire Breathing Log
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the moment of anxious expectation, the movement from a cough to influenza 
and from a doorbell to death, is a transformative one that reveals the atmospher-
ic nature of anxiety; it is, he writes, as if “a quantum of anxiety in a freely floating 
space is present, which, where there is expectation, controls the choice of ideas 
and is always ready to link itself with any suitable ideational content” (Freud, 
1926: 92). From within this quantum of free-floating anxiety we see that the af-
fective and predictive power of anxiety comes from its role as a pre-sentiment: it 
emerges prior to its objects, it is an orientation and an approach to the world. 
Following this, as research into the slide between anxiety and anxiety disorders 
has routinely shown, there is a clear form of embodiment where the anxious 
subject is overly aware of their own anxiety and Spire, in its constant system 
of monitoring and alerting, externalizes and visualizes this anxious orientation 
as a data set.14 Thus, in the logic of the Spire breathing application, the experi-
ence of anxiety is predictive as both a data set – it is trackable, monitorable and 
understood as preventable – and as an affect – it is a looping pre-sentiment that 
reproduces anxious expectations and anxious orientations. 
In order to assure its users that Spire can ultimately interrupt the recurrent 
anxieties that the application is itself visualizing, Spire relies on a topographic 
record for the user – it pinpoints the location of an anxious moment and repre-
sents that back to the user as a GPS located dot on the map (See Image 5) – to 
provide a sense of distanciation and objectification from the self. Just as Nike+ 
relies on blurring the lines between subject and object through both a confla-
tion and distanciation of the two, Spire equally transposes the automaticity of 
affect and anxiety into the control of cartography. This slide, from the run to 
the satellite and from the breath to the map, operates like the function of the key 
in Lacan’s reading of anxiety in that it is both in line with the emergent digital 
aesthetic of self-tracking and is constantly creating and enacting the very mode 
of aestheticization that has developed in response to these same technologies. 
In this way, Spire’s ability to track the autonomic functions of the body and 
to transform these functions into a data set that offers the promise of control 
reveals the anxiety of a broader contemporary moment – it reveals how the ha-
bituated and repetitive conflation of the digital and embodied self, the unend-
ing movement between subject and object, opens up to a new digital aesthetic 
marked by a sense of in-betweenness and an ongoing free-fall. 
14  As Clark and Beck have made clear, “Individuals prone to panic are oriented toward selectively attending to internal 
somatic or mental processes…The orienting mode in panic disorder is primed towards rapid detection of interocep-
tive cues that could represent an immediate and imminent danger to survival” (Clark & Beck, 2010: 289).
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The decision to offer satellite visions 
of anxious moments and miles run of-
fered by both Spire and Nike+ works 
specifically within this digital aesthetic 
as it attempts to transform the perpetual 
sense of movement and free-fall into the 
uncertain possibility of stability. That is, 
these applications draw on our grow-
ing familiarity and comfort with seeing 
the world from above to replicate our 
belief in the stability of the ground and 
to confirm the stability of the self in the 
world. Again, as Steyerl has argued, this 
view functions through the supposition 
of stability while, in fact, it moves sub-
jectivity away from the ground and into 
the liminal space of the screen: 
“…many of the aerial views, 3D nose-
dives, Google Maps, and surveillance 
panoramas do not actually portray a sta-
ble ground. Instead, they create a sup-
position that it exists in the first place. Retroactively, this virtual ground creates 
a perspective of overview and surveillance for a distanced, superior, spectator 
safely floating up in the air…This establishes a new visual normality – a new 
subjectivity folded into surveillance technology and screen-based distraction.” 
(Steyerl, 2011)
The stable ground of Google Maps and surveillance panoramas is less illu-
sion than it is uncertainty here; it is not false, but it is not consistent either. In 
Steyerl’s reading, this emergent digital aesthetic of the free-fall is built on an 
ever-present anxiety and an ever-present supposition of stability.15
15   Steyerl presents this particular aesthetic against a longer historical backdrop based around the shift from linear per-
spective to the perspective of the free-fall. In this way, she is able to present the contemporary moment as one that 
Image 5: Spire GPS Map
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In the discursive and aesthetic construction of self-tracking applications 
this same logic underlies the users’ supposition of the self. That is, just as sur-
veillance and mapping applications rely on the uncertain possibility of stable 
ground, the drive behind the self-tracking application relies on the uncertain 
possibility of a stable self. As Morozov makes clear: 
“Members of the Quantified Self movement may not always state this ex-
plicitly, but one hidden hope behind self-tracking is that numbers might 
eventually reveal some deeper inner truth about who we really are, what we 
really want, and where we really ought to be. The movement’s fundamental 
assumption is that the numbers can reveal a core and stable self – if only we 
get the technology right.” (Morozov, 2013: 307)
Within the logic of self-tracking, the self is revealed to be an uncertain sup-
position. There is certainly a belief in its existence, but this belief both fuels and 
is fuelled by the repetitions of the self-tracking application; it is fuelled by a 
belief that with the right level of precision we may ultimately capture ourselves 
on the screen. The desire here is both pragmatic, a question of fitness and well-
being, and existential, a question of who we really are and what we can be. Both 
Nike+ and Spire demonstrate the aesthetic connections between these novel 
forms of self-construction and new mapping and surveillance technologies 
because, just as the they posit a stable horizon, a ground that the subject could 
theoretically run and breathe on, they equally posit the possibility of a solid 
grounded self. In this way, self-tracking applications work through an aestheti-
cization of the self that is necessarily a question of both proximity and distance: 
by pulling on this new digital aesthetic of the free-fall and the non-space, self-
tracking applications are able to extract an image from our most embodied ex-
periences – running, sleeping, eating, breathing – in order to offer a potentially 
malleable, digital version of those experiences. 
We are presented then with a paradoxical anxiety: the movement to con-
struct a second self within the field of an emergent digital aesthetic is fuelled 
by an anxiety to create distance between the self as subject and the self as ob-
ject, yet it equally maintains an ongoing anxiety by consistently impeding this 
distanciation, by consistently reminding the user that the digital self and the 
is different from the past as the traditional rules and logic that govern linear perspective are revealed to be without 
grounding. In this way, the present is characterized by a sense of free-fall, a groundlessness, and an uncertainty that 
is both frightening and potentially liberating. See Steyerl (2011).
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everyday self are somehow one and the same; they are somehow conflated. The 
diegetic and non-diegetic cannot be pulled apart; the screen is the liminal space 
between selves – it is simultaneously mirror and Other. Further to this, as Lacan 
makes clear with regard to the object of anxiety and the object of desire – in 
this case the anxiety emergent from the desire for the digital self on the screen 
and the confirmation of that idealized screen self – there is no distance between 
the self and the object; movement between the two is not possible, “you are a, 
the object, and everyone knows that this is what is intolerable” (Lacan, 2014: 
103). In this way, the anxiety behind the desire to distance the subject (the run-
ner, the body) from its object (the digital profile, the satellite) is an anxiety of 
impediment; it is the moment when “movement is reduced to agitation, a kind 
of inexpedient-tentative running in place” and when “affect is known by a more 
specific name; it is called anxiety” (Copjec, 2006: 96).
What is ultimately revealed through this arrested movement, through the 
moment when running is transformed into stationary data, is the uncertain 
supposition – of both the self and of self-analysis – that fuels the contempo-
rary moment. The images of the self produced by the tracking application, a 
spectral self, a self in process and a self in translation, only accrue meaning with 
their constant repetition. But this same repetition reveals the very falsity of the 
whole self as, through its proliferation and automated production, the data of 
self-tracking is a form of writing the self: an inscription and an attempt to exert 
control on the self in order to create a narrative map towards a different future 
and a different person that will necessarily never exist. Anxiety emerges in this 
writing because of both the desire to move towards that future and the impedi-
ment to this movement. 
4. Conclusion: “There is No Auto-Analysis”
In Lacan’s understanding of anxiety, inhibition is most clearly about the 
halting of movement but impediment is a more complex form of blockage 
(Lacan, 2014: 10). For Lacan, impediment draws its force not from simply 
stopping the subject; rather it works as a type of ensnarement where “it implies 
the relationship between one dimension and something that comes to interfere 
with it and which, in what interests us, impedes not the function, a term of 
reference, not movement, which is rendered difficult, but truly and verily the 
subject” (2014: 10). Impediment’s power is that it exists as a threshold with-
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held – the subject is arrested between possibilities, between one dimension and 
something else – and the subject is caught within itself. Just as anxiety presents 
itself as the cut, as the space between furrowed lips, and as the possibility of at-
taining the real, impediment reveals itself as a similarly liminal space. 
In the case of the obsessive patient, for example, Lacan notes that impedi-
ment produces anxiety precisely at the level where the subject is uncertain about 
the meaning of an act, where the object of desire is unclear and in-between dif-
ferent registers, and where, “He didn’t know it was that, and this is why, at the 
level of the point at which he can’t impede himself, he lets go, namely, the to and 
fro of the signifier that posits and effaces by turns” (2014: 319). As desire moves 
the obsessive subject forward, he becomes anxious just as he cannot stop him-
self and he gives himself over to the infinite chain of discourse; he gives himself 
over to writing, to inscription, to the construction of an imagined Other. As a 
reminder that the signifier is itself a trace of the lost remainder of the whole self 
that drives desire forward, the obsessive’s relationship to impediment and anxi-
ety reveals how automated self-tracking fuels an insatiable slide into anxiety. 
As we work to separate an idealized digital self from our selves in the name of 
auto-analysis – that is, as we look for the cut, or the distance that would allow 
us access to our true selves – we are left chasing an uncertain object of desire 
that is, again as Lacan has reminded us, that very self we are fleeing from. 
Fantasy steps in here as our guiding principle as, in these moments of anxi-
ety, we look for a plane of consistency, a space of stability to cover our uncer-
tainty.16 In this way, the rise of automated self-tracking gestures to something 
far beyond our own individual anxieties; it gestures to a collective fantasy, to an 
emerging aesthetic and logic of the present that is part of the larger structure 
of feeling of the present. In this way, thinking through the prevailing mood 
for self-tracking can “provide a way to articulate the shaping and structuring 
effect of historical context on our affective attachments” (Flatley, 2008: 18). 
That is, the mood of self-tracking can give us a larger sense of how the struc-
ture of communicative capitalism, animated by Jodi Dean in her work Blog 
Theory (2010b), best illustrates our psychic experience of the ongoing present 
situation. As an envelope that holds the subject in place despite ceding them a 
sense of political agency and mobility, communicative capitalism is, for Dean, 
the “materialization of democratic ideals in the contemporary information and 
16   Renata Salecl makes clear that fantasy emerges as a way to make sense of, and assuage, our anxieties, explaining that, 
“Fantasy is a way for the subject to cover up the lack of by creating a scenario, a story that gives him or her consist-
ency. However, fantasy also helps prevent the emergence of anxiety” (Salecl, 2004: 14).
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entertainment networks necessary for globalized neoliberalism” (Dean, 2010a: 
21). This materialization relies explicitly on the circulation of affect to ensure 
the subject’s repeated participation and engagement. Building upon Lacan’s 
theory of drives, Dean sees this present form of capitalism as one that thrives 
“not because of unceasing or insatiable desires but in and as the repetitive in-
tensity of drive” (2010a: 30). It is through habituation, through the the repeti-
tion and ongoing participation of the subject in the capitalist sphree, that they 
come to intuit their own place within this network. Even as a model of online 
participation and communication, Dean most clearly gets to the heart of our 
fantasy of participation and communication in everyday life by articulating the 
excessive, and modulated, repetition that keeps a subject attached to modes of 
being and that propels our participation in the present. As she explains: 
“Insofar as affect as a movement designates a doubling of an image, utter-
ance, perception, or sound into itself and something else, we can account 
for the affective discharge or reflexivized communication. The additive 
dimension of communication for its own sake designates an excess. This 
excess isn’t a new meaning or perspective. It doesn’t refer to a new content. 
It is rather the intensity accrued from the repetition, the excitement or 
thrill of more. In the reflexive doubling of communication, the enjoyment 
attached to communication for its own sake displaces intention, content, 
and meaning. The something extra in repetition is enjoyment, the enjoy-
ment that captures us in drive, and the enjoyment communicative capital-
ism expropriates.” (Dean, 2010a: 39)
Dean draws out the doubling of affect and its parallelism with the doubled 
object of communication, the image, utterance, perception or sound, where 
this mirroring is established as the communicative object is repeated, forward-
ed, passed along through the network. While she is obviously imagining a more 
literal doubling of the object in online communication – the forwarded image 
of, say, a cute cat is doubled not just as affect in the subject and as information 
on the screen, but also as information received and transmitted out – the exces-
sive that ensnares the subject in the loops and ebbs, and anxieties and pleasures, 
of online forwarding is not unique to one structure of communication. That 
is, this excessive doubling is mirrored in the self-tracking application’s doubling 
of the self: at once subject and object, satellite and body, experience and data.
And the fantasy of self-tracking is that it can both end, and maintain, this 
doubling. Self-tracking in this mode of anxiety is an affective tool for judgment 
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and a mode of evaluating the self; it is a distancing aestheticized in the quanti-
fied numbers and satellite views of a self. In this distancing, self-tracking pre-
sents itself as an automated fantasy Other, where, just as the infant enthralled 
by their image in the mirror looks over their shoulder to confirm this image 
with the Other, automated tracking is a form of affective looping where this 
writing works by “summoning up a companion in the imagination in order 
to feel the pressure of the other’s gaze” (Dean, 2010b: 50). The affective force 
here, between the self as writer and the imagined and inscribed self as object, is 
transformed into an automated relationship that only furthers an appearance of 
objectification and, thus, operates as the anxious push that moves the self away 
from the subject in order to gain the critical distance necessary to pass judgment. 
To this end, the act of self-tracking mirrors the act of faltering online communi-
cation and, in writing the self through automation it opens up to jouissance and 
to a specific hope for erasure of the self. There is, as Eugenie Brinkema makes 
clear, a masochism at work in the reflexive pronoun, in the myself of ourselves: 
“A special form of masochism hinges on the problem of a reflexive pronoun 
– in the movement from I like to be hurt to I like to hurt myself, lost is the 
logic of intersubjective desire (the implied “by you” of masochism proper), 
and gained is the signifier that represents me to the statement (my own 
“myself ”). In this movement, a supplement appears: the doubled I/myself 
found only in the second instance. Agent of desire in iteration one becomes 
agent of desiring annihilation in iteration two, but, significantly, what is 
effected in the second sentence is a split – the gashing cut of the diagonal 
slash that forever holds apart I/myself.” (Brinkema, 2009: 131) 
This masochism, as a type of desire to annihilate the self, is the masochism 
of self-help books and of therapeutic discourses; it is the masochism of living 
in and through the neoliberal present.17 This is very much the initial desire, 
the first affective push that produces our need to self-track. But when this 
desire becomes automated – when the writing writes itself, when the journal 
becomes a sensor, and when the Other is replaced by the split my/self – desire 
is transformed into jouissance. There is no end to the chain of desire that could 
be quelled by reaching an ideal imagined object and we are all transformed into 
obsessives. Unable to stop ourselves from this automated writing, the desire to 
17  This form of masochism is perhaps best understood as part of larger projects to create narratives of self-reliance 
that have become a means for living through, and coping with, our contemporary neoliberal moment. For a clear 
description of the rise of these narratives of the self, see da Silva (2014).
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control the self is transformed into a habitual loop of jouissance; we no longer 
know what object it is we are pursuing, and we are left pursuing our own desire, 
we are left doubled. 
Repetition becomes essential to our means of self-tracking precisely be-
cause, as Dean argues, “The blockage or stuckness of anxiety, then, is at the 
same time the repetitive, circular movement of drive” (2010b: 118). Like the 
obsessive whose own impediment transforms anxiety into the infinite chain of 
writing and language, or our own desire to self track that cannot impede this 
same slide, Dean reveals Lacan’s larger claim that anxiety is at the centre of the 
movement between jouissance and desire.18 That is, the desire that sets us forth 
in our attempts at self-tracking – a desire to know our true selves, a desire to 
become our idealized and perfect whole selves – is very quickly transformed 
into the jouissance that drives us towards our unreachable objects of desire, our 
objet petit a. Where we imagine we are in control of this digital self, automated 
tracking reveals it to be an insatiable loop, a never-to-be-completed mode of 
inscribing the self that necessarily inserts us back into the infinite chain of the 
signifier. Without an end in sight, our pleasure is infinitely impeded and we are 
left chasing ourselves in perpetuity. 
This, then, drops us right back into the free-fall. As Steyerl has made clear, 
in the moment of falling, “you will probably feel as if you are floating – or not 
even moving at all” (Steyerl, 2011). The impediment of anxiety, the stuckness of 
our uncertainty blocks the hopeful move towards an idealized self and we, the 
subject-on-the-screen and the subject-in-the-flesh, end up ensnared together, 
caught in a type of free-fall. When we are faced with both an uncertain ground-
ing and uncertain self, when the aesthetic of self-tracking and the anxiety of 
auto-analysis meet headlong, the sensation of falling becomes equally uncertain 
because “Falling is relational – if there’s nothing to fall towards, you may not 
even be aware that you’re falling” (Steyerl, 2011). Here the subject and object, 
the runner and its data, the body and the satellite, the breather and their anxi-
eties, are caught falling together and, left with no possibility of distancing one 
from the other, it becomes impossible to separate one from the other. Caught in 
the loops of automated tracking we are revealed to be our own objects of desire 
and our own anxious objects.  
18   See Lacan, 2014: 320.
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Abstract: This paper takes the emergent field of digital feminisms as a case for 
thinking about the ways in which Jacques Lacan’s theory of the four discourses – that of 
the master, hysteric, university, and analyst – can contribute to our understanding of the 
subject in digitally mediated communications. Lacan’s theory is useful in articulating 
the relationship between the feminist subject, knowledge production, and the modes of 
enjoyment that structure speech particularly where feminist discourses are animated in 
digital communications. As a protest discourse, feminist discourse has been equated with 
the productive discourse of the hysteric, but once institutionalized, I argue, it takes on 
the structure of the university discourse, bypassing the critical phase of the analyst. Digi-
tal feminisms offer a particularly reflective case for understanding this structural shift as, 
with no gatekeepers, nothing impedes the personal becoming political in digitally medi-
ated spaces. Here, the structure of feminist discourses is amplified, exposing the dynamic 
affects in different discursive positions that obfuscate communication and make ‘true 
dialogue’ problematic. Drawing on Lacan’s theory of the four discourses, I map some 
of these affects as digital feminist discourses shift into the position of knowledge (what 
Lacan calls S2), where they are divided – cut off from their own experience and enjoy-
ment – and positioned to address the jouissance of the Other. In this, I hope to show how 
Lacan’s theory of discourse offers a means of understanding the frustrations felt in much 
digitally mediated communication. 
Keywords: digital feminisms, the subject, Lacan, discourse of the hysteric, discourse 
of the university, jouissance, knowledge, affect
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1. Introduction
This paper offers a theoretical consideration of the ways in which we might 
understand digital feminist discursive practices through Jacques Lacan’s theory 
of the four discourses articulated in seminar XVII (2007). Within Lacan’s 
theory of the four discourses – that of the master, hysteric, university, and 
analyst – feminist discourse has traditionally been equated with that of the 
hysteric (Bracher, 2006) for, as I elaborate in this paper, it is a ‘protest’ discourse 
associated with social, political, and epistemological change. This protest takes 
on many forms, from every-day rejections of social norms, to more theoreti-
cal rejections of the language used to create those norms. The work of écriture 
féminine is perhaps the most literal example in that it identifies with hysterical 
speech where it is perceived to be the only legitimate form of female discourse 
within phallocentric cultures, and mobilizes this discourse of protest to articu-
late a radical woman’s political aesthetic (Dane, 1994: 241). In protesting the 
status-quo, feminist discourse (as with hysterical discourse) speaks an epistemic 
desire: it generates a desire for knowledge. Yet even in its early association with 
hysterical discourse – seen by many as a proto-feminist protest (Showalter, 
1987) – feminist discourse has drawn on personal, subjective experience to 
protest the status quo. Drawing on Lacan’s theory of discourse, I show how the 
affective quality of this knowledge (and aesthetic) production creates counter-
productive conflicts within feminist discourses that are exacerbated in digitally 
mediated spaces. 
Digital technologies have provided a particularly useful stage for feminist 
protest, where platforms like Twitter can aggregate isolated voices into col-
lective political movements. An emerging field of scholarship engaged in the 
study of what I broadly call ‘digital feminisms’ canvases a variety of feminist 
discourses and practices that use digitally mediated platforms and services to 
mobilize feminist agendas, protest, and praxis. With some speculating that the 
affordances of digital media technologies have generated a fourth “wave” of 
feminism (Phillips & Cree, 2014: 938) that challenges mainstream media rep-
resentations of a post-feminist era (Gill, 2016: 613), this field of scholarship has 
focused on organized ”hashtag” feminisms (Portwood-Stacer & Berridge, 2014) 
and networked communities in the form of blogs, as well as activist and peda-
gogical websites, YouTube channels, tumblrs and memes (for example, Baer, 
2016; Fotopoulou, 2016; Khoja-Moolji, 2015; Pruchniewska, 2016; Scharff, 
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Smith-Prei, and Stehle, 2016; Seidman, 2013; Taylor, 2011; Thrift, 2014; Vivi-
enne, 2016). Included in these forms of digital feminisms are moments when 
feminist discourse is invoked (and re-distributed) in digitally mediated spaces 
to express feminist knowledge and assert feminist identities in ways that may or 
may not be organized or intended forms of feminist praxis or pedagogy (see, for 
example, Dobson, 2015; Keller, 2016; Thelandersson, 2014). Indeed, within 
the age of media convergence it can be difficult to separate digital feminist 
discourses – activism, protest, and praxis – from offline discourses given that 
digital platforms and services allow for the promotion, sharing, and pedagogic 
redistribution of some of these offline (or analogue) activities. Despite their 
intention or origin, then, digital feminisms share common characteristics with 
the discourses and praxis of non-digital feminisms, such as disparities in the 
production of feminist knowledge with considerable debate over their authen-
ticity and definitional positions. Such characteristics are enhanced, however, 
through digital technologies, platforms, and services because these technologies 
give voice to disparate discourses and agendas, and allow them to be widely 
shared and distributed. Nowhere is this more evident than in the contrasting 
tumblrs’ “Who Needs Feminism?” and “Women Against Feminism”, where 
privileged and marginal voices are mobilized into conflicting forms of protest. 
Indeed, the proliferation of feminist discourses in digitally mediated spaces 
sees the blend of amateur, professional, and celebrity voices create and imagine 
feminism for the new millennium with a contrariness indicative of the post-
feminist era (see Horbury, 2015). 
Yet where digital technologies promise the ability to subvert the political 
and economic hierarchies of media industries, the resulting frustrations in digi-
tal feminist communication often seem inexplicable. While tentatively celebrat-
ing the revolutionary possibilities of the digital sphere (to overcome barriers of 
distance, difference, time, generation, knowledge, economics, and power in 
the production of feminist discourse) feminist scholarship is equally cautious 
in detailing the emerging threats to this utopia (see, for example, Baer, 2016; 
Cole, 2015; Dobson, 2015; Keller, 2016; Khoja-Moolji, 2015; Pruchniewska, 
2016; Thelandersson, 2014; Vivienne, 2016). The tenor of this scholarship nev-
ertheless tacitly invokes both user and producer of digitally mediated culture 
as a fantasy of Enlightenment thinking, where digital feminists are perceived 
to be the perfect produsers who challenge the hierarchies of traditional media 
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industries. Undermining this fantasy of a rational subject of discourse, however, 
is the production of radically inassimilable ideas denoted in the rise of “toxic 
Twitter wars” and feminist in-fighting over the authenticity and legitimacy of 
feminist knowledge (see Thelandersson, 2014). The provocation of trolls within 
digital feminist communities contributes to this discord and, I suggest, reveals 
the particular composition of feminist knowledge in this space.2 For where trolls 
contest the legitimacy of feminist knowledge (for amusement or malicious 
enjoyment), this can, as Ganzer observes, replicate feminist in-fighting (2014), 
where it exposes the role of affect in knowledge, discourse, and communication, 
as I explore in this paper. 
Drawing on a variety of digital feminist discursive practices that are illustra-
tive rather than exhaustive, I sketch some observations regarding the effects of 
these practices where they shift from the ‘productive’ discourse of the hysteric 
to that of the university in the construction of an ideal feminist identity online. 
In particular, I introduce Lacan’s theory of discourse to explore the impact of 
this shift on the productive character of digital feminisms as well as the experi-
ence of subjects occupying this position. In addition to the institutionalization 
of feminisms within the academy, the sheer volume of production afforded by 
digital technology – and the erosion of distinctions between amateur, profes-
sional, academic and celebrity voices – brings a symbolic weight to feminist 
knowledge production in digitally mediated spaces where I argue, it takes on 
the status of the ‘big Other,’ or S2 in Lacan’s matheme. Identification with it 
demonstrates, I suggest, the way in which feminism becomes a signifier consti-
tuting onscreen identity; it functions to support idiosyncratic subjects, offering 
a consistency via the guarantee of the big Other in S2. Challenges to this signi-
fier then, effectively act as a challenge to the subject’s stability: as an attack on 
the screen that supports the fantasy of the subject’s rational, symbolic existence, 
especially where the attack addresses feminist knowledge. Moreover, where 
feminist knowledge-as-S2 becomes the ideal-ego of the agent’s online identity, 
the agent of this structure occupies the discourse of the university in Lacan’s 
schema, a split subject, cut-off from the subjective truth of their experience. 
The split subject speaks from the position of feminist knowledge to address the 
other who now occupies the position of object a in the matheme – what is lost 
2 I take Jonathan Bishop’s definition of trolls as agents who deliberately antagonize other individuals or communities 
online with the aim of drawing them into a futile debate, either anonymously for personal (sadistic) pleasure, or 
publically in the spirit of communal humour (2014: 8–10).
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to the subject, jouissance. Here, the agent of digital politics can be caught in 
the screen of the big Other, which alienates them from the truth of their own 
experience and where jouissance appears in the form of the Other’s enjoyment.
1.2. Why Psychoanalysis?
To introduce psychoanalysis to the topic of digital feminisms may appear 
especially problematic, for though the analysis of women in various media 
spaces was initially informed by the psychoanalytic ideas taken up in second 
wave feminisms, Judith Butler’s epistemic turn in Gender Trouble (2008) has 
reoriented this scholarship away from such engagements (see Horbury, 2015: 
45). This leaves the field, as Peter Dahlgren has observed (2013), of media and 
communication studies more generally, with a subject assumed as a product of 
the Enlightenment: a rational being whose flexible and contingent persona is 
nevertheless not informed by any unconscious desires, conflicts, or fantasies. 
This assumption is incredibly problematic for feminist media studies, where, 
as I have argued elsewhere (Horbury, 2015: 41), the subject of this scholarship 
– texts for women and the audiences for them – over time become informed 
by the ideas of feminist scholarship. Here, the “triangular network of influence 
that has formed between critical feminist discourses, public cultural com-
mentary, and the dramatization of women in media texts” can no longer be 
untangled or imagined outside of their relationship with one another (Horbury, 
2015: 8). Where feminism is popularised in cultural production it is then ab-
sorbed back into feminist analysis and integrated into new feminist discourses, 
perhaps explaining, as Gill notes (2016), the confusing reemergence of feminist 
ideas in mainstream media alongside post-feminist sensibilities. Moving into 
the digital sphere only increases this triangular relationship as the line between 
textual user and producer becomes blurred, as does the line between academic 
and amateur production of feminist knowledge – albeit a blurring of an already 
permeable boundary. Nevertheless, any study of communication must take into 
account the subject of that communicative act – be it the producer or receiver 
of that act – and, as Marshall Alcorn succinctly puts it, “[t]o understand speech, 
as opposed to language, one must understand what it means to be a subject” 
(1994: 23). This is not to say that psychoanalytic thought offers a complete 
solution to the study of communication; rather, it constitutes a significant per-
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spective that is absent from many efforts to theorize the subject of communica-
tive praxis.
While psychoanalytic ideas have been entertained in media and commu-
nication studies, the scepticism with which they are treated and largely cir-
cumvented in the classroom is perhaps, as Roger Silverstone suggests, because 
“the shift from clinical theory and practice to cultural critique is fraught with 
obfuscation and the too-easy elision, often, of the particular and the general, 
as well as the arbitrariness (masked as theory) of interpretation and analysis” 
(1999: 11). Due to the complexly nuanced positions produced in the last sixty 
years of feminism in the West, what I sketch here may appear similarly limited. 
It is difficult to speak of or attempt to analyse – let alone theorize – feminist dis-
courses in a general sense without appearing to reductively overlook important 
differences in theory and praxis, and I do not want to suggest that all utterances 
made by feminists fall into my analysis. I want to introduce Lacan’s work on the 
subject’s discourse, however, to consider the unconscious dimensions of (some) 
digital feminist discourses in the hope that these insights might be useful in 
understanding the ways in which digital communications more generally can 
be both productive and unproductive when the speaker inhabits or speaks from 
differently motivated subject positions.
2. The Four Discourses
Lacan’s seminar XVII (1969-1970) develops a formula for thinking about 
the subject and their relation to discourse that “goes much further than actual 
utterances” (2007: 13) to try and understand the relationship between the 
subject and language (symbolic meaning and the world of shared knowledge), 
between the subject and their unconscious and, consequently, between the 
subject and their unique mode of (unconscious) enjoyment. Notably, Lacan’s 
articulation of the four discourses is framed within his critique of science 
(Themi, 2014: 108) where it illuminates the limits of Enlightenment thinking 
that informs both feminist discourses and much media and communication 
theory. Both discourses assume, at the very least, that a subject (of media texts 
and producers of texts) is cognizant of their enjoyment and rationally invested 
in communication. Yet, paraphrasing Lacan, Susan Barnard reminds us that, as 
“knowledge and jouissance are inextricably” linked even in “ideal communica-
tion (e.g., a ‘complete’ text or an ‘entire’ oeuvre), interpretation confronts the 
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limits constituted by the particularity of the subject’s jouissance – the way in 
which a given subject ‘gets off’ on (in this case) a text” (2002: 3). Lacan’s under-
standing of the ways in which particular subject positions enjoy or “gets off” on 
different types of texts – though seemingly an “obvious point that readers come 
to any text with very different interests, motivations, and strategies of reading” 
(Barnard, 2002: 3) – is particularly useful in contemplating digital feminist dis-
courses because feminist discourses produce both a field of discursive knowledge 
that one may be drawn to on the basis of a certain enjoyment and, when this 
knowledge is identified with, a speaking position related to a particular mode of 
enjoyment. The modes of enjoyment implicated in this speaking position offer 
an insight, I suggest, into the conflicts produced in digital feminist discourses.
In articulating something of the relationship between the subject and 
language – knowledge, the unconscious, and modes of enjoyment – Lacan’s 
work also formulates something of “the social bonds we form with each other” 
(Themi, 2014: 108). The four discourses are thus useful because, as Mark 
Bracher puts it, they “offer the means, respectively, of understanding four key 
social phenomena” that correlate to the four positions of the university, master, 
hysteric, and analyst: that of “educating, governing, protesting, and revolution-
izing” (1994b: 107). These four positions and phenomena have the effect of 
“mobilizing” “ordering” and “repressing”, in turn, “four key psychological fac-
tors – knowledge/belief, values/ideals, self-division/alienation, and jouissance/
enjoyment” (Bracher, 1994b: 109). Lacan uses a “matheme” to represent the 
four discourses (see Figure 1), while the underlying schema of each discourse 
– the functions of each position regardless of which discourse is in play – are 
outlined in Figure 2. 
Discourse Discourse of Discourse of Discourse of
of the master the university the hysteric the analyst
S1 → S2 S2 → a $  → S1 a → $
–– –– –– –– –– –– –– ––
$         a S1 $ a S2 S2 S1
Figure 1: The four discourses (Lacan, 2007: 69)
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Figure 2: The formula of discourse (Lacan, 1999: 17)
In the top left position is the operative “agent” of the discourse (Lacan, 
2007: 169), which, in the master’s discourse is identified as S1 (see Figure 1), 
the signifier that stands in for the subject who has entered into language and the 
symbolic realm of meaning (the Symbolic in Lacan’s tripartite register of experi-
ence, Real, Imaginary, and Symbolic). Tim Themi notes that while this agent 
might be likened to the subject’s “conscious mind or ego” (2014: 109), Lacan 
also refers to this position as a site of desire (see Figure 4), and thus denotes the 
operative function of the unconscious in the agent’s actions and discourse for, 
in Lacan’s terms, “the agent” is “someone who is caused to act” (2007: 169: my 
emphasis). Beneath the agent, or as Lacan puts it, “beneath the bar” that sepa-
rates what is known from what is unknown to the subject, is the site of truth, 
that which is relinquished upon entering into language and the Symbolic order 
of symbolization that “defines” one “as a subject” (see Themi, 2014: 109). In 
other words, though the subject is realized through a signifier (S1) that “repre-
sents a subject, and nothing but a subject, for another signifier” (Lacan, 2007: 
47–8), it is incomplete: the signifier is not reducible to the “subject of knowl-
edge” because “there is something underneath” (Lacan, 2007: 48). This some-
thing underneath, Themi notes, is not necessarily something the agent is aware 
of (2014: 109) but, significantly for feminist discourses (as I will elaborate later) 
it constitutes “sexual knowledge” or knowledge of the drives (Lacan 2007: 93) – 
in Freudian terms id or libido. This “truth” beneath the bar of the agent in the 
bottom left position (see Figure 2) is what the subject knows without knowing 
(Lacan 2007: 93) and denotes the subject “divided” by language, which Lacan 
represents through the symbol $ (see Figure 3). 
master signifier knowledge 
–––––––––––– → ––––––––––––
subject jouissance
Figure 3: Formula for the subject of discourse (Lacan, 2007: 92)
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Figure 4: The effects of each position in the formula (Lacan, 2007: 93)
In the top right position of the underlying schema is the role of the Sym-
bolic order, the field or network of signifiers that constitute the socio-symbolic 
realm (see Figure 3): language and its production of knowledge, what is “already 
there” prior to the subject’s being (Lacan, 2007: 13) represented as S2. One of 
the practical advantages of Lacan’s schema is its ability to identify what each of 
the four discourses produces for, relative to whichever discourse is in the posi-
tion of agent, the bottom right position denotes the product of that speaking 
subject’s discourse (see Figure 2). 
In the master’s discourse (see Figure 1), the agent looks towards S2, the 
position most associated with work (see Lacan, 2007: 169), but the product 
or result of this discourse is object a, or jouissance, an excess of enjoyment or 
pleasure beyond normal limits. That is, the price of being situated as an agent, 
as a master, is the loss of jouissance. One labours towards the field of S2, but 
must relinquish certain parts of one’s desire to do so; this is what Lacan identi-
fies as “symbolic” castration, which separates our pure being in the world from 
the mediated experience enabled through the acquisition of language. Such a 
process requires letting go of being (unmediated existence), in order to mean 
something in symbolic terms, which effectively creates a divided subject ($). 
What is useful in understanding the structure of the master’s discourse then, as 
Lacan puts it, is that the master is an illusion because any master is symbolically 
castrated (2007: 128). Themi notes that the quality of lost jouissance in the bot-
tom right position (see Figures 3 and 4), can “contain anything pertaining to 
a loosening of the means required to sustain a masterly position” (2014: 109) 
and, moreover, might be seen as potentially destructive to the order of things 
(from work, for instance), because this jouissance
“signals what remains of, and what can lead to, the most intense or 
anguished type of desire we have, luring us back beyond the usual limits 
of the pleasure principle to repeat some kind of “ruinous,” nonproductive, 
nonutilitarian “loss”—to the point of “masochism,” Lacan adds, or maybe 
even “death.” (Themi, 2014: 110)
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The danger associated with this mysterious jouissance in the form of object 
a, the cause of our desire, is animated in many noir films, for example, where 
the lure of the enigmatic fatale figure can see the hero – or heroine in the case of 
neo-noir – risk all for the possibility of attaining lost enjoyment. The discourse 
of the hysteric, however, has a different relationship with enjoyment.
3. The Discourse of the Hysteric & its Product
As a discourse of protest equated with challenging social, political, and epis-
temological norms, feminist discourse correlates to the hysteric’s discourse in 
Lacan’s theory (see Figure 1), where its “industrious” product (the bottom right 
position) is knowledge: S2 (Lacan, 2007: 33). I want to canvas some of the ways 
we might gain a new appreciation of the mechanisms of feminist discourses 
where they operate through the hysterical structure, before considering how 
these discourses operate in digitally mediated spaces. For it is the knowledge 
product of digital feminist discourses that exacerbates conflict in online spaces 
because it addresses the Other with a response that is symptomatic of a problem 
– sexual difference and what Lacan calls the “no sexual relation” – rather than a 
solution. Sexuation for Lacanians designates the process of situating oneself in 
relation to sexual difference, but does not follow a strictly essentialist or reduc-
tive process of establishing gendered identities upon biological differences that 
might aim or result in complimentary couplings. Psychoanalysts identify mas-
culine and feminine subject positions distinct from the sexed bodies that inhab-
it these positions, but these terms do not correlate with commonly understood 
notions of ‘gender’ in feminist and queer theory. As Barnard puts it, in Western 
discourses gender and sex are largely “framed in terms of either natural science, 
phenomenology, or forms of sociohistorical analysis and cultural studies” where 
the emphasis is on the symbolic rendering of the body and experiences of em-
bodiment that are “socially constructed” (2002: 4). In contrast, masculine and 
feminine positions in Lacanian psychoanalytic discourse refer to “one’s position 
vis-à-vis the Other, and the type of jouissance one is able to obtain” (Barnard, 
2002: 5), the process of which – sexuation – may include (but is not limited 
to) identifications with sexed bodies and social positions. Lacan’s famous state-
ment that there is “no sexual relation” (see 1999: 63) more aptly refers to this 
dynamic, in that masculine and feminine subjects (psychical structures) strive 
towards different forms of jouissance: there is no correlation or complementary 
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symmetry in their aims. Simply put, they “do not relate to what their partners 
relate to in them” (Barnard, 2002: 8).
This non-relation is at the crux of the discourse of the hysteric. The agent of 
this discourse ($) speaks as a divided subject above the bar, where the “discord-
ance between Symbolic and Real” of experience is never adequately resolved 
through language, but is expressed “openly and painfully” (Bracher, 1994a: 7). 
The product of this structure, S2 (the bottom right position), is unconscious – it 
is a discourse that signifies beneath the bar. As Julien Quackelbeen et al. note, 
“the hysteric has a relation to truth that is quite unique” because their speech 
produces “the unconscious truth of the subject” which is “not a question of the 
truth of facts […] but of the truth that determines motives, that defines what tor-
ments the subject” (1994: 134; my emphasis). For the hysteric is one who has, 
however tentatively or temporarily, refused to identify with the available master 
signifiers – one who has refused symbolic castration – and instead speaks their 
“suffering” from the position of the divided subject where, as Alicia Arenas et 
al. put it, language “tears up” the “body” (1994: 148). Bracher observes that the 
hysteric’s discourse takes its name from cases of hysterical neurosis in the clinic, 
denoted in symptoms that speak to “the subject’s refusal to embody – literally, 
to give his or her body over to – the master signifiers that constitute the sub-
ject positions that society, through language, makes available to individuals” 
(1993: 66). In speaking from the position of division, the hysteric’s discourse 
is subsequently structured as a question – a demand to the Other in the form 
of the master signifier (S1) occupying the top right position (Quackelbeen et 
al., 1994: 133): “what is a woman?” (Lacan, 2000: 175). For Lacan, the speech 
of the hysteric “assumes its sense only as a function of a response that has to 
be formulated concerning this fundamentally symbolic relation” (2000: 170), 
between the Real of the body (its partial drives, impulses, and desires), and the 
representative possibilities of this body in the Symbolic. 
In speaking as agent from the position of a divided subject, the hysteric 
thus draws attention to the tenuous agency of the subject of discourse for the 
hysteric “speaks, as agent, from the lack and gaps in knowledge, language, and 
being” (Ragland-Sullivan, 1992: 164). The hysteric’s discourse subsequently 
exposes “the no sexual relation”: that one’s personal mode of jouissance does not 
necessarily find its counterpart in the Other. Yet this (unconscious) knowledge, 
and the problem of representing Woman in the universal (capital W) within 
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the Symbolic, can lead to the “cult of Woman” where, as with much feminist 
discourse from the second wave, the hysteric “unceasingly look[s] for this non-
existent signifier” (Quackelbeen et al., 1994: 132). As Lacan reminds us, Sig-
mund Freud’s famous question “what does a woman want” denotes a definite 
article; it is not Woman in the universal but “[a] woman” which “locate[s] the 
question at the level of desire” (2007: 129).
The association of feminism with the discourse of the hysteric is not un-
controversial given that many (if not most) feminist discourses reject Sigmund 
Freud’s work on hysteria. As Lisa Appignanesi and John Forrester observe, the 
“first wave of feminist historiography painted the hysteric as a victim” of male 
institutional power at a time when social structures were undergoing signifi-
cant upheaval such that the hysteric was situated as “a front line casualty of the 
intensified war of men on their womenfolk’s aspirations and protests” towards 
equality (2000: 68). Elaine Showalter (1987: 160) thus describes the hysteric’s 
protest as “protofeminism” where, similarly, as a response to the restrictions im-
posed on women within nineteenth century bourgeois circles, hysteria has been 
described as “feminism lacking a social network in the outer world” (Hunter, 
1983: 485). One might assume, then, that there are no more antiquated hyster-
ics given the loosening of restrictions on women resulting from the widespread 
impact of feminism and other social upheavals in the West. Indeed, some might 
argue that feminism is the solution to the nineteenth-century woman’s prob-
lems, if not contemporary problems regarding sexual difference. 
Yet the links between feminism and hysteria continue to manifest in their 
mutual interests – interests that speak to the ways in which (some) feminist 
discourses, as hysterical discourses, are cathected to conflicts regarding social 
and symbolic values surrounding sexuate positions. That is, some feminist 
discourses speak (protest) in symptom form and thus perpetuate rather than 
resolve the individual’s unconscious conflicts. Appignanesi and Forrester point 
out (2000: 68–9), for example, that many first wave feminists were caught 
up in “temperance and social purity movements” effecting a protest towards 
male sexual immorality in much the same way as the hysteric, who, identifying 
with the morality of bourgeois values, protests sexual immorality cannot be 
“avowed” in their own being (see also Goldstein, 1982: 325). That is to say, 
the hysteric’s discourse is “caught up in conflicts between ideals and desire – in 
Lacanian terms, between S1 and a” (Bracher, 1993: 66). This conflict is evident 
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in contemporary forms of feminist in-fighting over appropriate sexual ethics 
in sex-work and pornography; here morality is leveraged against desire because 
desire is often only attributed to men (see Horbury, 2015: 52, 130–1), mirror-
ing the hysteric’s relation to the master. For where the hysteric has refused the 
process of symbolic castration, the master has accepted it in order to occupy the 
position of master and has thus accepted (to some extent) their humility as a 
subject of discourse (to be motivated by unconscious desire), while the hysteric 
refuses, “attempt[ing] to cover up the humiliation that the symbolic finally 
brings”, via their Imaginary (Quackelbeen et al., 1994: 131). Arguably, where 
a feminist discourse appears overly puritanical towards sex and sex-work, they 
might be said to be speaking from this hysterical structure that refuses to be 
humiliated by desire, and builds a moral defence against it in their imaginary. 
But the Imaginary register is not necessarily shared or recognized by others – it 
does not directly equate to the Symbolic. For while the signifiers of language 
belong to the Symbolic, what is signified is situated in the subject’s “imaginary 
order” (Evans, 1996: 83). Any solution to impasses between Real and Symbolic 
forged in one’s Imaginary, then, are sutured to one’s idiosyncratic experience as 
a subject and the modes of enjoyment structured therein. The Imaginary realms 
of feminist discourses where they inhabit the hysteric’s structure consequently 
become significant sites of discord. 
4. Feminist Discourses in Digitally Mediated Spaces
In feminist discourses from the second wave onwards, the equivalence with 
hysterical discourse continues in that the hysteric’s resistance to the status quo 
forms “common feminist practice” (Leavy, 2006: 31). Moreover, like Freud’s 
hysterical patients, feminist discourse addresses the status quo (the Symbolic 
order or Other) with a question regarding its ability to represent, symbolically, 
their being. As Bracher puts it (1993: 67), “feminist criticism protests with ver-
bal discourse what Freud’s hysterical patients (most of them women) protested 
through the physiological discourse of their bodily symptoms”.  And where 
feminism has drawn on psychoanalysis is precisely to question the status of the 
position ‘woman’ and its construction through language (for example, Butler, 
2011; Grosz, 1990). Within digitally mediated feminist discourses, the problem 
of sexual difference continues to be the subject of protest and debate. Much of 
this discourse is composed of slippages and equivocations between the rejection 
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of sexual difference in pursuit of equality in terms of power (status and financial 
recompense) and the reassertion of difference in claims of special victimhood. 
Yet repressing difference for power can be counterproductive because beneath 
the bar of this discourse is the question of equality as regards desire and enjoy-
ment (pleasure). For example, much feminist discourse has been generated in 
digitally mediated spaces in response to Instagram’s censorship policy on female 
breasts, menstrual blood, and pubic hair. The Guardian’s feminist columnist Jes-
sica Valenti articulates a common feminist protest in response to this inequality 
of representation (2015), arguing that the visibility of female anatomy and bod-
ily functions is only censored when they break with representations of ‘woman’ 
vis-à-vis feminine masquerade. Different social taboos placed on the visibility 
of breasts/chests, menstrual blood/semen/excrement, body hair and pubic hair 
are all subject to intense scrutiny and debate within the online comments on 
this article (see Valenti, 2015), while the rebellious female body (the excessive, 
leaking, hairy, un-groomed body of feminist cliché) is promoted as a more au-
thentic embodiment of Woman. This assertion of Woman is nevertheless still 
a victim of inequality for, as Valenti rhetorically laments: “[w]hen will society 
accept women’s bodies?” (2015). Here, the function of taboo and its relation to 
desire is eschewed in pursuit of a sexuate equality that does not exist, while, as 
Lacan puts it, for the hysteric “what is in sexual knowledge is entirely yielded up 
as foreign to the subject” (2007: 93). That is, the tenor of this debate assumes 
the structure of the hysteric’s discourse that interprets feminine masquerade as 
an identification point offered by man (the patriarchy, the master, social media) 
that is rejected – ‘no, that’s not [Woman]’ – while the lack of a universal signi-
fier for Woman is attributed to someone else: it’s not my problem, it’s society’s. 
Valenti expresses this, for example, by pinning her own and other women’s 
discord to the one who must take responsibility (men), in her claim that “[s]
ocial media is protecting men from periods, breast milk and body hair” (2015). 
Here, the “truth” of the “hysteric’s complaint” – her symptom – manifests in 
an address “to the Other” (Quackelbeen et al., 1994: 134), where the hysteric, 
“dominated by her question” nevertheless “makes of the master the slave of the 
work” concerning that question (133). 
Consequently, a large part of feminist discourse in digitally mediated com-
munication where it aligns with the hysteric’s structure is addressed to the mas-
ter signifiers occupying S1 in the top right position in an address that openly 
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challenges the status of S1 and nominates the hysteric’s particular mode of 
jouisance in this social bond. These addresses offer a challenge to the presumed 
mastery embodied in S1 – produced through the deconstruction of subjects 
inhabiting this place: that is, ‘the patriarchy’, ‘white male privilege’, and ‘toxic 
masculinity’. Online feminist columnist Ellena Savage succinctly states that, 
“[p]atriarchy isn’t other men: it’s you” (2015), because “to a greater or lesser 
extent” misogynistic behaviour is something “that every male friend of mine 
has at some point been guilty of” (2015). As such, Savage demonstrates how 
feminist discourses refuse to be “enthralled” by “master signifiers and systems 
of knowledge” and respond with a show of “$, the experience of alienation, 
suppression, exclusion” (Bracher, 1993: 67). This address to patriarchy exposes 
the enjoyment structured in the hysteric’s discourse as it relates to the master, 
where the hysteric seeks “castration of the idealized father, who yields the mas-
ter’s secret” the flip side of which is an enjoyment in “privation”, that is, “the 
jouissance of being deprived” (Lacan, 2007: 99), because the hysteric’s discourse 
is “a matter of knowing … what? Of knowing at what price she herself is this 
person who speaks” (Lacan, 2007: 34). 
Yet this is where the master comes into being as a product of the hysteric’s 
discourse, as a fantasy that there is one subject who is not divided – “so much 
so” Lacan suggests, “that you have to wonder whether this isn’t where the inven-
tion of the master began” (2007: 129). For the master’s supposed knowledge 
(of sexual difference) allows the hysteric to cherish (however unconsciously) a 
belief in Woman. Because if no signifier for Woman exists, how can “equality 
with regard to the signifier of sexuality” exist (Quackelbeen et al., 1994: 135)? 
For Quackelbeen et al. (1994: 134), the discursive production of the hysteric 
“becomes a teaching about the object and the fundamental fantasy”. The “un-
conscious truth” beneath the bar of the hysteric’s discourse is a fantasy “that a 
sexual rapport can exist” (Quackelbeen et al., 1994: 134). Indeed, the fact that 
“the sexual for a human being is in principle without relation” in no way stops 
the hysteric from “dreaming of the contrary” that “there is no sexual relation, 
but there should be one” (Quackelbeen et al., 1994: 134; my emphasis). 
We can observe this fantasy of S1, where patriarchy stands in for the master 
that the hysteric creates, in popular second wave feminist theory taken up in 
digital feminist discourses. Jane Gallop (1982) has noted, for instance, that 
within some second wave uses of psychoanalysis there is an effort to master the 
theory explaining woman’s privation while the emphasis is on identifying the 
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master of this theory to castrate because, as Lacan suggests, the hysteric’s desire 
is ultimately for a master who “know[s] lots of things”, but not “so much that 
he does not believe she is the supreme price of all his knowledge” because “she 
wants a master she can reign over” so that “he does not govern” (Lacan, 2007: 
129). The jouissance in mobilizing psychoanalysis in this way – enjoyment 
in the fantasy of a master and in castrating him – manifests in some digital 
feminist film criticisms that draw on Laura Mulvey’s male gaze theory (1989), 
to reiterate how the structural fantasy of woman-as-object of the gaze in film 
and screen media secures the masculine subject in his privilege. Feminist blog-
ger film reviews, for instance, often revel in “lambasting” male directors who 
perpetuate this structural fantasy, and detail (with an intensity of jouissance) the 
actress’s embodiment of it (see Leab, 2011), simultaneously exposing the fragil-
ity of the master’s position while ensuring that Woman – actress or blogger – “is 
the supreme price.” 
The hysteric’s discourse thus sets a “trap” for the Other (the master) where 
what signifies in the hysteric’s speech (beneath the bar) calls out the Other’s 
impotence (Arenas et al., 1994: 148), which is observable in digital feminist 
discourses encouraging masters to realize their castration and identify with the 
hysteric. A blog post in Scum Mag entitled, “so your dick isn’t perpetually hard” 
(Muscat 2013), for example, invites men to accept their castration, rather than 
invest in the fantasy of themselves as masters. But in this, as Bracher suggests, 
“receivers of the hysterical message are also alienated by being summoned to 
produce master signifiers and knowledge in response to the other’s division ($) 
rather than in response to their own want-of-being (a)” (1993: 68). 
The underlying conflict between public ideals and personal (unconscious) 
desire in the hysteric’s discourse effectively (re)emerges in digitally mediated 
(public) feminist discourses speaking from this position. As Colette Soler ob-
serves, as a consequence of feminist ideals sexual difference is “repressed” in 
efforts towards making public spaces “unisex[ual]”, while the hysteric’s “ques-
tion is played out elsewhere, in the closed field of the sexual relationship” where 
sexual difference “remains irreducible” (2002: 53). That is, the unconscious 
(personal) mode of the hysteric’s discourse regarding the signifier Woman con-
flicts with the public pursuit of equality at the level of (feminist) ideals because 
this requires the suppression of sexual difference. Digitally mediated communi-
cation makes this schism more immediately problematic because digitally me-
diated interfaces erode the distinctions between public and private discourses. 
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5. Making the Personal Political
This conflict between ideals and desires plays out in digital feminist dis-
courses where the pedagogical structure of digital feminisms creates conflicts of 
difference that result in internal policing over the shared territory of feminist 
knowledge, because this knowledge production is grounded in the immediacy 
of the personal. Insofar as the affordances of digitally mediated technologies 
make personal storytelling more widely available to those without access to 
commercial media production, digital forms of “storytelling” have been widely 
credited with “emancipating” under-represented identities (Vivienne, 2016: 
3). Equally, the “thorny issue long affecting feminist politics” of internal dif-
ferences and conflict is, according to Urszula Pruchniewska, overcome through 
the shareability of information and archive functions that “allow women to 
work together across their differences” (2016: 739). Yet, where digital femi-
nisms produce a greater volume of content and erode the differences between 
amateur, professional, scholarly, and celebrity voices they create greater and 
seemingly more vicious moments of conflict. Indeed, the affordances of this 
space promote a personal discourse that, where it seeks to be political, is nev-
ertheless not accountable. Susan Greenberg notes, for example, that within 
debates theorizing digital Web 2.0 discourses, “[t]he perception that personal 
feelings are ‘true’ and real because they are unmediated remains a popular and 
persistent one, and overlaps with the popular understanding of ‘authenticity’ 
as trueness to the self ” (2001: 166).3 Within this frame of blogging culture, 
feminist discourses can more easily slip into hysterical structures that speak in 
symptom form because much blogging approximates a process of “thinking out 
loud” that borders on a stream of consciousness (Greenberg, 2011: 157), and 
is particularly pertinent to the production of truth in the hysteric’s discourse. 
Where the emphasis on emotion and personal experience constitutes a 
particular feature of blogging practice, it opens the way for the affective pro-
duction of the hysteric’s discourse to be taken for truth. Soler (2016: 61) points 
out that where language and the signifier intervene into one’s being to produce 
the subject, they come to “define that status of the jouissance” for that speaking 
being, including the production of affects “that are particular to him” as well 
as those produced through the socially bonded discursive positions (61) such 
3  As Krüger suggests (2016), documenting one’s affective experience is often an implicit requisite of participation in 
digitally mediated social platforms.
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as the hysteric and master. The power of affects, Soler notes, is that they are so 
immediately felt that they are very “convincing” (2016: 2) to the point that 
they bring a “hue of reality” in which the subject “recognizes” themselves (105). 
Nevertheless, affects are not direct signifiers carrying meaning or information; 
rather, they work through metonymy and displacement, sliding “from represen-
tation to representation” and, as such, do not carry “any epistemological value” 
but designate “[a] false obviousness” (Soler, 2016: 9–11). Because to the one 
“who is affected, [affects] are plainly obvious”, it is easy to “(mis)take” affect as 
one’s “own truth” (Soler, 2016: 105). While critical affect theory examines a 
wide range of affective states, for Lacan, anxiety – angoisse or anguish – is one 
of the most important affects for the hysteric, because in its signalling of an 
encounter with the Real (see Lacan, 2014), it can denote “a failure in the field 
of discourse” (Soler, 2016: 25). This failure of discourse can, I suggest, play a 
motivating role in the feminist incitement to discourse, which is evident in 
female traditions of diary-writing.
Where feminist blogging recalls traditional forms of diary-writing particu-
lar to women and girls (see Keller, 2016), we can see the ways in which some 
digital feminist discourses adopt feminism as a signifier that nominates their 
affective experience. This signifier legitimates the subject’s affect and seemingly 
produces a truth about experience. Where digital feminisms provide a “feminist 
toolkit” for young women (see Keller, 2016; Seidman, 2013: 553; Thelanders-
son, 2014: 528), for example, they offer a means – a vocabulary and structure – 
to name and express their experience. The pedagogical and public aspect of this 
toolkit equates with feminist pedagogy as a “protest [hysterical] pedagogy” that 
seeks, as Bracher puts it, “recognition” from the other regarding their division 
as a subject (2006: 96). For instance, in her study of girls’ blogging, Jessalynn 
Keller quotes a young blogger’s “coming out” as a feminist: “I want to write 
about life from my perspective – a feminist teen just trying to make sense of 
the world – and hopefully appeal to others who feel the same way … – Renee, 
Sunday June 27, 2010, blog post” (see 2016: 18). Greenberg suggests that “the 
increasing role of emotion and subjectivity in the public sphere … typically 
work[s] to connect facts and feelings” and the “manipulation of the reader to 
respond in a prescribed fashion” (2001: 152–4). As Renee’s quote attests, then, 
“the personal, confessional element found in much feminist teaching and writ-
ing” (Bracher, 2006: 96) is a sign of authenticity but one where affect structures 
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logic. For it is not that drawing on “private emotions” in public spheres is an 
unstructured discourse but, rather, that forms of “confessional journalism” de-
liberately “craft” feelings to “communicate” them “in a controlled and deliber-
ate way”, so as to “connect those feelings to argument and thought” (Greenberg, 
2011: 155–6). The slippage made possible then, when personal affect becomes 
political discourse, leads to considerable internal conflict in digital feminisms.
5.1. Affective Discourse: Diversity, Conflict, & Policing
An outcome of making the personal political would seem to be distin-
guished above all else by the conflicts and in-wars between different feminist 
fractions, built upon different feminist affective knowledge, literature, and 
pedagogic exchange, all of which is amplified in digitally mediated communi-
cation where there are few gatekeepers to the discursive production of feminist 
knowledge. For instance, Fredrika Thelandersson notes that on Tumblr 
“feminist debates often turn into seemingly never-ending processes of call-
ing out and blaming users for offensive terminology and ignorance of vari-
ous groups. […] Much of the discussion is based around ‘policing’ other 
participants about what they’re doing wrong instead of encouraging them 
for what is being done right.” (2014: 528)
Equally, “toxic-twitter wars” between feminist commentators, activists, and 
scholars tend “to be overtly hostile and insular”, reflecting “feminist arguing in 
general” (Thelandersson, 2014: 527). The hysterical structure of some digital 
feminist discourses might account for this, in that the hysteric’s discourse is a 
symptomatic demand to the other, the master, who is “called, obliged, sum-
moned to produce the response” (Quackelbeen et al., 1994: 133). When the 
address is intercepted by another hysteric, however, a problem emerges; as 
Bracher notes, where feminist discourses are structured as protest (hysterical) 
discourses, they “can support socially destructive forms of identity politics that 
pit different groups against each other in a competition for recognition as the 
greatest victim” (2006: 97). That is, the affective quality of feminist knowledge 
invites individuals to perceive their own affective truth as the most legitimately 
and painfully alienating, denoting, as Soler observes, the “dissident” affect 
of discourse where enjoyment produced in the social bond (such as shared 
feminist values) can be discordant from the enjoyment “characteristic” of each 
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individual in their relation to language, their unconscious, and the symptoms 
and fantasies that follow (2016: 104). Subsequently, “the disparity between one 
person and another”, in terms of the Imaginary, “explains the ‘absence of true 
dialogue’ that befalls us despite all our ideals of communication” (Soler, 2016: 
104–5). 
The intensity of discord in digital feminist discourses might thus be un-
derstood to stem, at least in some instances, from the discordance between 
individual discursive affects where, as Soler puts it, “the other’s affects” “seem 
strange” and sometimes “unbearable” because they conflict with one’s own af-
fective truth (2016: 105). The hashtag “#YesAllWomen”, is a good example: it 
seeks to anchor women’s collective experiences (Cole, 2015: 356–7) in a social 
bond but does so in a way that, as with other feminist hashtagging, “assimilates” 
differences of class, race, and history into “already-circulating discourses” about 
girls and women (Khoja-Moolji, 2015: 348–9; see, also, Pruchniewska, 2016: 
1). The resulting conflicts see feminists hailing other feminists who appear as 
masters (by contrast), demanding to have their victim status – their painful di-
vision as a subject, and refusal of master signifiers – recognized by the other. For 
a feminist to be “subject to the Other’s discourse”, then – even that of another 
feminist – can generate or even reproduce certain affects “such as indignation, 
protest, anger” (Soler, 2016: 26). Such disparities also elucidate how in some 
instances feminist discourse can appear to other feminists as an external an-
tagonist if not master obfuscating the search for Woman (Quackelbeen et al., 
1994: 132). 
Consequently, the pedagogical structure of digital feminist discourses – the 
invitation to identify with alienated subjectivities, the “toolkit” for naming af-
fect and hailing masters – can have damaging effects on both other feminists 
and the masters addressed. As Bracher suggests, the “inherent danger” of pro-
test pedagogies is that one is asked to identify with the “teacher’s desire for a 
new master signifier” such that one is effectively “coerced” to “identify with 
someone else’s S1” (2006: 97). In this, we see that where digital feminist dis-
courses invite one to participate in the deconstruction and “exposure” of “the 
deficiencies of the master or the master signifiers”, they tend to encourage, the 
“repression” of one’s “own feelings, impulses, or qualities” (Bracher, 2006: 97). 
The sentiments of the “Women Against Feminism” tumblr denote a resistance 
to such identification, the tenor of which might be summarized as: ‘I don’t 
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necessarily want to be included in claims of (all/current/past) feminisms on the 
basis that I identify as woman because such claims do not match my affective 
experience’. The hysteric’s cutting down of masters thus includes other women 
who, in rejecting feminism, identify with feminine masquerade, as well as other 
feminists who, by invoking dissident forms of feminist knowledge, undermine 
the individual’s affective truth, as toxic feminist twitter wars attest. 
5.2. The Hysteric’s Knowledge: A Revolution in Discourse?
The hysteric’s discourse is considered vital to the production of knowledge 
in the analytic situation as the subject is required to pass through it in analysis 
to produce “the desire to know” (Lacan, 2007: 34). Yet, though this discourse 
produces knowledge, it does so beneath the bar. Therefore, though feminist dis-
courses have transformed some aspects of the public and private spheres in the 
West, these changes do not necessarily satisfy; object a – the truth of what mo-
tivates, what torments the subject – remains beneath the bar and the hysteric’s 
product is largely un-analysed. In addition, because the hysteric’s discourse is a 
desire for an unsatisfied desire, no response from the Other (in either public 
or private reform) will ever match the enjoyment produced in the hysterical 
structure (privation). As a result, the hysteric’s discourse does not produce a 
(personal) revolution or transformation of discourse (a positional turn in the 
matheme) – that occurs through the discourse of the analyst (see Figure 1).4 
Where digital feminist discourses take feminism as an identity bearing signi-
fier, moreover, there is a slippage between the personal and the public/political 
product of this discourse. The hysteric’s (socially bonded) discourse produces 
knowledge excluded from the symbolic, while in the private analytic scenario 
this knowledge is recognized as that which the hysteric has excluded or not 
found a way to include in their S1: object a. 
Despite this unresolved schism, the discursive product of feminism where it 
is taken as truth denotes, as Bracher suggests, the production of “a new canon, 
a new tradition to be taught”, which effectively functions as an “authoritarian 
and establishment pedagogy” (Bracher, 2006: 97). Feminism’s knowledge prod-
uct – published and disseminated through various public institutions such as 
the university – is now amplified through the critical mass of digital feminisms 
4   Indeed, Soler argues that “psychoanalysis is really what the hysteric needed, because it agrees to recognize the 
enigma of sex and assumes responsibility for it” (2002: 53). 
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where it sustains the authority of personal experience. In other words, the in-
dustrious product of feminist discourse creates the foundation of a new S2: the 
discourse of the university. 
6. The Discourse of the University: 
Feminism as S2 & the Split Subject
What distinguishes the discourse of the university from that of the hysteric 
is that, where the hysteric’s discourse poses a question, the discourse of the uni-
versity presumes an answer: knowledge. The subject occupying this discourse 
speaks from a position of authority, invoking knowledge in a way that might be 
likened to Michel Foucault’s theorizing of discourse, where certain utterances 
are regulated by a field of ideas and practices that “determine” the “conditions 
of existence” for this utterance (2005: 30). As Renata Salecl puts it, in the dis-
course of the university “utterances always refer to some field of knowledge; 
they purport to be justified by proofs and arguments” (1994: 163). In digital 
feminist discourses, then, we often see the subject assume answers via reference 
to the production of feminist knowledge (S2) gleaned from feminism’s insti-
tutionalization and increasing prominence in digitally mediated spaces. The 
affordances of digital technology allow such knowledge to be appropriated, re/
produced, and distributed without, necessarily, going through formal processes 
of fact-checking or critical evaluation. In terms of sheer numbers, this re/pro-
duction and distribution of feminist discourses/knowledge is given a symbolic 
weight. Where it takes on the status of S2, it is taken as knowledge that gives 
its speaker authority. The “Who Needs Feminism?” tumblr, for example, not 
only reasserts and produces feminist discourse, but also functions (in part) to 
school others on feminist knowledge and praxis with an authority grounded in 
its university setting (see Siedman, 2013: 557). Similarly, Shenila Khoja-Moolji 
notes that some digitally mediated feminist practices offer a sense of “collec-
tivity” within a knowledge space that presumes a “certainty about the lives of 
girls” (2015: 348). In effect, digital feminist discourses slip from the hysteric’s 
discourse into the discourse of the university where ‘feminism’ not only be-
comes a signifier of identity (a new S1) from which the subject speaks, but also 
a signifier that bears the weight of knowledge, S2, enabling the subject to speak 
with tacit authority. 
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The discourse of the university is, in Lacan’s schema, largely associated with 
the discourse of science, which offers the grantee of the big Other formerly held 
by religion. David Corfield observes that science, in taking the place of God, 
provides a limit of authority for the subject – one they would willingly cross 
significant ethical lines for (2002: 196–200) – such that, when the author-
ity of science goes unquestioned it can become equated with or “approach” 
the “super-egoical effects of the installation of the paternal metaphor” (2002: 
199).5 The problem, as Lacan puts it, is that “the discourse of science leaves no 
place for man” (2007: 147) – it leaves no place for the subject constituted in 
language with unconscious fantasies, libidinal drives, or desire. Where feminist 
knowledge-as-S2 becomes the ideal-ego of the agent’s online identity, the agent 
of this structure is, according to Lacan’s schema, a “split” subject (2007: 104, 
148), cut-off from the “subjective truth” of their experience because both S1 and 
the divided subject ($) are beneath the bar. For when speaking in the discourse 
of the university, Bracher notes, one relays “personal history, and reflections on 
that history” through reference to external “knowledge” that promotes an ideal-
ego considered “worthy” of attention from others (1993: 69).
A good example of feminist discourse speaking from the position of S2 on 
digitally mediated platforms is Lena Dunham’s pronouncements about her 
experience at the Met Gala across her e-newsletter, Twitter, and Instagram ac-
count. On the basis of feminist knowledge Dunham reported that Odell Beck-
ham Jr. (seated at her dinner table) was not interested in talking to her because 
she failed to embody a form of feminine masquerade or present herself as an 
object for (his) male gaze (Dunham, 2016, 02 September). In this, Dunham 
invoked feminist knowledge-as-S2 to relay a personal experience with the as-
surance she knew what Beckham was thinking as he looked at her: “Do I want 
to fuck it? Is it wearing a … yep, it’s wearing a tuxedo” (Dunham, 2016, 02 
September; my emphasis), positioning herself as an (unworthy) object for the 
gaze but a worthy subject of feminist discourse. Dunham’s subsequent apology 
further shows us how feminist knowledge-as-S2 allowed her to be split-off from 
her own subjective truth. As she put it, she used feminist knowledge as a screen 
for her personal “insecurities and made totally narcissistic assumptions about 
5  Corfield (2002: 196–200) refers here to Milgram’s experiment, where one subject is asked to inflict a lethal electric 
volt on another in the name of scientific research, comparing it to God’s demand that Abraham kill his only son.
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what he was thinking, then presented those assumptions as facts” (Dunham, 
2016, 04 September).
Dunham’s discourse also demonstrates how, where feminism-as-S2 comes to 
constitute an onscreen identity that provides super-ego ideals for the subject, it 
seemingly guarantees a subject that can be exempt from critique. Yet this signi-
fier is unstable, not simply because it leaves the subject in ignorance of their 
particular enjoyment through which they experience themselves as a subject, 
but also because the product of the hysteric’s discourse is a symptom. This slip-
page perpetuates the symptom in an effort to confront and resolve a phenom-
enon, for with a new authoritarian pedagogy (pedagogy of the master), one is 
“inculcated” into the discourse based on the “assumption that the best way to 
understand a phenomenon or solve a problem is to devote oneself to reading 
and interpreting the writings of the master” (Bracher, 2006: 88). In addition, 
Dunham’s response illustrates how “knowledge” is “contained in different ways 
and in different ‘layers’ within the subject, [such that] it easily produces con-
flict” (Alcorn, 1994: 41). The hysterical structure, for instance, is the product 
of an internal conflict between the subject’s ideals and their partial drives and 
unconscious desires. But when the product of this discourse is identified with 
– as in the case of feminism-as-S2 – one identifies with a symptom and takes it 
for truth. As such, though “mastering a field of knowledge” can feel empower-
ing, identifying with knowledge valued for its “social currency” rather than its 
ability to “solve problems” in the subject’s private realm (Bracher, 2006: 91) can 
result in a restricted relation to self-knowledge and, ultimately, a breakdown in 
communication. 
It is here that challenges to this signifier in the form of other feminist dis-
courses or external trolling can act as a challenge to the subject’s stability: an 
attack on the super-ego ideals that support the on-screen fantasy of the agent’s 
symbolic existence.6 Indeed, where trolls challenge feminist knowledge, they 
expose the “dissident affects” in the subject speaking from feminism-as-S2: the 
gap between the subject’s idiosyncratic mode of enjoyment that may already be 
in conflict with the super-ego ideals of feminist thought. For where feminism 
is a product of the hysteric’s discourse, ‘feminist knowledge’ signifies what is 
inassimilable within the hysteric subject, what remains steadfastly unconscious 
6  This could, perhaps, be likened to the structure of the ‘mirror phase’ in Lacan’s work, where the subject’s relation to 
a specular mirror (in this case screen) image offers a sense of mastery counter to the reality of one’s alienated being 
(for a concise summary of Lacan’s mirror phase, see Evans, 1996: 115–116).
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in the symptom of the hysteric’s speech: sexual difference. Consequently, one 
can observe the unstable ground the subject occupies when speaking from the 
discourse of the feminism-as-S2, and can perhaps explain the quick and often 
violent – that is, emotionally affective – discourse whenever this S2 is subject to 
criticism.
6.1. The Enjoyment of the Other
Although not exhaustive of all digital feminist discursive practices, these 
formulations might explain some of the frustrations felt in forms of digital fem-
inist communication, and I want to finish this paper by briefly considering how 
the addressee of feminism-as-S2 is important to the effects of this communica-
tive exchange. In the discourse of the university, the agent addresses object a, 
the vessel to be educated in the knowledge of S2; however, in digital spheres in 
particular, the Other is not necessarily acquiescent to this social bond. Bracher 
notes that we begin life in the position of object a, a “yet unassimilated piece 
of the Real that is an object for the desires of those around us, particularly our 
parents” (1993: 562) who can be “tyrannical” in their imposing of knowledge 
values or beliefs on us. In digitally mediated spaces, however, the subject occu-
pying this place would have already assumed an identity in the Symbolic, and 
would not always be receptive to the knowledge values addressed to them. Put 
in context, where the addressee of those speaking from feminism-as-S2 ques-
tions feminist knowledge discourse – irrespective of motivation – they attack 
the imaginary solution produced in the hysteric’s discourse: the suppression of 
sexual difference and symbolic castration. 
Lacan suggests that the neurotic (in this case, hysteric) assumes that “the 
Other demands his castration” (Lacan, 2006: 700), such that the neurotic 
maintains a defence against castration particularly where it might “serve” the 
jouissance of the Other. As the Dunham example suggests, much digital femi-
nist discourse reflects this preoccupation with the Other’s enjoyment particular-
ly where the question of sexual difference and feminine masquerade is invoked. 
The self-portrait by artist Rupi Kaur (2016) in which menstrual blood is visible, 
for example, protests the image of feminine masquerade in social media that 
offers enjoyment to the Other, and celebrates her refusal to feed “the ego and 
pride of misogynist society” (quoted in Valenti, 2015: para. 4–5). Where the 
agent of digital feminist discourses speaks from S2 then, they are alienated from 
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truth in the bottom left position (of themselves as a subject, their division, and 
desire), such that object a appears to belong to the addressed Other. In this, the 
Other – embodiments of patriarchy, masters, or figures of toxic masculinity – 
constitute the feminist subject’s object a, lost, or in this case, seemingly stolen 
enjoyment. That is, what torments and motivates the subject appears in the 
enjoyment of the Other. Dunham’s comments about Beckham Jr., for instance, 
are preoccupied with male enjoyment in feminine masquerade, admitting in 
her apology that “surrounded by models and swan-like actresses it’s hard not to 
feel like a sack of flaming garbage” (Dunham, 2016, 04 September). However 
humbly phrased here, it is the imagined enjoyment of the Other that torments. 
The short-circuit from the protest discourse of the hysteric to that of the 
university is by no-means exclusive to digital feminisms, but where a protest 
discourse bypasses the analyst, no genuine revolution in their discourse can oc-
cur; rather, the short-circuit perpetuates a politics of the symptom as a solution. 
Therefore, where the affordances of digital communications – the immediacy of 
affective discourse, the relative accessibility and shareability of content – facili-
tate if not exacerbate the process, digital communication merely contributes to 
a pre-existing problem. In adopting an ideal-ego built upon another’s affective 
discourse, the subject remains split-off from what motivates them, their desire, 
and their enjoyment. 
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Abstract: Of the many challenges facing the field of media studies today, the rapid 
acceleration of the media ecosystem through which people communicate, share and in-
dulge, and seek escape from the tedium of everyday life, presents a set of specific problems. 
The contemporary media landscape is both an extension and a continuation of more 
traditional forms and objects for analysis, and also an arena that has, arguably, radically 
redefined the discipline in terms of the innovations and stark changes to technology, in-
stitutions and financial arrangements that have shaped the world of media and commu-
nications as we know it. A key area in which post-Jungian approaches are well-placed 
to accommodate is in the fast-changing field of online media celebrity. The meteoric rise 
in popularity of YouTube vloggers has given new impetus to the fields of celebrity studies 
and persona studies – redefining the popular understanding of how celebrity status is 
sought, conferred, and consumed; and ultimately, transforming how celebrity is defined 
as a notion. Using critical inquiry as a method, this article discusses mediatised notions 
of self, persona, and self-commodification from post-Jungian and relational perspectives. 
The discussion from these theoretical perspectives will open vistas into the critical study 
of digital, networked media, as well as affording the possibility of an intensification of 
the critique from psychological and psychoanalytic perspectives on contradictions and 
tensions present in such contexts.
Keywords: celebrity, YouTube, Jung, Marcuse, recognition, performance, self-
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1. Introduction
On 16th August 2007, a YouTuber calling himself “shaycarl” posted the first 
of what would become several hundred videos (‘Fun with Helium and Pass-
ing Out’). Subsequently, during the course of 2008, shaycarl incorporated his 
family into regular posts. Over time, he also introduced viewers to his family’s 
lifestyle and domestic environment. The SHAYTARDS YouTube channel has 
an impressive 4.8 million subscribers at the time of writing.2
Mirroring the transformation of rock star brands such as Alice Cooper, the 
public entity (“Shaytard”) has become synonymous with an individual person 
(Shay Carl Butler). This unlikely comparison illustrates the metonymic confla-
tion of public celebrity and private individual that often occurs in celebrity cul-
ture: fans and avid YouTube subscribers often refer to Butler simply as “Shay-
tard”, in the same way that fans refer to Vincent Furnier as “Alice Cooper”. 
This practice outlines the continuity in the association of YouTube practices, 
and celebrity culture in general. It also reflects the psychology of personality 
in public life. In particular in online contexts, but also in celebrity culture at 
large, personality is a shorthand for public entities of a kind that embody what 
is understood in media studies and marketing discourse as ‘media property’ or 
‘brand presence’, and all of the values associated with those terms.3
It is worth noting that, even with his impressive CV, Shay Carl Butler is 
a virtual outsider in orthodox media studies. However, Lagore (2015) and 
Lashley (doctoral thesis 2013) both write about the importance of Butler and 
his work at the intersection of traditional media, television and celebrity stud-
ies perspectives. Having researched psychoanalytic studies of various schools, I 
can find no mention of him or his various enterprises and in fact, at best, the 
discipline offers wafer-thin coverage of Web 2.0 celebrity culture in general, just 
as psychoanalytic approaches to celebrity culture in more established, vested 
media such as television, cinema or publishing have often been found wanting. 
Where psychoanalytic approaches have attempted to deal with the digital, as 
2  November 2016.
3  Butler’s main YouTube channel, SHAYTARDS carries links to ShayCarl, ShayLoss (a vlog dedicated to Butler’s 
weight loss journey over the course of several years), a dedicated website, as well as all of the major social media 
platforms; Shay Merch – the website hosting a clothing and merchandise store with connections to Trixin, an apparel 
range owned by Butler; and Maker Studios, Butler’s substantial convergent media production company, originally 
set up in 2009 and acquired by Disney in 2014 for an amount reported to exceed $500 million dollars in cash, plus 
options (Spangler, 2014).
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Balick (2014a) suggests, all too often “thinking stops”.4 Processes of engage-
ment, co-production and meaning-making in online communication practices 
are part of the fabric of everyday lives in popular culture, but when thinking 
continues (rather than stops) one can see clear parallels between these processes, 
and the processes found in psychoanalysis, as well as various practices of rela-
tional and other therapies.
This implies that a meaningful dialogue between media studies and psy-
choanalytic studies on the interface between celebrity, technology and selfhood 
in popular culture is long overdue. The aim of this article is to set up such a 
dialogue in three directions. These directions work through a critical frame-
work of post-Jungian persona (1953) and Winnicott’s false self (1956), Aaron 
Balick’s essays of relational psychology in the online world (2014a, 2014b), and 
Herbert Marcuse’s work on the politics of recognition and performance (1955). 
The first of these directions intends to map out, for non-specialists, the con-
temporary media ecosystem as an accelerated, convergent realm of connectivity, 
particularly in relation to YouTube as the popular media platform for celebrity 
existing today.5 I indicate salient issues where a post-Jungian perspective can 
form insights into that ecosystem. The second direction will be to engage the 
psychology of personality in terms of the way in which consumer-users engage 
with and mobilise online identity in such accelerated contexts. This will be 
done through a critical discussion of theoretical frames, including Jung’s con-
cept of persona, Winnicott’s notion of the false self, and the presentation of the 
self in interpersonal exchange, applied in Web 2.0 contexts. The third direction 
I wish to pursue considers how relational processes concerning the negotiation 
of private and public lives in Web 2.0 contexts function to accommodate the 
contradictions associated with apparent opposites in play (the opposites re-
4  As an aside, there is some crucial reflection as to why this happens – psychotherapist Mick Cooper, for example, 
identifies research that considers various kinds of online therapy, and the kinds of factors that impact upon its ef-
fectiveness (2008). One prevalent attitude regarding the effective therapeutic space is the psychotherapy room as a 
space free of technological impingement; and it is therefore easily understood in this context why psychotherapy in 
practice often views the social media world with suspicion – as an invasion of psychological space that can get in the 
way of the healing process. In my view, this is precisely the reason why a collection such as that found in this special 
issue of CM seems like such a departure from orthodox subject matter for psychoanalytic studies – and is entirely 
justified as a crucial intervention in the field of digital media phenomena.
5  According to its own press release for statistics, YouTube has over a billion unique users; and ‘every day, people watch 
hundreds of millions of hours of YouTube videos and generate billions of views.’ The streaming service also reaches 
more 18-34 and 18-49-year-olds than any cable network in the U.S. https://www.youtube.com/yt/press/en-GB/
statistics.html [Accessed: 28/10/2016].
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ferred to here are experiential distinctions and similarities in online and real-life 
identity). Here, I draw from Marcuse’s notion of performance principle – his 
attempt to account for the excess materiality associated with politics of recogni-
tion, and the need for the human psyche to accommodate this in dialogue with 
reality and desire. The discussion in these directions will open critical vistas into 
the study of digital, networked media, as well as affording the possibility of an 
intensification of the critique from psychological and psychoanalytic perspec-
tives on the contradictions and tensions present in such media contexts.
2. Mapping Problems of an Accelerated Media Ecosystem
Of the many challenges facing media studies today, the rapid acceleration of 
the media ecosystem through which people communicate and share, and seek 
escape from everyday life seems to be central (see, for example, Cunningham, 
Craig & Silver, 2016). This acceleration effect presents a set of specific prob-
lems. While the contemporary media ecosystem is both an extension and con-
tinuation of more traditional media forms, it has also redefined the discipline 
of media studies in terms of thinking about how innovations in technology 
and their relationship with end-user behaviours shape the world of media and 
communications as we know it.  Sherry Turkle (2011) and danah boyd (2012) 
have both used the term “always-on” to describe a state of persistent, semi-
permanent connectivity where being part of a network connected to people and 
information, wherever and whenever, is assumed. This state has transformed 
both the character and immediacy of social interactions, and fundamentally, a 
sense of who I am, and ‘where’ that ‘I’ might exist.
This situation precipitates a major concern for media studies scholars who 
are interested in psychological and humanist approaches to media. My own 
perspective is shaped by innovations in the field of post-Jungian depth psychol-
ogy and its potential to provide an understanding of the psychic, unconscious 
and archetypal processes at work in the production and consumption of cul-
ture. Whereas post-Jungian ideas have been applied to a number of arts and 
humanities fields, perhaps most successfully in film theory and criticism, there 
are at present still very few post-Jungian or depth-psychological interventions 
in the field of contemporary digital media cultures. Notable exceptions to this 
include edited collections (e.g. Weitz, 2014), a special issue of The Spring Jour-
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nal on the theme of technology, cyberspace and psyche (Winter, 2008), and 
book-length studies (Balick, 2014b; and Singh (forthcoming).
A key area in which post-Jungian approaches would be well-placed is in 
the fields of celebrity and persona studies. In particular, the meteoric rise in 
popularity of YouTube vloggers (such as Zoella, Pewdiepie, Smosh, Caspar Lee, 
Miranda Sings and shaycarl) has given new impetus to these fields, helping to 
redefine the popular understanding of how celebrity status is sought, conferred, 
and consumed; and ultimately, transforming how celebrity is defined (see Bires-
si & Nunn, 2010; Chen, 2016; Click, Lee & Holladay, 2013; Davis, 2013; 
Driessens, 2013; Hill, 2014; Jerslev, 2014; Marshall, 2014; Rojek, 2015; Stever, 
2011). Whereas a number of formative studies on YouTube, performance and 
identity have facilitated debates in this area that are largely confined to ortho-
dox media studies concerns (Snickars & Venderau, 2009; Lange, 2014; Burgess 
& Green, 2009), there are some efforts that focus on emotional and parasocial 
connections (Walker Rettberg, 2008, 2014; Papacharissi, 2010, 2011; Baym, 
2010). Because of its focus on archetypal and archetypical notions of persona, 
post-Jungian thought can provide an insight into the dynamics of performance 
of self, and of blurred public and private distinctions in collective psychological 
encounters. Whereas there are studies on Youtube celebrities, and on YouTube’s 
emotional and relational aspects, there are few psychoanalytic perspectives. 
Such perspectives might offer something valuable to the understanding of net-
worked media, particularly in its Web 2.0 iteration.
As Jose van Dijck writes, “Between 2000 and 2006, quite a few media 
theorists claimed that Web 2.0 applications exponentially enhanced the natural 
human need to connect and create, and they declared early victory for the user” 
(2013: 10). Such an explicitly utopian discourse on social media empowerment 
is noticeably less common in the current recuperative climate where increasing 
and accelerating media concentration has led to the centralisation of a very few 
massively-influential “siren servers” (Lanier, 2013). Therefore, YouTube, far 
from being a Web 2.0-optimised ‘pull’ medium where the “produser” is king 
(Bruns, 2008), is in some ways significantly aligned with the push mechanisms 
associated with concentrated, top-down broadcast media forms; and gatekeep-
ing practices more akin to vested interests of capital, than to democratic ideals.
According to Snickars and Vendereau (2009), since Google’s acquisition of 
YouTube in 2006, the discourses associated with the platform have changed 
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markedly from the championing of entry-level amateur productions of every-
day activities to a quest for ‘quality’ content, with Google ushering in a new 
era of monetisation as the “no. 1 priority of 2009” (YouTube Fact Sheet, cited 
in Snickars & Vendereau, 2009: 10). Of course, there is still no shortage of cat 
videos and badly-framed clips of cute babies on the platform. However, in the 
context of 2016, you are as likely to get this kind of content from an already-
known celebrity as you are from a member of the general public; and alongside 
professionally produced content (that is sometimes feature length, rather than 
mere clips), often on the same channel.
However, this tension between the Web 2.0 ethos of inclusion and the quest 
for better content as a “no. 1 priority” merely refers to front-end, ‘plug-in-and-
play’ consumer experiences. The back-end of these convergent media services 
– which are made up of massive amounts of personal data, held in datasets, 
which are almost exclusively of a proprietary nature and ultimately unusable in 
the hands of the ordinary end-user – ensures that the average consumer has very 
little knowledge of these processes, let alone has access to that data in a read-
able and usable form (Zelenkauskaite, 2016). This amounts to a systematized 
abnegation of users’ ownership of their own personal information and, on the 
part of the platform, is a systematically and structurally disempowering institu-
tional arrangement. It is reasonable to assume that the average consumer would 
have little interest in pursuing such access: even with a basic awareness of such 
arrangements of information flow, consumers of such convergent media forms 
are satisfied6 with the trade-off of personal data for goods and services (Markos, 
Labrecque & Milne, 2012). Furthermore, there are an increasing number of 
studies that seek to deal with the aftereffects on users’ habits and attitudes 
towards convergent Web interaction (Fuchs, 2012, 2014; Fuchs et al., 2014; 
Meikle & Young, 2012; Hogan, 2010). 
From these perspectives, the individual as such has become part of the content 
being produced. Purpose-built algorithms designed to draw out data to increase 
the efficiencies of reach and identify safe areas for investment only serve to ac-
celerate this direction of movement. In essence, the ordinary user is the prod-
uct. Content, in this sense, can be taken as front-end social media profile and 
browser/click-through patterns, through mid-points of consumer profiling, to 
6  At least, satisfied in the instrumental sense of receiving gratis access to key mass communications platforms, subject 
to accepting terms and conditions.
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back-end data production. In this way, contemporary media interaction has 
taken on (to borrow from classic Marxian terminology) the appearance-form of 
consumer-as-agent, which sublates a deeper, atomised version of consumer-as-
commodity, and tends to reduce the character of customer satisfaction to the 
choice of trade-off: access to media services for a surrender of data. This is, es-
sentially, an estranged relationship with a set of popular practices and activities 
to which users generally devote considerable amounts of their time.7 It renders 
more holistic notions of labour, and indeed subjectivity, as unfit for purpose 
(the ‘purpose’ here being bottom-line leveraging of surplus value), unless such 
labour and subjectivity can be wholly quantified.
3.  Self-Presentation and the Public-Private:  
Relational Perspectives 
This process of the commodification of users has been the subject of 
scholarly attention, as outlined. However, the related-but-separate notion of 
self-commodification, where users self-identify publicly with specific lifestyle 
choices, and document these extensively on platforms such as YouTube or in 
connected social media, is more immediately relevant in the context of celeb-
rity YouTubers and their followers. For example, documenting one’s FitBit data 
or an Instagram of one’s healthy breakfast, or vlogging about one’s experience 
of a fitness challenge are commonplace. This self-disclosure practice is also il-
lustrated when consumer-users post links to personal lifestyle material via the 
comments section on a celebrity’s YouTube channel. This expresses, in a public 
space, a parasocial commonality with that celebrity. Whereas distinct public and 
private spaces do exist today, and are valued according to their own qualities, 
there is also something new in the conceptual sense where public and private 
distinctions are no longer upheld as conventions of social relationships, and in-
timacy is signified through a kind of public-private interchangeability on social 
media platforms. In this latter scenario, we are dealing with worldviews aligned 
to everyday mediatised experiences, negotiated through a sort of consent within 
the relations of labour, consumption and exchange outlined above, and shaped 
through values associated with celebritization (Driessens, 2012, 2013). 
7  Krüger & Johanssen (2014) discuss this at length in relation to alienation and digital labour.
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Far from being a purely technological phenomenon in the conventional 
sense, these issues are fundamentally tied to notions of identity and presenta-
tions of self in everyday life. However, these notions are amplified exponentially 
in the context of interpersonal communications via YouTube and other Web 
2.0 platforms that facilitate self-commodification through extensive online 
documentation. This amplification reveals contradictions running through the 
heart of YouTube as a platform for identity mobilisation, as seemingly opposite 
notions of public and private are suspended, as are other seemingly dichoto-
mous elements such as the ordinary on the one hand, and the extraordinary on 
the other.
Such tensions between public and private, ordinary and extraordinary, are 
especially interesting in terms of YouTube celebrity because its effectiveness 
often relies upon striking a balance between extremes. It emphasises at specific 
moments one over the other, but more often than not extremes are held in a 
delicate suspension. A basic requirement of vlogging is that it presents for the 
viewer an ordinary person who can be related to on some personal level, at least 
in the first few posts before the vlogger is established as a ‘personality’. Conven-
tions often include being framed in a talking-head shot, in an everyday setting, 
making observations about the quotidian and being relatable to the audience. 
This was the case with Shay Carl Butler. His pronounced physical transfor-
mation over time via a very public weight-loss challenge was matched by heav-
ily self-publicised changing family arrangements. New members of his family 
were born into his publicly-viewable lifestyle, and alongside Butler’s own vlog-
ging professionalization, his family members became professional vloggers too. 
The contradictions of celebrity and everyday were also reflected in the choice 
of environments within which the vlogs were produced – from conventional 
talking-heads posts to shopping trips in Times Square, and even more tellingly, 
a vlog posted from a media industry award ceremony to which his whole fam-
ily was invited. The change in presentation (if not production values, which 
remain resolutely DIY for the majority of his posts) reflects the mediatized 
journey that shaycarl has undertaken since 2007. The contradictory elements 
suspended in this celebrity-driven media ecosystem are intertwined spectacle 
and everyday life, and public and private identities. 
For Luke Hockley (2014), this “flowing together” of public and private 
aspects of our identities, and the way we come to regard ourselves and others, 
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allows a psychological space of consideration for the messy, lived complexity 
of social phenomena. I would take this further in suggesting that, in contem-
porary image-driven culture, and within the persistent connectivity associated 
with the always-on, the way that humans as intersubjective beings tend to 
engage in their dealings with one another amplifies this complexity. This lived 
complexity is as important for spaces of imagination as it is for social spaces of 
communication, and by extension, the co-produced relationships between indi-
viduals and groups in the social and imaginal realms. In the context of cinema 
and cinema cultures, for example, Hockley (2014: 35) states that:
“Jung used the term enantiodromia […] to suggest that opposites, far from 
pulling in different directions, in fact turn out to run into each other. 
When seen in this light it is apparent that the cinema is both a place of 
psychological encounter yet equally provides a safe space for this encounter 
to happen.” 
He writes that this pulling together of seemingly contradictory terms is es-
sential to engage the role of culture in determining the expression of collective 
psychological encounters: “[…] in keeping with post-Jungian theory, which 
aims not to establish a lack (as in Freudian and particularly Lacanian theory) 
but rather to find a productive tension in bringing what might appear to be op-
posites together” (Hockley, 2007: 14).
Perhaps the most productive tension in the context of YouTube personali-
ties and celebrity cultures is the blurred distinction between public and private 
in the identification, construction and mobilisation of the self. The immediacy 
and sheer speed of exchange, amplified through emotionally-charged celebrity 
culture, and engaged with by consumers of popular culture who are not only 
fans (and anti-fans, haters) of the celebrity figures themselves, means that 
consumer-users tend to be adept with the discourses featured in the commu-
nicative practices of platforms. Things tend to escalate very quickly under such 
intense circumstances. The GamerGate phenomenon illustrated this tendency 
with alarming results.
GamerGate started out as a Twitter hashtag response to a viral blog post, 
uploaded by software developer Erin Gjoni in August 2014. In the post (known 
colloquially as ‘The Zoe Post’, and widely distributed on several online sites and 
chat forums, including 4chan) Gjoni detailed his relationship with ex-partner 
Zoe Quinn, an independent game designer. Subsequent commentary and re-
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sponses from readers of this blog, mainly from the crossover of gaming culture 
and ‘Men’s Rights Activism’, led to allegations that Quinn had given a games 
journalist sexual favours in exchange for a favourable review of her free-to-play 
game, Depression Quest (Poland, 2016; Stuart, 2014; Kolhatkar, 2014). It later 
transpired that the critic had never reviewed the game, but the train of events 
spiralled out into widespread death and rape threats on several social media and 
chat sites, doxxing (the publication of personal data of Quinn and members of 
her family) and even the release of nude pictures of Quinn on so-called ‘revenge 
porn’ websites (Busch, Chee & Harvey, 2016). As Keith Stuart (2014) reported 
in the Guardian at the time:
“[…] proponents of this movement say their key target is games journal-
ism. Gamergate complains about cronyism between certain writers and 
developers […]. The undercurrent, however, has always been darkly misog-
ynistic. The victims of Gamergate’s ire have mostly been female developers, 
academics and writers.” 
Although it has largely disappeared from popular cultural view, GamerGate 
has remained more than a mere Twitter hashtag. For Shaw and Chess (2016) 
it is a constellation of website activities – across Tumblr, redditt, the 4chan 
and 8chan forums, the subject of memes, and also of crucial importance to its 
longevity, a persistent presence across several YouTube channels. The voracity, 
extremity and self-belief, for example, that Gamergaters have displayed in their 
dedication to discrediting female videogame developers, critics and commenta-
tors is deeply troubling in its aggression (MacCallum-Stewart, 2014; Poland, 
2016). Well-known examples of this practice of trolling-as-a-lifestyle goal in-
clude the relentless attacks upon ‘Tropes vs. Women in Video Games’ Youtuber 
and ‘Feminist Frequency’ vlogger, Anita Sarkeesian (Kolhatkar, 2014; Chess & 
Shaw 2015). Indeed ‘Men’s Rights Activist’ YouTubers such as NateTalksToY-
ou, Thunderf00t, and dozens of others have devoted entire YouTube series to 
discrediting her work; comments on their posts often appear to endorse cross-
ing multiple social boundaries to attack Sarkeesian on a personal level, punctu-
ated with sexually violent language towards her or her family (Poland, 2016). 
The position of Sarkeesian as a public intellectual rests upon her profession-
alized use of Web 2.0 technologies to pursue and leverage audience reach. Her 
success is such that demands for content have seen Sarkeesian crowdfunding 
future work through Kickstarter campaigns. This itself has led to criticisms of 
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her work ranging from drifting away from her video essay DIY roots, to criti-
cisms of her using fans’ money for her own private gain (Kolhatkar, 2014). At 
this purely technical level, Sarkeesian cannot win: her opponents use the same 
productions conventions as weapons to undermine her position. At another 
level, the professionalized nature of her opposite numbers is in itself astonish-
ing. Using the same levers and monetisation tactics as those attacked, these 
YouTubers have established norms in harnessing parasocial mechanisms of both 
identification and alienation to facilitate parallel careers. 
They present as ‘reality’ – the logic of such right-wing critics relies on an 
appeal to facts, logic and ‘keeping things real’ to succeed. But even at a super-
ficial level, the levels of constructed self-presentation enacted by both bloggers 
and commenters are similar. Sarkeesian, for example, presents as a public intel-
lectual and critic. Her critics, when forming full critiques of her work, tend to 
use similar presentation techniques and conventions to present their cases. In 
the Sarkeesian case, as in other right-wing YouTuber cases, this even produces 
instances where fan videos are made in tribute to critics (e.g. dedicated to Na-
teTalksToYou) of so-called ‘Social Justice Warriors’. The point here is that the 
escalation into what can only be described as hate-filled practices on free speech 
platforms, ironically predicated on a perceived need to shut someone down, is 
sped up through the capabilities of the platform itself, and through appropria-
tion of similar conventions to those used by the targets.
The parasocial involves the application of unsaid protocols informing ap-
propriate behaviours and responses in such contexts. In the case of a YouTuber’s 
interaction with users, this is a one-way system in the first instance, particu-
larly in such massively popular cases as Shay Carl Butler. However, the public 
and private distinction is not merely a matter of deception: it is an everyday 
description of an interplay between a number of levels operating within social 
encounters. Firstly, a number of conventions are invoked through a setting, 
for example, affordances of the medium, comment-enabled exchanges; generic 
codes and conventions associated with the content of the posted videos; and 
discourse associated with the short forms of communication held to be stand-
ard in comments posted on YouTube, and the emotional discourses associated 
with celebrity more generally (aspiration, admiration, infatuation etc.). Sec-
ondly, through what might be described as a proxemics of YouTube, social psy-
chology approaches serve to illustrate the added complexities of social context 
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cues, the level of communication fidelity, non-verbal communications clarity, 
the absence of eye-contact in non-visual communications forms, and so on 
(e.g. Sproull & Kiesler, 1986; Joinson, 2003). Thirdly, levels of trust and anxi-
ety management (Gudykunst, 1995) are made more complicated through the 
character of emotional investment associated with fannish devotion to particu-
lar YouTube personalities. Finally, from a post-Jungian perspective, impression 
management might be described as a normal, ‘everyday pathology’ regarding 
this misrepresentation. 
In this sense we might consider the intersubjective dimensions of interper-
sonal encounters and the presentation of a ‘version’ of oneself – phenomena 
described by post-Jungian and relational schools as the presentation of a mask 
or false-self of some kind. 
4. Jung’s Concept of Persona
When Jung (1953; 1921/1998) described the notion of persona, he referred 
to it as a psychological archetype of social adaptation. This persona is not ‘false’ 
in quite the same way as a ‘fake’, or as an inauthentic or imaginary construct, 
or as a vehicle for intentional deceit.8 The main point in classic Jung is the 
emphasis on the dangers of over-identifying with one’s persona. He saw this as 
coming at the expense of deep self-development in the sense of an unconscious 
process. He also saw this in terms of the labels that are given us by others in 
social situations – labels that ‘stick’, and are internalised. It is not so much 
the misrepresentation that is problematic here, but the proclivity for human 
subjects to fully identify with the misrepresentations involved. Crucial to fully 
understanding the presentation of self, therefore, is the acknowledgement of 
the role of persona (the aforementioned ‘mask’ or ‘false-self ’) in such contexts.
The key schools of thought in relation to persona and false self are the post-
Jungian and relational traditions associated with Winnicott (1956). For Aaron 
Balick (2014b), the Jungian persona and the relational false self are expressions 
of ego functions, because “they both lie between internal experience (intrapsy-
chic) and the outside world (intersubjective); hence, they can both be conceived 
8  Although, it is perhaps worth noting that deception might be thought of in the sense of a conceptual category re-
lated to aspects of all of these descriptions insofar as the archetype existing as part of the self ’s psychological defences 
against both the degradation of the continuity of self, and social ineptitude.
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as ‘relational’ because they develop for the purpose of managing the space be-
tween self and other” (2014b: 16).
Jung’s own description of persona also reveals and emphasises the relational 
aspects of this function. For Jung (1998: 99, my emphasis), the persona is a
“[…] functional complex that comes into existence for reasons of adapta-
tion or personal convenience, but is by no means identical with the indi-
viduality. The persona is exclusively concerned with the relation to objects. 
The relation of the individual to the object must be sharply distinguished 
from the relation to the subject.”
This concern with objects is key to understanding the Jungian dilemma 
of persona. In the first instance, the essence of persona is relational, in that it 
forms an interface in the way people communicate and socialise. It enables the 
functioning of interpersonal protocol in social settings. In this model of self-
presentation an individual can present to others a version of themselves they 
deem appropriate to the given situation. However, the Jungian model empha-
sises the unconscious, psychic function of this ‘versioning’ process – vital for the 
health of ordinary social relations and the psychic wellbeing of the individual. 
This is because it is an ongoing process, occurring alongside and supporting 
every social interaction within which we participate. It is at least the function (if 
not exactly the same form) of what Winnicott (1956) described as a ‘false self ’. 
He wrote (1956: 387) that
“This false self is in no doubt an aspect of the true self. It hides and protects 
it, and it reacts to the adaptation failures and develops a pattern corre-
sponding to the pattern of environmental failure. In this way the true self is 
not involved in reacting, and so preserves a continuity of being.”
Jung made similar observations when he wrote that, as the social face an 
individual presents to the world, persona is a complicated system of relations; 
“[…] a kind of mask, designed on the one hand to make a definite impression 
on others, and on the other to conceal the true nature of the individual” (1953: 
190).
Therefore, one may see similarities between Jung’s notion of persona and 
Winnicott’s false self, where the hidden character of the encounter with selves 
is elaborated. Not foregrounded, but made apparent, through a comparison 
of these descriptions in both lines of thought is a discernible enantiodromic 
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running-together of an impression-intention and a concealment-intention. It 
is true that concealment has negative connotations associated with deception 
and acts of anti-social behaviour. However, concealment also provides for a hid-
ing, a protection, which, although present in Jung’s notion of persona, is made 
much more explicit in Winnicott’s notion of false self. Both systems attempt to 
account for the dialogical complexity of interpersonal presentation and impres-
sion management in social contexts, and Balick’s work draws from the relational 
aspects of both to create a three-dimensional sense of how these encounters 
work in online social communications.
For Balick, persona is suited to the individual: even as it distorts the view of 
the true self for others, it is never fully a false self that is presented. In this sense, 
both Jung’s and Winnicott’s systems account for a relation to a partial accuracy. 
Therefore, the term ‘false’ is not intended to signify ‘inauthentic’. Inauthentic-
ity ought to be reserved for cases where the individual identifies with the false 
self as if that is all there were. For Balick, “Pathology develops only when the in-
dividual identifies with their persona at the expense of other attributes of their 
personality: when they believe the persona to be ‘the whole thing’” (2014b: 16). 
It is not a straightforward matter to reconcile conceptualisations of persona 
and false self as being the same in terms of form. Winnicott’s false self is very 
much an aspect of self that one might relate to the notion of identity, whereas 
Jung’s persona needs to be considered as a more fundamental adaptation arche-
type. Therefore, while it is fair to say that they are not the same, I would argue 
that they are related nonetheless.9
This matter leads us to the second instance in Jung, and his concern with 
objects specifically. Where there is over-identification of an individual with their 
persona, as can happen in the everyday psychology of personality, this mis-
recognition has implications for the differentiation in consciousness between 
individual and person, which Jung took pains to distinguish in his essay on 
Psychological Types (1971). In human interactions, healthy personae are char-
acterised by both robustness and strong differentiation. However, social media 
9  Some schools of relational thought, particularly Kohut’s self-psychology (1977, and elsewhere), and Jacoby’s read-
ing of Kohut and Jung (2006) articulate the similarities and differences in these two conceptions with remarkable 
clarity, using relational terminology to describe the articulation of self and identity.  I have little space to dedicate to 
this matter here. However, it is worth stating the value of Kohut’s work in this regard as an under-explored area for 
developing a robust theoretical framework for online identity. I discuss his work in more detail elsewhere (Singh, 
forthcoming). I ought to acknowledge a debt of gratitude here to Luke Hockley, who introduced me to Kohut’s work 
some time ago.
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communications have an in-built tendency for communication shorthand, and 
this tendency systematically favours the personally convenient, and the im-
mediacy of identification with persona as a quick-response, ‘easy version’ of the 
self. On this basis, assumed versions of oneself and others have a tendency to 
become estranged; and relations become objectified. This bears out in Lupton’s 
work on the quantified self (2016), which considers the layers of objectification 
and profiling in self-tracking processes – ultimately governed through routines 
of data automation, rather than necessarily through user agency. Self, in this 
sense, is systemic and simulated, rather than expressed in any strong sense by 
the user; and these routines are the governing principle at the data level in all 
social media platforms, YouTube included.
The function of persona as social interface is a description of relational 
aspects of interpersonal communication, and also has an intrapsychic func-
tion. As Balick notes: “Both the [Winnicott model of ] false self and [Jungian] 
persona function in an outside-facing way by utilising the reality principle to 
prevent id-oriented aims” (2014b: 16 [my emphasis]). Here Balick overtly 
uses Freudian terminology to articulate tensions inherent in the self-identity 
dynamic, where the self is partially founded upon basic drives – something 
Jungian psychotherapists sometimes refer to as ‘affectivity’.10 However, there are 
further questions to be addressed regarding how these intrapsychic processes are 
transformed in routines of a commodified-self. For example, how does this self 
become sublated by relations between individuals and personae to appease the 
needs of what might be described as a performance principle? 
Balick makes a similar argument largely in the context of identity expression 
though front-end profile information (status updates, field form information 
in comments, etc.). However, a thicker description is possible regarding the 
nature of this identification at the data level – where the extent of consumer-
user agency is curtailed even further by regimes of automation and filtering that 
go largely unchecked and are invisible to users. Not only is there a danger that 
users will identify with the presentation on social media as the whole thing, 
but social media itself, through its algorithms and filtering mechanisms, identi-
fies the profiled user as the whole thing. Innovations such as semantic media and 
artificial intelligence may be ingenious, but they do not and cannot constitute 
human consciousness as a recognising presence in the same sense.
10  For example, C.T. Stewart refers to affectivity as the “primary motivation system in humans, the energy behind all 
agency”, expressed as “innate affects” (2008: 5).
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5.  YouTube Celebrity, Reality Programming 
and the ‘Performance Principle’
In this light, I contend that the commodified self, addressed through rou-
tines of automation (such as targeted advertising, suggested links, recommen-
dations and so on) experiences an estrangement from the world of the social 
at the level of data profiling. There are a number of precedents outlining this 
direction of argument (e.g. Krüger & Johanssen, 2014; Andrejevic, 2011), 
particularly in relation to affectivity. From my perspective, data profiling as a 
practice and process actively encourages the Jungian pathology of persona iden-
tification; in classical terminology, this automated commodification of identity 
comes at the expense of the ‘soul’ or psyche of the consumer. In a less poetic 
description it is an affront to the notion of agency in an everyday sense and 
runs counter to assertions that participation in social media can lead to strong 
freedoms of expression.
This is also the case at the more front-end level of online interpersonal 
encounters, where the performed version of the self is the version presented 
to, and acknowledged by, the other, in mutual exchange. There is a doubling 
effect to the character of this estrangement where the individual over-identifies 
with the false-self presented in interaction with other false-selves. In this way, 
doubling occurs in an amplifying circle of estranged social relations and recog-
nition politics. This is a kind of compliance towards the state of affairs inherent 
in the system, in which the compliant self carries with it the very real danger of 
potential for misrecognition by individuals, groups and society as representative 
of the whole thing.
The important issue is not so much the fact that people have a false self or 
persona, but that SNSs are geared towards emphasising these aspects of inten-
tionality and agency over and above others. Whereas Jung and Winnicott ac-
count in different ways for the problems associated with over identifying with 
persona and the false self, the converse is also true. We see this in the disinhib-
ited behaviours of fans commenting on their favourite YouTube videos, where 
they open themselves up to the extent that they become vulnerable to uncaring, 
toxic responses.11 Ultimately, this points to another dialectic – in relation to 
performed intimacies and public shows of affection in fans’ comments towards 
11  Such practices of self-disclosure are the subject of a range of scholarly approaches to social media behaviours (boyd, 
2014; boyd & Donath, 2004; Baym, 2010; Papacharissi, 2010; Walker Rettberg, 2008 and 2014), and so I will 
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their YouTube celebrities. The nature of this parasocial performance is con-
nected to the maintenance of a specific impression that adheres to conventions 
of public presentation. This points again to the tension between authentic and 
inauthentic, where distinctions between the private self and public persona are 
marked by a perceived authenticity of the former, and a relative inauthenticity 
of the latter. Erving Goffman, whose work is influential in the field of social 
media studies, writes (1997: 22–23 [Lemert and Branaman eds.]) that
“In their capacity as performers, individuals will be concerned with main-
taining the impression that they are living up to the many standards by 
which they and their products are judged. […] But, qua performers, indi-
viduals are concerned not with the moral issue of realizing these standards, 
but with the amoral issue of engineering a convincing impression that these 
standards are being realized.”
There is a standardization or convention of behaviours, emphasising the 
version of the self as performed to be the specific object intended for the other 
party’s attention, rather than standards in any moral sense. It has been pointed 
out (e.g. by Athique, 2013) that this might in itself lead to a superficial or di-
minished interpersonal exchange, because of Goffman’s implication that there 
is an ‘original’ self, lying at the heart of personality – the performed version is 
something quite apart. However, this does not fully engage the reciprocal in-
trapsychic nature of the versioning process as maintaining an accommodation 
of inner and external worlds (within the social imaginary), and the space that 
Goffman himself gives over to this reciprocation. Goffman goes on to state 
that, “At one extreme, one finds that the performer can be fully taken in by his 
own act; he can be sincerely convinced that the impression of reality that he 
stages is the real reality” (1997: 95). This is, of course, an internalisation, of the 
performed version of the self as ‘the whole thing’ – the very phenomenon that 
both Jung and Winnicott guard against. The immediacy and semi-permanence 
of the contemporary media ecosystem not only affords such practices, but ac-
tively rewards them.
This is found especially in practices of celebrity YouTubers themselves, 
whose success often depends upon the creation of strong and stable mytholo-
gies about their own personal journeys – an interaction standard as much as a 
not explore them in too much detail here, except to observe the relatively obvious and underexplored avenues for 
considering public displays of intimacy and disclosure from a post-Jungian perspective on the false self and persona.
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skilled narrative – to build fan viewership over the course of several videos. In 
some cases, this journey can take years. It involves a performed, explicitly stated 
conviction that one is on a journey; and this conviction in turn encourages end-
users to invest emotionally in the notion that they are sharing that journey – a 
telos embodied by the metaphor of a journey. In a protracted series of vlogs over 
the course of several years, shaycarl gives his weight-loss ‘journey’ extensive cov-
erage. These materials detail Butler’s reflective experience of starting out, gain-
ing conviction and a sense of mission, achieving goals, overcoming stumbling 
blocks and so forth. The conviction with which Butler dedicates himself to bod-
ily transformation is concomitant with his steady rise to fame. The corporate 
“mission” to which he applies his efforts is both well-documented, and received 
with enthusiasm amongst his fans. The more they engage with his work, the 
more his fans are rewarded with further content. This might be said to be the 
case for much of the transmedial content produced in the contemporary media 
ecosystem, which is, by a general rule of thumb, reliant upon the convergence 
of media platforms and the synergy involved at the level of industrial and cor-
porate convergence (Jenkins, 2006; Jenkins, Ito & boyd, 2015). However, in 
the context of YouTube’s specific role in Maker Studios’ output, these interac-
tions mask, at barely a hair’s breadth, the underlying secondary effects of this 
journey – that all of the activity generates phenomenal amounts of data about 
end-users, which is quantified into information, and is convertible into surplus 
value of specific interest to YouTube as a corporate platform, and therefore 
Maker Studios’ business model. 
There are other kinds of performances in celebrity YouTuber activities. 
Some are more discernibly theatrical and performative to the user-consumer 
than the kinds of performances that are constructed as ‘real’ (I refer to the 
Shaytards here as a typical example of the latter). In such cases the performances 
are presented as deliberate, and often, deliberately awful. The synthetic nature 
of this may be summarised as parody or at the very least, a playful interaction 
with the conventions and values associated with the platform, and the end-user 
is both fully aware of the levels of performativity, and the direction in which 
the joke is aimed.
A clear example of this kind of performance can be found in the work of 
another popular YouTuber, Miranda Sings (played by Colleen Evans). The 
function of Miranda’s performance is not to deceive the audience, but to play 
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on conventions of reality programming forms. Miranda’s shtick is to perform 
popular songs, in an act where she is convinced of her popularity due to being 
such a likeable YouTuber (she is purposively neurotic, over-sensitive, irritable 
and generally unlikeable) and a pop star in the making (her renditions are de-
liberately awful). In this case, the target of the parody is both the concept of 
YouTube celebrity itself, and the presentational form through which standards 
impress their meaning through gesture, iconography, and generic convention. 
In this sense, then, Miranda’s persona is much more playfully in tune with 
formal aspects of drag performance, and certainly operates at a level of camp-
ness that is both knowing, and excessive. Evans has her own YouTube channel 
(PsychoSoprano),12 has produced vlogs specifically addressing the artifice em-
bedded in the Miranda performance e.g. make-up tutorials on how to emulate 
Miranda’s look (‘Becoming Miranda Sings!’ published Feb 22, 2013) and often 
breaks the illusory authenticity of Miranda through appearing simultaneously 
as both herself and Miranda, using split-screen technology.13 
We may think about the nature of Evans’ performance in a number of ways, 
operating at different levels in terms of interacting with the platform itself (You-
Tuber performance, end-user performance in comments etc.). However, one 
might begin to take this interaction further, by considering Herbert Marcuse’s 
notion of performance principle. This idea moves criticism towards the implica-
tions of how the technical mechanics of practices found in the interactions of 
presentation, misrepresentation, quantified profiling and emotional investment 
in YouTube engagements interact at the level of the psychological. His approach 
lends itself to a political economic trajectory of the psychological projects that 
find root in both Jung and Freud. The performance principle, according to 
Marcuse, is the “prevailing form of the reality principle” (1955: 35) and can 
therefore be said to characterise a development of Freud’s original concept, 
which dates back to his “Formulations Regarding the Two Principles of Mental 
Functioning” essay (1911), itself claimed by Vannoy Adams (2004: 1–2) to be a 
development of Jung’s work, “Concerning Two Kinds of Thinking” (also 1911). 
It is intriguing to think about Marcuse’s work in relation to firstly, the per-
formativity of social media interactions within routines of data automation and 
12  As of October 2016, Miranda has featured in her new Netflix Originals series ‘Haters Back Off’.
13  For example, ‘Miranda and Colleen Q+A’, posted Feb 10, 2015; and ‘Miranda and Colleen sing together!’ posted 
Jan 31, 2013.
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governance (i.e. a quantified self ) and secondly, the performance of self at the 
level of subjective encounter (i.e. YouTube ‘personalities’). The way Marcuse de-
scribes his notion of performance principle could have been written with these 
two factors in mind. He is worth quoting in full (1955: 45) here:
“The performance principle […] presupposes a long development during 
which domination has been increasingly rationalized: control over social 
labor now reproduces society on a large scale and under improving condi-
tions. For a long way, the interests of domination and the interests of the 
whole coincide: the profitable utilization of the productive apparatus fulfils 
the needs and faculties of individuals. For the vast majority of the popula-
tion, the scope and mode of satisfaction are determined by their own labor; 
but their labor is work for an apparatus which they do not control, which 
operates as an independent power to which individuals must submit if 
they want to live. And it becomes the more alien the more specialized the 
division of labor becomes. Men do not live their own lives but perform pre-
established functions. While they work, they do not fulfil their own needs 
and faculties but work in alienation.” 
As with most Marxian approaches, work in the sense that it is necessary to 
subsist is superseded here by a kind of work that is surplus to that need – the 
digital labour of social media users, who produce monetised data sold at a 
remove to third parties. Simultaneously, such labour is performed in relation 
to another kind of work – the labour of YouTube personalities and their pub-
lic relations teams, in co-ordinating the production of content and enriched 
pathways to merchandising and third party sites and other revenue strategies. 
Ironically, although the industrialized nature of this activity may be classed as 
another kind of surplus work because of its inherent estrangement from the 
products of individuals’ labour, it is also performed, in the sense that it serves the 
purpose of professionalized activity for the individual ‘personalities’ involved. 
The distinction Marcuse implies between work that is needed for one’s satis-
faction and work that is needed for the apparatus happens to coincide, fulfilling 
the career needs of the YouTuber, and the profit needs of industrial sponsors, 
of various descriptions. However, the instrumentalized relations through which 
the YouTuber-as-a-worker tends to, and supports, the needs of the apparatus 
involved (a content platform to generate user-interest for the purpose of mon-
etising their data) is doubly estranged when bringing the status of the other 
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YouTube worker (the end-user) as a product into the equation. If YouTubers 
themselves are conforming to the needs of the apparatus through content 
production and the performance of conventions associated with professional 
vlogging, YouTube end-users are also conforming to their own assigned roles 
as commodified objects. When applied to this relationship in social media 
relations of production-consumption, one can see how the notion of perfor-
mance principle can help describe how desire is manipulated to establish what 
Marcuse (1964) described as one-dimensionality – the one-dimensionality of 
a commodified self, or a false self, or, in the over-identification with persona as 
the whole thing. The parasocial aspects of relationships formed in social media 
contexts alone give rise to aspects of desire-fulfilment that are necessary as a step 
(one among many) towards that instrumentality.
6. Conclusion
The extremes of performance of self that Goffman suggests are in some ways 
deconstructed by the playful conventions of vlogging, such that whereas no-one 
in particular is deceived by a performed act or character, we are also as audiences 
no longer required to hold such performances in cynicism. Networks on You-
Tube become more like nebulae in that the apparatus through which to read 
performances becomes ever more subtle and nuanced, just as the performances 
themselves become more standardized and conventional over time.
In the final analysis, there are a number of political questions that need to 
be addressed further. Political economy critique of the role of data profiling in 
relation to the quantifying and commodification of selves in social media con-
texts has established itself in media studies (e.g. Dyer-Witheford, 1999, 2010; 
Allmer, 2015). Parasocial approaches to social media interaction are also emerg-
ing as key themes for critical theory to develop (e.g. Bocarnea & Brown, 2007; 
Click, Lee & Holladay, 2013; Stever, 2011). Theories of parasocial phenomena, 
and the emotional investment built through such interpersonal relationships 
with unknown and unknowable public personalities, tend not to feature in 
political economy approaches and vice versa; and therefore neither paradigm 
alone adequately foregrounds the social imaginary of connectivity within plat-
forms such as YouTube, as a rich psychosocial space for critical inquiry and 
further exploration. 
188
YouTubers, Online Selves and the Performance 
Principle: Notes from a Post-Jungian Perspective
Greg Singh
CM : Communication and Media  XI(38) 167–194 © 2016 CDI
Data profiling as a process actively encourages what Jungian perspectives 
consider the pathology of persona identification; and in classical Jungian ter-
minology, data profiling comes at the expense of the ‘soul’ or psyche of the 
consumer. There is a sense in which this description holds true in its poetic, 
experiential sense. The trade-off argument in Web 2.0 discourse (goods and 
services are gratis, with the proviso that end-users give up certain rights to con-
trol data associated with their activities, movements, opinions, meaning, and 
even world-views) very rarely goes so far, except perhaps in circumstances where 
critics take more polemical stances towards the status quo. Although there is a 
danger here of reproducing the notion of an authentic/inauthentic binary, what 
is needed, perhaps, is a holistic, enantiodromic approach to the notion of what 
might constitute an inauthentic self, particularly in response to the need for 
a more dynamic and dialectical consideration of self and identity relations in 
online interpersonal communications.
In terms of a politics of recognition and the commodification of identity 
mobilisation in online communications, there is a question concerning the 
practices of ‘versioning’ that YouTube practices seem to lay bare, as a goal-
oriented performance towards quantified status – and the professionalization 
of such performative practices. The character of professionalization of vloggers 
primarily working on YouTube14 reflects the wider cultural shift in Web 2.0 
from creating and expressing as aspects of democratised communicative prac-
tice, to the monetising and industrial recuperation of technologies and practices 
as ends in themselves. This much has been commented upon and critiqued by 
various segments of the political spectrum (Jenkins, Ito & boyd, 2016; Lovink 
2011, 2016; Dyer-Witheford, 1999, 2010; van Dijck, 2013). What I hope to 
have outlined in this article are three directions of the performance of online 
selves that may be explored further, and in turn, for which post-Jungian and 
relational schools of thought might shed further light.
14  Zoella, Sprinkleofglitter and other big-name celebrity vloggers in the field of fashion, lifestyle and cosmetics are 
perhaps typical here.
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Abstract: This paper offers a critique of the fetishisation of ‘the digital’ in Western 
culture by bringing together Freudian and Marcusian psychoanalytic theory with Greg-
ory Bateson’s cybernetics. In particular, it correlates the cybernetic concepts of analog and 
digital information with the psychoanalytic conceptual pair of Eros and Thanatos. The 
psychoanalytic concept of the ‘death drive’ appears through the cybernetic lens as a fetish-
istic tendency towards freezing or regressing to lower levels of complexity and sensitivity 
of learning. With the help of Marcuse and Bateson, I understand the contemporary 
prevalence of a ‘digital death drive’ as an inhibition of learning in terms of the nature 
of the digital and its severing from the analog context. By contrast, by reading Marcuse’s 
concept of Eros as having multiple logical levels (Eros1,2,3) in the cybernetic sense and by 
comparing these levels with Bateson’s multiple logical levels of learning (Learning1,2,3), 
we come to see Marcusean ‘erotic liberation’ or ‘revolutionary love’ not as resulting from 
simple acts or statements of rebellion against repressive socio-political norms, but rather 
as being profound, lifelong learning processes, fraught with complexity and difficulty. 
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1. Introduction
It goes without saying that digital technologies are having an unprecedented 
influence on social and political life across the globe today.  With the ‘internet 
of things’ we approach a point of convergence between ‘the media’ and every 
other kind of technology. However, the fact that terms such as the ‘digital,’ the 
‘internet of things’ and ‘virtual reality’ apparently do not go without saying in 
the media today, and that on the contrary they are ubiquitous promotional 
metaphors, suggests a psychoanalytic symptom, or even a fetish in the classic 
sense (Freud, 1925/1989: 249-50). Arguably, the repetitive, quasi-magical use 
of these words points to something happening at deeper psychic levels, some-
thing that has not been entirely worked through – even something traumatic.
I believe this fixation runs much deeper than the technological develop-
ments of the last several decades. The un-worked-through discourse of the 
‘digital’ today is the contemporary avatar of a much more ancient conflict 
involving the relation between language and experience that spans the human 
experience in its entirety – and which has made for particular difficulties in the 
history of western thought and psycho-social life. In some sense, however, this 
conflict is ‘coming to a head’ in the symptom of the digital fetish. In this paper 
I propose that the fetishization of the digital is a symptom of what Sigmund 
Freud (1920/1989: 618) and his interpreter Herbert Marcuse (1955: 22) called 
“the death instinct.”
The death drive, Thanatos, is presented in Freudian theory as the antagonist 
of the life drive Eros, which both Freud and Marcuse agree has in a sense been 
suppressed in the process of civilization, due to the requirements of civilization. 
In Eros and Civilization, Marcuse (1955) disagreed with Freud’s pessimism re-
garding an alteration in the terms of this conflict, and argued that civilization 
could be radically transformed in an erotic direction, such that the force of 
Thanatos (expressed in wars, ruthless competitive acquisition, the glorification 
of righteous cruelty and careless indifference to risk, etc.) would be to some 
extent tamed or pacified by Eros.  
For Marcuse this involved the problem of distinguishing between ‘basic’ 
and ‘surplus’ repression, a task whose complexity has arguably been underes-
timated by some who cite him without much attention to the details of the 
whole psychoanalytic theory of Eros and Civilization. It is in order to illuminate 
this complexity of the digital as a socially and psychically repressive process 
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that I am setting the Freudian-Marcusean psychoanalytic approach alongside 
the cybernetic psychology of Gregory Bateson. In this frame, the death drive, 
Thanatos, can be translated into cybernetic terms as the inhibition of learning. 
Eros, on the other hand, comes into view as a continuous process of learning on 
multiple logical levels. Cybernetics draws out explicitly the dimensions of learn-
ing that remain implicit in Marcuse’s erotic reorientation of Freud. Marcusean 
theory in turn deepens cybernetics as a theory of multi-dimensional learning 
and emphasizes the dangers of a digital fetish that reduces learning to the acqui-
sition of bits of knowledge, to competency and control. 
2. ‘Digital’, ‘Analog’ and Wholeness in Cybernetic Systems
Referring etymologically to the fingers, those ancient instruments of count-
ing and manipulation, the word ‘digital’ as it is widely used today means ‘a 
black box in which digitization happens.’ Digitization is seen as an electro-
mechanical process that occurs inside the media and devices we label ‘digital.’ 
With help from the cybernetic scientist Gregory Bateson (1971), we can see 
how this fetishistic use of the term serves to conceal the profound significance 
of the digital to human culture in every age of technological development. 
Batesonian cybernetics specifies that verbal language is the primary experience 
of the digital: culture has always been an ‘internet of minds.’2 Digital comput-
ers are merely an extension (admittedly massive in scale) of our already-existing 
linguistic activity. Digital communication comes broken into discrete manipu-
lable ‘bits,’ like words or numerals. It is characterized by the ‘arbitrariness’ of the 
sign as it was formalized by Ferdinand de Saussure’s (2011) linguistic theory. 
The digital can be generally described in terms of that form of communication 
that fragments the whole into parts:
“A signal is digital if there is discontinuity between it and alternative signals 
from which it must be distinguished. Yes and no are examples of digital 
signals. In contrast, when a magnitude or quantity in the signal is used to 
represent a continuously variable quantity in the referent, the signal is said 
to be analogic.” (Bateson, 1979: 227–8)
2  Indian-Californian scientist Vilayanur Ramachandran offers a theory of an ‘internet of minds’ in relation to mirror 
neurons in the brain, and in particular the theory of an evolutionary burst of mirror neuron development that oc-
curred in conjunction with the emergence of verbal language and complex tool use (see Ramachandran, 2009). 
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Sensory experience comes to us whole, ‘without outlines,’ without catego-
ries or discrete delimitation. But from an early age verbal language extends the 
fingers and hands in the sense that it facilitates the breaking of the world into 
discrete objects of contemplation.3
Verbal language has the peculiar quality not only of fragmenting the whole 
into parts, but also of counterfeiting and standing in for the wholeness of non-
verbal experience. The digital cut, in other words, can conceal itself while mak-
ing itself, by giving an apparently complete and seamless image of the whole 
of something. The word ‘something’ itself, the notion of a ‘whole thing’, is an 
example of this peculiar quality, as if there is some ‘thing’ that could be whole 
in itself, sufficient to itself and not in dynamic, internal, outline-less relation to 
the analog whole that exceeds it. 
The way the digital cuts into the analog is exemplified in the contrast be-
tween a compact disc or mp3 recording and a magnetic tape or LP recording. 
The sound produced by the analog LP is a direct transform of vibrations in the 
needle. One can see (with a microscope) the waveform in the record groove 
that is quite literally the impression made by the sound of the music, passing 
through a needle, pulled across a wax template for the vinyl record. Analog 
audio-tape transfers sound vibration into magnetic variations on the tape sur-
face in a similar fashion. However, with the advent of digitization, the pattern 
of magnetic differences on the tape or disc ceases to have any direct perceptible 
similarity to the sound, even under a microscope or via a magnetic image. As 
digital, it has become ‘arbitrary’ in something like Saussure’s sense – meaning 
that the data must pass through a series of algorithms to transform it back into 
meaningful sound.  
It is important to be aware that, depending on the level of resolution of 
the digital sample, more or less information is inevitably lost in the process of 
digitization. Digitization, in other words, is a process of abstraction and simpli-
fication. In moving from the noisy, ultra-high resolution patterns of the analog 
to the grainier bit-rates of the digital, it is always necessary to specify a cutoff, 
which is determined by the finite capacity of the processor and the practical 
limits of time. Whether this cutoff matters to the human ear depends very 
much on a host of contextual factors. One such factor is commercialization – 
3 The psychologist Daniel Stern reconstructs the experience of the prelinguistic and paralinguistic infant using an 
impressive synthesis of experimental observation and linguistic experimentation in his Diary of a Baby (Stern, 1990).
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where the criterion of the quality of the sound of music may be obscured by ease 
of transmission-replication.
Digital communication can be vastly more efficient than analog – and this 
explains in large part the immense evolutionary ‘success’ of humans, whose 
linguistic extensions of experience permit an entirely new kind of adaptive 
process: culture. However, adaptive efficiency comes with a psychic cost, in the 
way it simplifies and cuts up the whole of experience. As we will see, the digital 
cutoff bears a very intimate relation with the Freudian notion of trauma (Freud, 
1920/1989: 607), a kind of cut or wound that can numb our experience of 
the wound itself. The issue of abstraction for the purpose of transmission-
replication-exchange (at the expense of ‘use’-value) is also notably related to 
Karl Marx’s notion of the commodity fetish (see Marx, 1990). Indeed the whole 
notion of the commodity is deeply dependent on the digital logic of discrete 
countable units. Alternatively, in a Heideggerian vein, being digitized nature 
becomes a ‘standing reserve’ (Heidegger, 1993) that can be exchanged and 
measured in identical units (whether it is in barrels or gigabytes). In Bateson’s 
(1971: 365) terms, Freud’s, Marx’s and Heidegger’s overlapping concerns can 
be summarized as the overextension or fetishizing of the digital and neglect of 
the analogical ways of thinking and communicating. Digital communication is 
not only profoundly useful; in fact in some sense that it defines ‘human nature.’ 
However, the digital fetish numbs us to the profound relation between body and 
machine, technology and nature. It obscures the relation because it locates ‘the 
digital’ simply in the machine and not in relation to the linguistic processes of the 
nervous system. 
Of course, the digital fetish is a perfectly ‘natural’ potentiality of digital 
processes. Only a digital framework, after all, can produce the fiction of a ‘digi-
tal entity’ contained in the limits of a machine–something ‘whole,’ complete 
in itself, seamlessly self-contained. Gregory Bateson always insisted that, like 
any communicational phenomena, the digital exists as a relation and in a con-
text, not as a simply located entity. For humans and all known mammals, this 
context is an analog one; the sinuous and noisy contexts of our experience and 
relationship cannot be digitized without loss. There is always a cutoff. A trauma. 
Nonverbal gestures and signs are not ‘arbitrary’ like words, and their mag-
nitude (the intensity of the expression) actually affects their meaning in a way 
that is not the same as or even comparable to words – for example as on the 
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printed page, surrounded by regularized-digitized white space. The word ‘big,’ 
displayed in the mostly digital context of a printed-displayed white page, is not 
bigger than the word ‘small.’ However, a face convulsed with emotion ‘speaks’ 
with a greater magnitude than one that politely indicates mild pity. The level of 
the analog is that of gestures and signs that in a sense are continuous with our 
whole comportment, our whole body-mind.  In mammals particularly this is a 
level of what Bateson (1971: 370–2) calls ‘relationship’ (a term which he some-
times uses interchangeably with ‘relationships’ in the plural).This ‘relationship’ 
consists of the rich interplay of gesture, sound, touch and smell that encom-
passes mammalian social relations.4 Among humans, this continuous interplay 
is usually unconscious. Human use of verbal language introduces a digital cut-
off by way of a sub- or super-system; verbal language ‘samples’ the unspoken 
level of ‘relationship,’ and the set of ‘samples’ shapes the larger part of what 
we call ‘consciousness.’ Consciousness is a map of or abstraction from what is 
actually going on at the level of ‘relationship’, always with a limited resolution.
Using verbal-digital language, cybernetics tells us that we cannot not cut 
off. Bateson emphasizes: we should not forget it! (1971: 426–39). Forgetting 
the cutoff leads very easily to a distortion of priorities and a steep loss of infor-
mation quality in the name of a quantitative gain in replication-exchange. The 
flattening generated by quick summaries of complex relationships in simple 
words (‘justice,’ ‘crime,’ ‘God,’ ‘evil,’ ‘agency,’ ‘power,’ etc.) obscures the com-
plex structures of relations characterizing all mammalian social contexts, and 
particularly human ones. The analog needs to be mapped as richly as is feasibly 
possible for the sake of ‘sane’ communication.  
To sum up, according to cybernetic theory, digitization can be defined as 
the action of fragmentation, an inherent part of the human neural constitution, 
the part that deals in parts. Our perception of separate objects as such is made 
possible by our capacity to name them, and with this comes the human capacity 
for education and culture. All in all, the unique danger for humans is that our 
conscious linguistic activities, always reducing the complexity of relationship, 
might radically uproot us from the wholeness of the analog context. Human his-
tory is littered with cases of overconfidence in verbal formulations such as ‘the 
4  Bateson suggested that insects might use digital rather than analog communication for “relationship”; but this in 
turn only highlights the profound intertwinement between the undigitized motions of the skinned-furred body 
and mammalian social activity. See Problems in Cetacean and Other Mammalian Communication (Bateson, 1971: 
364–378).
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enemy of my enemy is my friend,’ or ‘you are either with us or with the enemy’. 
The fetish for the digital betrays an excessive confidence in the autonomous 
power of digital machines and also in the autonomous power of verbal logic 
in the brain – without perceiving at all the intrinsic relations between machine 
and verbal logic, and between logic, emotion, and the self-as-a-whole. A failure, 
in other words, to achieve wholeness.5  This failure, radicalized and unaware of 
itself as such, is what Bateson called ‘hubris.’






5  Bateson clarifies his view of cybernetics as wholeness in Beyond the Double-Bind: “But note that the word ‘cybernet-
ics’ has become seriously corrupted since it was put into circulation by Norbert Wiener. And Weiner himself is partly 
to blame for this corruption of the conception in that he associated ‘cybernetics’ with ‘control.’ I prefer to use the 
term ‘cybernetic’ to describe complete circuiting systems. For me, the system is man-and-environment; to introduce 
the notion of ‘control’ would draw a boundary between these two, to give a picture of man versus environment” 
(Bateson, 1978: 52–3).
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3. Hubris: the ‘Digital Death Drive’
‘Hubris’ is Bateson’s label for the psychic structure that accounts for the 
contemporary digital fetish. In classical Aristotelian philosophy ‘hubris’ is a 
kind of problem internal to the individual, an “error of human frailty” (Aristo-
tle, 1963: 238). Bateson generalizes the definition: ‘hubris’ is an overestimation 
of the capacity of the part to represent and/or control the whole. ‘Hubris’ is 
therefore equally the refusal to accept Alfred Korzybski’s verbal mantra, ‘what-
ever you say it is, it is not.’6 ‘Hubris’ is the belief that the word or map contains 
all the detail of the territory, leading to what Korzybski called ‘unsane’ modes 
of human interaction, comprising ever-expanding territorial possessiveness, ag-
gression and murder.
‘Hubris’ comprises both the voice of Authority – what Bateson refers to as 
the ‘top dogs’ or ‘upper dogs’ – and the voice of Challenge to Authority – which 
Bateson labels the ‘underdogs’ (Bateson, 1971: 426–7). It is Hitler when he is 
a young, psychically wounded artist, and the ‘same’ Hitler when he is stand-
ing astride Germany and presiding over the slaughter of millions. It is Marx in 
1848, and Marx in October of 1961 at the site of the explosion of the ‘Tsar 
Bomb’ by the Soviet Union. It is the arrogance of corporate elites, but also the 
tendency to view public life as invested with a much greater sense of control 
and direction than actually exists. ‘Hubris’ always fatally ‘misunderestimates’ 
the stochasticity of the fine-grained flux of the analog. It is the persistence in 
believing, in the face of all experience, that ‘the unknown unknowns’ will finally 
be mastered. This is the substance of its repetition compulsion – a failure to ac-
cept the digital cutoff. This failure, unable to accept itself as such, issues forth in 
ever more simplistic, polarized and binary renderings of the social context that 
remain as tragic today as they were in ancient Athens.
There is a rich theoretical link between Bateson’s cybernetic-holistic-gener-
al-semantic concept of ‘hubris’ and Freud’s concept of the death drive, the ob-
stinate and aggressive antagonist of the life-drive, Eros, destructive to the self as 
well as others, expressed as a “compulsion to repeat” (Freud, 1920/1989: 604).
6  Korzybski and his associated general semantics movement deeply influenced Gregory Bateson. “Science never 
proves anything,” and “The Map is not the Territory” are the first two lessons that “every schoolboy should know,” 
according to the first section of Bateson’s magnum opus, Mind and Nature (Bateson, 1979: 27–31). To help correct 
for the sometimes-low resolution of that particular digital form we call North American English, Korzybski would 
apply a set of subscript numerals (1…n, n meaning ‘wherever we stop counting’) to any given term. I am employing 
this device here to help envision a simultaneity of the psychoanalytic and cybernetic visions (Eros1,2,3 and Learn-
ing1,2,3).
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In the present cultural conjuncture, a prevalent form of the compulsion is to 
repeat the label ‘digital’ with ever-higher amplitude and ever-lower resolution.7 
The prevalent digital fetish is not only a symptom of trauma in the individual 
psyche, as both Freud and Herbert Marcuse surmised (Freud, 1929/1989; Mar-
cuse, 1955), but it is also operating at the level of human civilization generally. 
I want to suggest that looking at the problem through the Batesonian-cyber-
netic and the Freudian-psychoanalytic lenses simultaneously has the virtue that 
Bateson attributed to binocular vision (1979: 69–70). The duplication of an 
information receptor (an eye for example) at a slight distance, seeing ‘the same 
object’ from only a slightly different position, results in not only additional or 
redundant information, but also a multiplicative and qualitative increase: the 
perception of depth. 
The task of this kind of back-and-forth translation between the Freudian 
death drive and Bateson’s digital ‘hubris’ is challenging because Freud and Bate-
son developed their psychological theories in fundamentally different scientific-
practical contexts. Cybernetics tends to model whole systems in which every 
part is explicitly-simultaneously influencing every other part. The separation 
of the system into parts appears as a digital-linguistic abstraction that cybernet-
ics makes explicit as part of its process-thinking, distinct from and related to 
the analog context. The complex distinction and link between the part and the 
whole is sustained in cybernetics monistically, by way of mathematical notation 
and terminology, which in particular has to do with the organization of parts 
and wholes in sets, patterns, etc. Freud, for his part, presents a quasi-mythic 
dualistic system whose elements, as ‘eternal antagonists,’ are separate and in-
separable at the same time. It is as if, we might say, Freud fuses or con-fuses the 
digital and the analog where cybernetics distinguishes them; or equally, that 
Freud begins from a perspective of analogical wholeness where cybernetics, due 
to the analytical nature of its language, risk minimizing or even missing the 
traumatic quality of its own way of thinking.8
Nevertheless, the deep intuitive insight in Freud’s images of the mythic an-
tagonism between Eros and Thanatos, drawn equally from folklore, literature 
and his patients’ character structures, often brings him very close to cyber-
netic notions of positive and negative feedback, of self-amplifying and self-
7  As T. W. Adorno (2005: 65) wrote, “Always speak of it, never think of it”.
8 In The Cybernetic Brain, Andrew Pickering (2010) writes, “One can almost say that everyone can have their own 
history of cybernetics”. 
204
A Digital Death Drive? Colin John Campbell
CM : Communication and Media  XI(38) 195–216 © 2016 CDI
correcting systems. This is especially evident in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 
in his treatment of Breuer’s notions of “freely mobile” and “bound or tonic” 
cathexis (Freud, 1920/1989: 611), which clearly resemble positive and negative 
feedback respectively. A nascent notion of homeostasis is implied in Freud’s 
discovery that the life instincts are “conservative in the same sense as other 
instincts in that they bring back earlier states of living substance; but they are 
conservative to a higher degree in that they are peculiarly resistant to external 
influences” (Freud, 1920/1989: 615). Freud’s ‘discovery’ of the unconscious 
clearly anticipated and influenced Bateson, who in 1967 declared that, “people 
are self-corrective systems. They are self-corrective against disturbance, and if 
the obvious is not of a kind that they can easily assimilate without internal dis-
turbance, their self-corrective mechanisms work to sidetrack it, to hide it, even 
to the extent of shutting the eyes if necessary, or shutting off various parts of the 
process of perception” (Bateson, 1971: 429).
According to Freud’s final hypothesis, as expressed in Civilization and its 
Discontents (Freud 1929/1989), the telluric duel of Eros and Thanatos traps 
humans in an irresolvable double-bind.  Unrestricted Eros threatens social 
bonds, because it constantly induces fresh claims and desires, destabilizing fixed 
relationships and character features. Thanatos appears from the beginning as 
a craving for stillness and order and the cessation of tensions. But Thanatos 
unchecked would be a desire to return to the womb and ultimately to regress 
behind life itself, to become inorganic (Marcuse, 1955: 25). By the very same 
token, the root of all social bonds is ultimately libidinal, and it is Eros that 
makes it possible for humans to “combine organic substances into ever larger 
unities” (Freud, 1920/1989: 616).The action of Thanatos in the interest of the 
social order has the simultaneous effect of weakening it, just as the expansion 
of erotic relations can also produce their disintegration. The death drive’s forces 
of aggression help form the ego, but they also form the very entity (superego) 
that most threatens the stability of the ego. The superego emerges as “animal 
righteousness,” (Bell & Horowitz, 2016: 74), compulsive rage at the perceived 
impurity of the other.  
‘To repress or not to repress’ is Freud’s translation of the Shakespearean 
double-bind, ‘to be or not to be.’ Freud remained pessimistic and ambivalent 
about this dilemma in 1929, as the ideas and actions that would lead to an at-
tempted ‘Final Solution’ to the ‘Jewish problem’ in Europe began to materialize. 
Repressive controls are unavoidable corollaries of the maintenance of normal 
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social ties, controls whose traumatic intensity Freud found that many people 
were unable to sustain individually, and which could lead to explosive violence 
socially and politically, in a kind of blowback or ‘revolt of nature’ (Horkheimer, 
1947). Freud’s interpreter Herbert Marcuse summarizes: “The work of repres-
sion pertains to the death instinct as well as the life instinct. Normally, their 
fusion is a healthy one, but the sustained severity of the superego constantly 
threatens this healthy balance” (Marcuse, 1955: 53).
4. Wholeness – the Hidden Trend in Marcuse
In Eros and Civilization Herbert Marcuse (1955) claimed to have found 
a ‘hidden trend’ in Freud. Marcuse found grounds for a distinction between 
basic and surplus repression that would permit the loosening of certain civi-
lized restrictions deemed surplus to the basic requirements of responsibility and 
survival:
“…while any form of the reality principle demands a considerable degree 
and scope of repressive control over the instincts, the specific historical 
institutions of the reality principle and the specific interests of domination 
introduce additional controls over and above those indispensable for civi-
lized human association. These additional controls arising from the specific 
institutions of domination are what we denote as surplus repression. For ex-
ample, the modifications and deflections of instinctual energy necessitated 
by the perpetuation of the monogamic-patriarchal family, or by a hierar-
chical division of labour, or by public control over the individual’s private 
existence are instances of surplus-repression pertaining to the institutions 
of a particular reality principle. They are added to the basic (phylogenetic) 
restrictions of the instincts which mark the development of man from 
the human animal to the animal sapiens. The power to restrain and guide 
instinctual drives, to make biological necessities into individual needs and 
desires, increases rather than reduces gratification: the “mediatization” of 
nature, the breaking of its compulsion, is the human form of the pleasure 
principle.” (Marcuse, 1955: 37)
The utopian dimension of Marcuse’s theory is a direct corollary of the basic-
surplus distinction: our experience of the double-bind of repression is that of 
a particular historical era; it is not necessarily a universal human experience. 
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What appears necessary for civilization today might be discarded tomorrow 
as surplus. Controls on erotic activity, e.g., the rigidity of the institution of 
marriage, family structure, norms of public behaviour, etc. might all be greatly 
relaxed in a future social context where the energies of the death instinct called 
up for sustaining surplus repression have cooled off. In Batesonian terms, we 
could say that Marcuse is theorizing a release from the digital fetish, and his 
‘great refusal’ (see Marcuse, 1964: 255–7) of repression can be interpreted as a 
refusal to accept the ‘hubris’ embedded in actually-existing social institutions. 
Basic repression would then be the result of a trauma made humanly necessary 
by the inevitable digital cutoff. Surplus repression, which is not at all humanly 
necessary, results from the forgetting of that trauma and a spiraling feedback loop 
of ever-steeper losses of resolution in communication of all kinds.  
However, what might seem to be an elegant or convenient solution to the 
Freudian double-bind – distinguishing the basic from the surplus and discard-
ing the latter – is subtended by Marcuse’s complex meditation on the relation 
between Eros and Thanatos. Having extended the Marxist concept of surplus 
value into the psychic-instinctual realm, Marcuse does not seem satisfied. Rath-
er, in Marcuse as in Freud, “The ultimate relation between Eros and Thanatos 
remains obscure” (Marcuse, 1955: 27).  
The complexity of Marcuse’s investigation in Eros and Civilization seems 
at times undermined by apparently simple binary formulations: “Domination 
differs from the rational exercise of authority” (Marcuse, 1955: 36). This and 
a general spirit that might be summarized as ‘let Eros prevail,’ overemphasized 
and under-thought, can obscure the importance of some of Marcuse’s more 
ambiguous philosophical ruminations. Marcuse’s exasperated attention to the 
complex paradoxes generated by the Eros-Thanatos binary can be cut off in 
the interest of building solidarity for the ‘progressive’ side. If one reduces Mar-
cuse’s meaning to a slogan such as ‘be realistic and demand the impossible,’ he 
can be easily assimilated to such tragic and spectacular figures as Guy Debord 
and Slavoj Žižek, brand names for viral symbolic-insurrectionary violence that 
explodes throughout ‘social media’ today.9 On the global-celebrity academic 
9  The atmosphere of simmering rage that one often finds in ‘social’ media brings to mind Freud’s pessimism: “And 
now it is to be expected that the other of the two ‘Heavenly Powers, eternal Eros, will make an effort to assert himself 
in the struggle with his equally immortal adversary.  But who can foresee with what success and with what result?” 
(Gay, 1989: 772).
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stage, Marcuse is reduced to a footnote in the ongoing history of the insurrec-
tion of the underdogs. 
But perhaps this simplification should not surprise us. After all, Marcuse’s 
theoretical solution to the double-bind of surplus repression only places us in 
another double-bind. The civilized psyche is a product of surplus repression. 
This means that the death instinct colours its whole experience, along with its 
judgment and its relations with others. How, if one’s life has been ‘damaged’ 
(Adorno, 2005), can one be sure that a given mode of conduct judged to be 
surplus-repressive, really is surplus? Marcuse makes it ‘clear as mud’: “[I]n the 
history of civilization, basic repression and surplus-repression have been inex-
tricably intertwined” (Marcuse, 1955: 38). Marcuse’s extended meditation on 
this problem, which includes his warnings about the repressive desublimation 
– i.e., what appears sexually liberatory might actually serve the forces of sur-
plus repression – seem to cut against any easy sloganizing of Marcuse’s theory 
of political resistance. A resolution to the conceptual tension this generates in 
relation to his affirmative invocation of Eros remains a hidden trend in Eros and 
Civilization.  
It should be clear that the point of bringing Marcusean theory into con-
versation with cybernetics is not to refute Marcuse’s (or Freud’s) privileging of 
Eros over Thanatos. On the contrary, I think Bateson implicitly affirms Freudo-
Marcusean Eros in cybernetic terms, conceptualized as a process of learning 
operating simultaneously on multiple verbal and nonverbal levels. Cybernetics 
does not refute or radically exclude the Eros-Thanatos binary as a map, but 
rather sets up another way of seeing the organism alongside psychoanalysis, 
where we begin with a unified monistic structure of inner relations, nota duel 
or mythic antagonism. Let us see what depth can be generated with a binocular 
view of the Freudo-Marcusean notion of instinctual liberation and a cybernetic 
concept of learning.
5. Eros1,2,3 and Learning1,2,3
To make more explicit what is hidden in Marcuse, I am employing sub-
script numerals (1…n) as my application of a linguistic device developed by Alfred 
Korzybski in Science and Sanity (1948), which he called the index. I am using 
this device to account for the fact that the Freudian term “Eros”, as Marcuse 
uses it in Eros and Civilization, is very much multiordinal. To say a word is 
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‘multiordinal’ is to say that it refers to different logical levels in an ascending 
‘nesting’ scale of wholeness. For example, point is different from line, line is 
different from surface, and surface is different from cube, etc. but nevertheless 
point, line and surface are all contained in the higher-dimensional wholeness of 
the cube. Freudo-Marcusean ‘Eros’ similarly refers at once to a pulsating flux of 
partial drives demanding gratification, as well as to the integrating forces that 
bind the Ego, and yet further to a kind of generalized energy of cohesion in the 
organism and (at a higher level of abstraction) among organisms.
Unbound primary Eros1 is a violently unpredictable flux, almost indistin-
guishable in many manifestations from Freud’s infamous ‘oral aggression,’ the 
desire to consume the loved object. However, Eros1 also refers to the primary 
experience of continuity of being with the mother and is at the root of all social 
bonds. Eros1 seems to be dominated by what Bateson might call positive or 
regenerative feedback loops that shatter the stable operation of homeostasis.10 
Eros1 is, as it were, a steam engine lacking a ‘governor’ in the properly cyber-
netic sense of control-through-responsiveness. It corresponds to the experience 
of the human baby who intermittently explodes in hallucinatory traumatic 
screams and dissolves in blissful oneness with the mother, and who is otherwise 
unable to ‘fend for himself ’ until a relatively advanced age (relative to other 
mammals). Eros1, the level of fragmentary and partial drives, can be immensely 
destructive if it produces a conflict within the whole that contains it.  The hu-
man infant requires a maternal or parental agency outside of it as its ‘governor.’
In this fragmentary, incoherent form, Freud and Marcuse would say that 
Eros can become Thanatos. In a Korzybskian-Batesonian framework, speaking 
multiordinally, we can designate the fragmentary partial drives as Eros1. Eros2 
would be of a higher logical order, a structure that binds together the partial 
drives – or more precisely, that is those drives, in a higher-order structure – and 
in this way makes the human being capable of responsibility to others. This can 
be described in psychoanalytic terms as ‘repressive’ in the sense that it represents 
a stage of greater self-control that evolves out of conflicts at the level of Eros1, 
involving crucial ‘altruistic’ experiences of failure, self-sacrifice, etc. With such 
a multiordinal map of the psyche we gain a sense of depth: we can sense why for 
10  See “Cultural Contact and Schismogenesis” for Bateson’s account of how positive feedback cycles within and be-
tween individuals disrupt psychic and social stability (Bateson, 1971: 61–72).
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Marcuse Agape (responsible, self-sacrificing, divine love) need not be seen as 
the opposite of Eros. Rather it ‘is’ Eros organized at a higher logical level:
“…nothing in the nature of Eros justifies the notion that the “extension” of 
the impulse is confined to the corporeal sphere.  If the antagonistic separa-
tion of the physical from the spiritual part of the organism is itself the his-
torical result of repression, the overcoming of this antagonism would open 
the spiritual sphere to the impulse. The aesthetic idea of a sensuous reason 
suggests such a tendency. It is essentially different from sublimation in so 
far as the spiritual sphere becomes the “direct” object of Eros and remains 
a libidinal object: there is change neither in energy nor in aim. The notion 
that Eros and Agape may after all be one and the same – not that Eros is 
Agape but that Agape is Eros – may sound strange after almost two thou-
sand years of theology.” (Marcuse, 1955: 210) 
Not only does Marcuse reject the tradition of replacing Eros with Agape; he 
goes further, to the point of suggesting that Eros at the higher levels is Agape, 
that its wholeness is marked by an erotic as well as empathic (and traumatic) en-
counter with suffering, whether in the other or in the self – with Thanatos. The 
ambiguity and mystery of these formulations can be reduced, or seen freshly, if 
we imagine Marcuse as wanting to replace the traditional notion of moralizing 
Agape afflicting Eros with guilt, with a notion of Eros as a structural process 
operating simultaneously at differing logical levels.  
Eros1, a bundle of partial drives incapable of sustained empathy with others 
and lacking a character structure, corresponds to the Freudian id and to pri-
mary process. Eros2 corresponds to ‘normal’ character development, the erec-
tion of a structure of controls that Freud recognized as repression of Oedipal 
ambivalence, the development of secondary out of primary process, feelings of 
guilt and self-worth etc. Marcuse is not advocating the ‘liberation’ of Eros1 as 
against the controls and responsiveness characteristic of Eros2. Rather, to put 
it in cybernetic terms, Marcuse aims to achieve Eros3. Eros3 would reform and 
bind the energies of socialization in a yet-higher-order structure. Eros3 would 
feature deepening awareness of the multiordinal structure of Eros(1,2,3)as well as 
of the double-binds encountered at the level of Eros2 in a socially fragmentary 
context. Discourses of ‘self-worth’ would be supplanted by notions of self as a 
constellation of learning experiences.
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This tripartite structure of Eros(1,2,3)can be provisionally mapped onto Bate-
son’s theory of levels of learning (Bateson, 1971: 279–308).11 Learning1 is then 
the acquisition of bits or fragments of information (corresponding approxi-
mately in humans to Freud’s ‘primary orality’, Eros1). Most, if not all, living 
beings appear capable of this form of learning. Learning2, which Bateson also 
called ‘deutero-learning’, is learning how to learn bits of information by organ-
izing them in sets. This development is routinely accomplished by most ‘higher’ 
animals and by humans after the age of about three, and indeed is ingrained in 
us as a set of self-correcting, relatively static features of the kind Freud called 
‘character’(1908/1989: 293–7):
“It is said that Mr. Jones is dependent, hostile, fey, finicky, anxious, exhibi-
tionistic, narcissistic, passive, competitive, energetic, bold, cowardly, fatal-
istic, humorous, playful, canny, optimistic, perfectionist, careless, careful, 
casual, etc.  In light of what has already been said, the reader will be able to 
assign all these adjectives to their appropriate logical type.  All are descrip-
tive of (possible) results of Learning2…”(Bateson, 1971: 297–8)
‘Character’ formations are stereotyped and self-correcting habits of which 
we are mostly unaware, because they form the context of how we ‘learn to 
learn.’ ‘Character’ formations are inevitably at work in humans in every in-
stance of the operation of conscious purpose. This corresponds to the level of 
the Ego and of Eros2.
What would correspond to Marcuse’s distinction between basic and surplus 
repression in Bateson would consist not in acquiring a piece of information 
about the nature of politics (Learning1). Nor would it consist in acquiring 
a new way of acquiring pieces of information about social and political life 
(Learning2), the level where a great deal of ‘ideological critique’ comes to rest.  It 
would require learning new patterns of learning to learn, or Learning3. Learn-
ing3 is an order of magnitude more complex than Learning2, an exponential and 
not additive expansion, which would be experienced as a continuous dynamism 
in a new dimension whose existence could not be inferred from the contents 
of Learning2. Bateson said that a normal human adult would encounter Learn-
11  We might, for example, provisionally ignore the difference between ‘love’ and learning. After all, Bateson defines 
learning as change, and love continually changes us – if it does not change us in each moment it is more than likely 
bound at the level of character or a partial drive (Eros1 or Eros2). For more on Bateson’s theory of levels of learning 
see “The Logical Categories of Learning and Communication” (Bateson, 1971: 279–308).
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ing3 as an event of supersession of life’s difficulties, a ‘conversion experience’, 
an overall opening of the self beyond the ego’s conscious purposes that Bateson 
called ‘the larger system.’12 This would in turn involve a profound analog-digital 
integration, a quantum leap forward in the capacity of language and conscious-
ness to map social experience richly, without forgetting the traumatic cut digital 
language applies.
In practical terms, looking at Marcuse’s basic-surplus repression distinction 
through a Batesonian lens, we may have a clearer sense of why it is not sufficient 
merely to transmit or receive the ‘correct’ political information, from the ‘cor-
rect’ wing of the spectrum, as if one wing holds a monopoly on repressiveness or 
responsibility. What is needed is a fundamental flexibilization of ways of learning 
to learn, a flexibilization that shatters the narrow fixation of a few behaviour 
patterns (avaricious acquisition, neurotic co-dependence, limitless self-evalua-
tion, self-justification and vilification of the hated other, etc.).We need to tran-
scend the narrow fixation on the acquisition of information and control where 
‘the digital’ (inside or outside our skin) is fetishized as the whole of learning. 
We need to shake loose this digital fetish that operates as the commodities as 
much as it operates among them, and this requires a fundamental and dynamic 
epistemological shift connecting the level of self to the level of the larger system, 
encompassing self-in-society and in turn society in the whole biosphere.  
6. Learning4 and the Political Problem of Wholeness
But this is to point to what we might call Eros4, corresponding to what 
Bateson labeled as Learning4 which, as he conjectured very briefly, might be 
achieved at the level of the evolution of an entire population or the biosphere in 
toto (Bateson, 1971: 293). It seems plausible enough to compare what Bateson 
means by Learning4 (i.e. a fundamental transformation of terrestrial mind and 
nature via the overcoming of ‘hubris’) with what Marcuse means by ‘revolu-
tion,’ which he explicitly articulates in terms of the liberation of nature from 
12  Bateson describes Alcoholics Anonymous as an organization aimed at helping its members to undergo the difficult 
process of Learning3 as the only effective way to transcend addiction patterns.  The first step is admitting I have a 
problem and that I cannot solve it, that I must appeal to a Higher Power than my own judgment for aid.  A shatter-
ing of fixed patterns of Learning2 can result in psychic breakdown, a reversion to Eros1 in Freudian terms; hopefully 
it may activate higher order learning patterns such that multiple patterns of Learning2 can be noted and compared 
in the self.  The unicity of the self is both abandoned and consummated as the Wholeness of Self-in-contact-with-
Higher-Power (Bateson, 1971: 309–337).
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domination. And yet Bateson explicitly distanced himself from the Marxist 
identification with class schismogenesis and certainly never endorsed any idea 
of ‘revolution.’  We have seen that the Freudo-Marcusean theory of instinctual 
liberation bears many implicit similarities to the Batesonian theory of learn-
ing, and that the surplus repressive double-bind (‘how can I eliminate surplus 
repression from within a surplus repressive context?’) can be traversed, if not 
undone, by approaching the entire psychic structure in terms of multiordinal 
levels of organization (Eros1,2,3). We thereby move from a quasi-mythic binary 
system (Eros v. Thanatos) to a monistic multiordinal system typical of cybernet-
ics. 
The difference between Freudo-Marcusean theory and Bateson’s is not 
erased. A relation has been established without eliminating the difference, 
which is necessary to maintain the depth for the binocular vision of Bateson’s 
metaphor.13 For just as Marcuse’s text may be vulnerable to a reduction to insur-
rectionary romanticism, misguided acts of provocation, interminable vindictive 
self-righteous blame, etc., cybernetics is vulnerable to what the radical Leftist 
group Tiqqun call ‘the cybernetic hypothesis.’ Tiqqun remark incisively on the 
socio-political significance that Bateson’s theory has had in practice:
“Under the influence of Gregory Bateson, the Von Neumann of the so-
cial sciences, and of the American sociological tradition, obsessed by the 
question of deviance… socio-cybernetics was aimed, as a priority, towards 
studying the individual as feedback locus, that is, as a “self-disciplined per-
sonality.” Bateson became the social editor in chief of the second half of 
the 20th century, and was involved in the origins of the “family therapy” 
movement, as well as those of the “sales techniques training” movement 
developed at Palo Alto. Since the cybernetic hypothesis as a whole calls for 
a radically new physical structuring of the subject, whether individual or 
collective, its aim is to hollow it out.  It disqualifies as a myth individual in-
wardness/internal dialogue, and with it all 19th century psychology, includ-
ing psychoanalysis…. Each person was to become a fleshless envelope, the 
best possible conductor of social communication, the locus of an infinite 
feedback loop which is made to have no nodes. The cybernetization process 
13 There is in fact another possible approach that I do not have time to cover in this paper, namely treating Freud’s 
confrontation of Eros and Thanatos, as a lived experience of a mythic archetype, in the therapeutic relation, as itself 
a formation of Eros3, albeit one whose necessarily social dimension was expressed in more tragic and ambiguous terms 
than in Marcuse, for example in Civilization and its Discontents.
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thus completes the “process of civilization,” to where bodies and their emo-
tions are abstracted within the system of symbols. ” (Tiqqun, 2001: Section 
III, para. 1)
Bateson’s relational theory of the psyche, for example, as interpreted and 
practised by some family therapists, has dissolved from Learning3 (patients and 
communities learning dynamically about the way ‘mental’ illness is learned in 
social contexts) back into Learning2 (moral judgments of families – see par-
ticularly Bateson, 1978: 231ff). This in turn may have helped clear the field for 
that simplest and most invasive of technological psychic controls, the pharma-
ceutical-commodity form (Learning0). This inertia, it might be argued, resulted 
from Bateson’s failure or refusal to articulate clearly a specifically socio-political 
distance between his notions and those of traditional morality, civilized values, 
etc.14 Mary Catherine Bateson has questioned her father’s refusal to commit 
himself to political action, which she conjectures may have derived from war 
trauma:
“I believe that Gregory’s rejection of political action came out of his World 
War II experiences, when politics were directed toward the defeat of an ene-
my, and Gregory’s own role in psychological warfare involved the deliberate 
corruption of communication. Thus, I see him rejecting an action program 
that, by defining purposes and particularly the purpose of victory, would 
embrace a deliberate blindness. We have, however, in our heritage from the 
Greeks, side by side with the idea that politics are about domination and 
power over the other, the idea that politics are about conversation – that the 
process benefits from disagreement and difference.” (Bateson, 1991: 320)
On the other hand, to describe contemporary global politics as a ‘conver-
sation’ seems rather optimistic – at least more so than it may have seemed in 
1991.In this ‘damaged life’ (Adorno, 2005) the ‘spiritual’ or ‘internal’ dimen-
sions of the struggle may sometimes be more important or all that is possible in 
a given time and place. Contrasting Batesonian psychology with Lacanian psy-
choanalytic theory, Gad Horowitz notes that in Bateson’s work hubris remains 
a ‘systemic-ecological-epistemogical-cognitive’ issue and that Bateson does not 
directly confront the “inevitable traumatic incursion of language into Being” 
(Horowitz, 2016).
14  This failure or refusal arguably places Bateson close to the pessimistic position of Freud, though he does not occlude 
the social dimension of the ego as much as Freud’s quasi-mythic language can do or be made to do.
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What do we see when we look simultaneously through cybernetic and psy-
choanalytic lenses? That ‘partial’ Eros (Eros1 and Eros2) can be destructive as 
well constructive to wholeness. That a ‘correct’ course to ‘liberation’ cannot be 
given in its entirety, complete and whole, in any non-contradictory language. 
Perhaps it must begin and end with questions rather than answers:
“Perhaps there is no single vision that everyone should agree on; perhaps 
the essential wisdom will be woven through the discourse of diverse com-
munities. Perhaps I am right only by virtue of being contradicted, but 
whoever drowns out my words, for whatever reason, is surely wrong…. The 
central achievement of political action and education may be the broad-
ening of political agendas, the acceptance of new patterns of relevance.” 
(Bateson, 1991: 320)
Then again, cybernetics reminds us that information can be most easily 
corrupted by the addition of more and more information, ultimately resulting 
in insignificant noise. Too much noise impedes the articulation of the higher 
dimensions of relevance.15 So it would be ‘surely wrong’ to allow Marcuse’s 
chilling last words in Eros and Civilization to be swallowed up in a cybernetic 
sea. They are truer than ever today:
“Theology and philosophy today compete with each other in celebrating 
death as an existential category: perverting a biological fact into an onto-
logical essence, they bestow transcendental blessing on the guilt of man-
kind which they help to perpetuate – they betray the promise of utopia. In 
contrast, a philosophy that does not work as the handmaiden of repression 
responds to the fact of death with the Great Refusal – the refusal of Or-
pheus the liberator. Death can become a token of freedom. The necessity 
of death does not refute the possibility of final liberation. Like the other 
necessities, it can be made rational – painless. Men can die without anxi-
ety if they know what they love is protected from misery and oblivion…. 
But even the ultimate advent of freedom cannot redeem those who died in 
pain. It is the remembrance of them, and the accumulated guilt of man-
kind against its victims, that darken the prospect of a civilization without 
repression.” (Marcuse, 1955: 236–7)
15 Mary Catherine Bateson’s response to Klaus Kippendorff’s pessimism about political communication, recorded as 
part of her introductory lecture for “Cybernetics in the Future” the 2014 conference of the American Society for 
Cybernetics, Washington D.C. (M. C. Bateson, 2014), illuminates the issue of ‘cutting through the noise’ of global 
political discourse (Kippendorff’s comment occurs at 1:02:40 in the video, Bateson’s reply follows).  
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The Female Target:  




Abstract: The essay culls from classical texts and personal experiences of libertine 
intimacy with strangers to address age-old academic blind spots regarding group sex as a 
recurring fantasy and sexual practice. What is brought forth is a Freudian and Lacan-
ian analysis of the relationship between contemporary desire and digitality through “the 
gangbang” as articulated on digital platforms. The focus is on digitally-assisted gang-
bangs involving a transvestite and several heterosexually identified males, and what such 
events reveal about digital media’s and heterosexuality’s demands. The author argues 
that this sexual configuration is a re-enactment of “the great misdeed”, which Freud 
recounts in Totem and Taboo as the mythic primordial killing of the Father by the band 
of brothers. This symbolic occasion is described as the genesis of social organization and 
re-emerges as a form of mourning the disappearance of the fleshly body as new media 
turn it into digital code. Such a codification of the body awakens anxieties around the 
fictitious conflation between penis and phallus. In the face of the digital, man outsources 
his phallic power, which is suddenly required to be represented corporally at all times, 
to a virtually organized multitude that is willing to sacrifice freedom in the name of 
the group, and the legitimation of hetero-masculinity that it can presumably grant. The 
gangbang also appears as a digitally mediated opportunity for old fantasies of aggression 
and expiation to articulate themselves without putting the white male heterosexual body 
on the line. 
Keywords: psychoanalysis, digitality, digital culture, rape culture, gangbang, group 
sex, trans, cross-dressing, cruising, death drive
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“Because there are three, one of them can watch 
what the other two are doing together. (…) Or, 
because there are three, two can worry about the 
third, for instance the one lying down.”
Lydia Davis, The Cows
1. The Phallus as Collective Trompe L’œil 
In the summer of 2009, I attended a conference in France entitled The 
Unconscious and Sexual Identity, organized by a Lacanian research group. The 
room was filled with renowned panelists, mostly practising psychoanalysts, and 
the moderators were celebrities in the field. The ideas raised were theoretically 
fascinating, but the comments were anodyne, and the discourse rather techni-
cal. For an intellectual space whose language was supposed to be desire, nothing 
indicated that we were speaking about bodies and bodily practices. It was as if 
in the name of rigor, erudition or decorum, concepts had to be handled with 
latex gloves – no matter, or precisely because of, how messy they were, as if not 
to taint, or implicate, the bodies of their handlers. 
That is until a lone woman in the audience raised her hand and punctured 
the protocol. Her very physicality felt conspicuously out of sync with the well-
coiffed multitude that surrounded her. Her red hair was too voluminous to be 
tamed into place, her skin slightly weathered, her demeanour unapologetic. 
Without hesitation, she delivered a response about women’s bodies being me-
diators of sex between men, heterosexuality’s most fundamental schema, by 
claiming that feminine mediation became most literal in the gangbang.
In a conference about sexual identity, on its third day, that had yet to con-
sider something other than the heterosexual desire of the couple, apart from 
its supposedly opposite homosexual counterpart, which simply “confirms” it, 
the woman’s speech caused no visible commotion. Yet it worked as a Pandora’s 
box opening, the kind that makes others feel guilty, if not intellectually dis-
honest, for not having initiated such a move sooner. One comment, and its 
straightforward delivery, introduced the body as a living organism among many 
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– potentially ugly, porous, dishevelled, disgusting, leaky, horny, smelly,2 and un-
interested in its intactness –into the domain of a legitimate object of inquiry. 3
The woman’s comment cracked open the limits of the discourse as its recog-
nizing the gangbangable body – the body as gangbangable – meant a recogni-
tion of the body in practice, that is, the body that wants too much, too much 
and all at once, the body that wants because and despite. To see this body and to 
speak it is to expose oneself as an animating agent of such a body. It is to refuse 
the omniscience and distance associated with a masculinist position, which we 
may call écriture masculine: a masculine way of writing bodies out without risk-
ing disclosing the status of one’s own. To render the gangbang public meant 
implicating her self in a sexual multiplicity that is loud and obtrusive, that is, in 
the terrain of the unavowable, the disgusting, the not-so-catholic noises (Giard, 
2014).
Virginie Despentes (2006) recognizes in collective male laughter a seminal 
sign of the brotherly multitude that enacts a gangbang, the brotherhood on 
which the gangbang depends, but also the general (rape) culture – a methodi-
cally arranged gangbang in its own right. Despentes notes that man’s attempts 
to live up to the myth of the phallus always fall short, regardless of the various 
technologies he may use to mimic a convincing phallicity, such as artificial 
limbs in their literal and symbolic forms (Despentes, 2006: 37). This phallic 
failure thus begets stratagems of denial and the interpellation of the group as a 
way to masquerade absence, inability and frailty. 
The phallus depends on a complex network of technologies to hold itself up 
in a spectacular non-fragmentary fashion. One way of forging a believable phal-
lus, or a sense of it, is through the coming together of “a number of men” who 
unite “in strength superior to any single individual and remain united against 
all single individuals”, which amounts to the constitutive dynamic of civiliza-
tion (Freud, 2011: 53). For Freud, “artificial limbs, so to speak, [are] quite 
2  Gayle Salamon, via Merleau-Ponty and Freud, reconsiders identity and the drive, and sexuality more generally, as an 
atmosphere, an odor, a sound, or a leading towards which points to past and future and spans multiple temporalities 
(Salamon, 2010). 
3  The body is, for Foucault, “a volume in perpetual disintegration” (Foucault, 1977: 148). Its condition as always 
already disintegrating gains explicit status with online representation of the cruising body, as it is pulled apart and 
back together, cropped into limbs and re/de-contextualized by the self who makes it anew and the other to whom 
such bodily compound is supposedly addressed. Fictions of intactness are at the center of Guy Debord’s concept of 
spectacle in a way that echoes the digital sex session as a specular and spectacular technology of disavowing the frag-
mentary existential condition of the body, evolving “into a world where even the deceivers are deceived” (Debord, 
2014: 1).
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magnificent when equipped with all his accessory organs; but they do not grow 
on him [on man] and they still give him trouble sometimes” (Freud, 2011: 59). 
Following this logic of gender configuration, Preciado sees the impossibility 
for man to ever nurture a link of solidarity with someone other than another 
man (Preciado, 2008: 318).4 This solidarity, that of the brotherhood that the 
gangbang displays so palpably, is exclusionary, as all solidarities, and rests on 
the inferiority of women, enabling men to laugh among themselves the loudest 
laughter, made louder through numbers. 
Despentes calls collective rape, also driven by the gangbang ethos of non-
consent and masculine multiplicity, masculinity through multiplicity, a war 
strategy that promotes one group’s virilization over another (Despentes, 2006: 
35). Man’s soldier-ness is thus literalized in the temporal juxtaposition that the 
gangbang performs: The battalion is not dispersed through time, kinship and 
geography (from father to husband, for example). It is not even housed inside 
an inbox with thousands of emailed photographs from potential, rejected and 
done-and-discarded digital lovers, but all at once in the same space with a clear 
and palpable target keeping their multiplicity from becoming one (Despentes, 
2006: 37). The gangbang is thus an apparatus of death-driven brutality in the 
repertoire of what Haver calls orthosexuality (Haver, 1996: 3), and Javier Sáez 
and Sejo Carrascosa name the feathers of heterosexuality, alongside genocide, 
nuclear terror, racism, misogyny, sports, engines, alcoholism, gangs and risk 
(Sáez & Carrascosa, 2011: 119).5 
For Jonathan Dollimore, the terrain of the unavowable – the “not-so-
catholic” configurations, temporalities, noises, and smells – too often suggests 
“anxiety if not aversion” (Dollimore, 2001: 367). This surfeit of a body (of 
orifices, blood, piss, vomit and overpowering hunger), excised from theoretical 
work and from conference rooms alike, shares a kinship with “one of the most 
significant repressions of academic writing about sexuality,” namely, disgust 
(Dollimore, 2001: 367). Disgust, which is excessive, as it trespasses on the limit 
of good taste, has a critical organizing function for sexual identity, practice, 
4  Jack Halberstam notes the complementary relationship between men in his reading of the film Dude, Where’s My 
Car? (Leiner, 2000) arguing that before the menace of castration and humiliation, the dudes face their obstacles “as a 
team, a unit, a collective, and each functions as the other’s phallus, or weenie”. Patriarchal power takes, then, at least 
two: “one to be the man and the other to reflect his being the man” (Halberstam, 2011: 66).
5  Sáez and Carrascosa also include “shouting,” “pushing” and “spitting” in the roster of the “obsessive rituals” of het-
erosexual masculinity (Sáez & Carrascosa, 2011: 120).
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politics and discourse: “the sexuality of some straight men is organized around 
a barely concealed contempt for, but also a fundamental disgust with, women. 
Crudely, they fuck them despite – or because of – not much liking them” 
(Dollimore, 2001: 368).6 In a gangbang scenario, the bonding of the brothers 
is achieved through the formation of an ambivalent target – it is wanted and 
reviled in unison, and its desire must be explicitly addressed through and for the 
group, as its annihilation (Dollimore, 2001: 371).
There is a silent etiquette that governs sexual noises and academic confer-
ence rooms, which not only polices the excitation/disgust divide, or composite, 
but also genders them: Loud moaning feminizes the subject as it indicates the 
‘too-much’ of desire that the subject is simply too weak to contain. The gang-
bang ensures that excess of desire is evenly distributed by the number of men 
in the space, whereas the feminine body is made extra vulnerable to libidinal 
excess by being that much lonelier in a room full of strangers. It is as though 
in a war whose victory and defeat are pre-determined by the sheer quantity, or 
asymmetric force, of those on one side and the sole target on the other side. 
That is, precisely the type of war currently fought across the globe, whose drone 
logic turns the battlefield into a hunting ground, doing away with the tradi-
tional relationship between sovereignty and borders. 
Contemporary digital culture demands a certain priapism from bodies. This 
is a perpetual interpellation of bodily visibility that male subjects have histori-
cally not “enjoyed,” or have historically not been demanded to put forth. Self-
display, when it comes to clothing, for instance, was progressively renounced 
by male bodies starting in the 18th century through Industrialization in what 
scholars have called The Great Masculine Renunciation. This meant that wom-
en became responsible for marking and flaunting class and gender difference 
through adornment, granting men protection from the perils of self-exposure. 
Masculine bodily presentation became progressively self-effacing, sober and in-
conspicuous: the very cut and colours of the male suit have remained virtually 
unchanged for hundreds of years when compared to women’s dress.7 
6  Susanna Paasonen remarks that heterosexual pornography tends to revolve around “female bodies as desirable yet 
somehow disturbing, disgusting, or even abject”. I would argue that the abject-ness of the feminine object is a pre-
condition for it to reach desiring status, which, as Paasonen suggests, works to maintain a safe distance between 
subject and object through disgust so that the first cannot be swallowed by the latter (Paasonen, 2011: 216). 
7  For a critical account of The Great Masculine Renunciation (see Silverman, 1986).
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We can thus see that there is something quite new and unsettling for men 
to suddenly, through the demands of constant digital representation of their 
bodies (that ultimate site of phallic failure), find themselves interpellated by 
the position of being-looked-at. When they are finally asked to represent them-
selves bodily, even if such a demand does not do away with their ability to look, 
new strategies for managing the threat of phallic undoing emerge. Furthermore, 
men are forced to come up with new ways to over-compensate the emptiness of 
that undoing, as well as new narratives for denying the sameness that the phal-
lus aims to mask.
The forging of the mirage of the phallus goes necessarily through the group, 
not only in the scene of the gangbang, which the digital makes practical, if not 
probable, but in the many ways men pose for selfies, which consistently involve 
pointing at other men in the frame (particularly in workout culture selfies): 
men making sure their hands are always rigid, never resting, never pointed at 
themselves but at the bodies of their fellow men. In the absence of other men, 
social media selfies of men often include phallic props, such as these men’s cars, 
trucks, alcoholic bottles, dogs, joints, bongs or protein supplements.8 
In a gangbang setting, the perpetual rigidness is both material, through the 
help of active accomplices, and aural, through noises of a specific kind – like the 
sound from slapping the (t-)girl on her bottom, the audible comments to the 
other men, and their collective laughter. These noises are elicited as if to remind 
the men that they are a brotherhood but also individuals, albeit circling around 
the same target: They have not merged into oneness, which would feel inces-
tuous, homosexual and ensnaring.9 The exchange of such sounds works like a 
call-and-response game where the other’s reply will always be a confirmation of 
what sense the sex scene has for its agents: a “we are all in this together”, which 
further alienates the (t-)girl and puts her in her place of ensnarement. 
Catastrophe, or the dreaded failure to abide by the fantasmatic regulations 
of heterosexual intercourse, is never too far away, as even the cleverest necropo-
8  For Alison Winch and Jamie Hakim, an obsession with muscular male bodies online is necessitated by a politics of 
austerity that literally strips men of being able to boast material goods. They are left with their bodies to work on 
and display as a plea for symbolic legitimization and cultural belonging (Winch & Hakim, 2017, forthcoming).
9  The complete loss of individuality is precisely one of the most fundamental necropolitical technologies granting men 
in a position of power – Western heterosexual white cisgender males – the luxury of omniscience and omnipotence. 
Entire populations are managed, and marked to die, through the very process of losing their status of human subjects 
and becoming masses to be occupied, through surveillance, migration, institutionalized violence or drowning with 
their sinking boats (see Mbembe, 2003). 
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litical techniques risk malfunctioning. Failure hovers over, always awaiting, in 
the process of undermining the sex scene (Giard, 2015). The disgust that the 
figure of the gangbang is supposed to elicit in a woman in the general culture is 
constitutive to her, for she is supposed to yield, not yearn. Her response to the 
spectacular cowardice that brings joy to the supposed agents of the scene must 
be one of only partial consent, which makes the gangbang an essentially rape-
like spectacle. Due to the sheer difference in numbers – the active multiplicity 
against one single presumably passive body – confirms, in the most scopophilic 
ways, the asymmetry that codes, and drives, the scene of the gangbang. The 
gangbangable body cannot completely long to be gangbanged, or, at least, 
shall not admit to it. Her loud moaning comes about as the après-coup of man’s 
ability to make woman speak not her pleasure, but the brutality of their own 
bouncing off of her.
2. Caulking, Shutting, Sealing: The Hole and/in The Frame
The introduction of the gangbang in the conference room that worked as a 
preamble to this essay spawned a new sense of academic integrity for me, one 
that allowed the body proper, the body in practice, my own cross-dressing body 
of the night before, my body of each and every night if sexual enjoyment is to 
happen at all, the nocturnal body of the t-girl for solely sexual purposes, my 
body, to be present, to be available, to be heard, to be smelled. Ironically, this 
body is missing even in the pornography of every night, in my bedroom and on 
my screens, obstructed by the ocean of men trying to penetrate its every hole, 
bust the female target into pieces, or piece her into a target. In gangbang videos 
and photographs, all one sees, after all, are men’s backs and buttocks obstruct-
ing the visual evidence that a woman is there somewhere, if anything, to keep 
the proximity of the male bodies from gaining homosexual status. If my only 
entry point into this economy of heterosexual violence seems to be to dress up 
as a girl and claim trans not as a stable identity, but as a technology, this also 
tells us how much the digital discloses the fragility of the concept of sexual dif-
ference. The popularity of my online ads, where a t-girl looks for straight men 
for a gangbang, points to the status of “woman” in the digital age, or perhaps 
to the loss of woman’s body, which is mourned into the broader, less bounded, 
category of the target – which covers a larger area. Here the object (of desire) is 
exposed, in all of its psychoanalytic glory, as a semblance, not a substance. 
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Scholars have argued that the digital is rooted in a binary logic in its back-
end, the actual code that mobilizes data flows and makes images appear in 
highly pre-determined ways. By the time we interact with the manifested digital 
content, much like what happens once sexual partners arrive at a sex scene like 
a gangbang, all the chips are down. Tara McPherson (2012) has referred to this 
binary structuring and archiving of data as a lenticular logic where two things 
are never true at the same time, but remain necessarily segregated. Yet at the 
level of affect digital networks are experienced mostly in a highly privatized 
fashion, which can lessen the surveillance of the superego (while raising other 
more institutionalized types of surveillance), allowing for desire to derail itself 
back to its original queerness and away from its normativizing, orthodox and 
orthopedic channels.
The abundance of the male butt(hole) in the frame of gangbang pornog-
raphy is excused as that excess is understood in the name of the overarching 
objective of the scene: the utilizing of woman’s holes as if to deny one’s own, 
or rather, the spectacular confirmation of woman as a collection of holes to be 
handled by a collection of men. The gangbang is an intimate (re-)erection of 
borders. Such tinkering with a hole-infested body to be managed by the group 
ends up producing the visual occlusion of the body in question in favour of a 
visual overabundance of the male hole and its vicinity. If the target is virtually 
kept from view, it must have been properly hit, claimed and occupied. At the 
level of the very frame, a scene that is meant to perform and enhance the in-
tensity of an invincible phallus – and to confirm the passivity of woman – her 
lack of wholesomeness – produces an undeniably homo-sexual visual spectacle. 
Through the devouring of woman’s holes (or, of woman into holes), which 
leads to the curious exhibition of the male hole and its provinces as a collective, 
another fantasy of hermetic masculinity is told. 
Since the male ass may serve as evidence of a universal hole (the anus has no 
gender, no race, no trans or cis status), it is generally disavowed through laugh-
ter and absence from the field of vision in non-pornographic conditions.10 Sáez 
and Carrascosa argue that male heterosexual subjectivity is based on a (male) 
body whose mouth can be open but whose ass must be sealed, whereas women 
10  On laughing as a violent kinship operation between men to the detriment of women, or femininity more broadly, 
as it plays out in digital trolling see Phillips (2015). 
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can prop their asses open provided their mouths remain shut (Sáez & Carras-
cosa, 2011: 73). 
The anus and its vicinity function as signposts for this universal condi-
tion, that is, of the human body as an open wound, unbounded and perpetu-
ally exposed, that transcends genderization and other forms of border control. 
Sáez and Carrascosa note that the skin has pores and, through them, water is 
exchanged with the environment. The stomach and intestinal walls are also 
porous, and it is thanks to that very porousness that the nutrients of food can 
be assimilated by the body. As a matter of fact, they argue, the survival of living 
organisms depends on their systems being open (Sáez & Carrascosa, 2011: 92). 
Control of the anus, which is literally framed by the buttocks, may even 
mark “something like a point of subjectivation” in the constitution of the 
subject, which the gangbang aims to shut, like the fixing of a leak, in woman, 
and disavow in men – despite visible evidence to the contrary. The anus and its 
vicinity overtake the frame while the men caulk the very small anatomic evi-
dence that props up naturalized fictions of a material female lack – the vagina, 
or its “opposite,” in the case of the t-girl  (these two figures, with such different 
genitals being so interchangeable in the scene of the gangbang is quite telling), 
as if emptying their own anal-existential anxieties by filling woman up to the 
brim.11 The heterosexist system hinges on the magnification of a small genital 
difference so that woman functions as the absolute other (Sáez & Carrascosa, 
2011: 119).12 As one potential gangbang participant from Craigslist once put it, 
“I can beat that pussy up and I love to DP [double penetration] and really get 
that slut airtight”. The organizers of a Bay Area gangbang recently advertised on 
Fetlife highlighted plans for a triple penetration (woman’s mouth, vagina and 
anus filled by penises) and entitled that event an “Airtight Party”. And if gay 
gangbangs are often scenes where pharmacological drugs such as crystal meth 
and poppers are meant to relax the feminized bottom’s sphincter we can pre-
sume that the looser the target the more room there is for it to be filled.
Human Rights Watch published a report on Iraq in 2009, which described 
a gay extermination technique that involved cementing the victims’ buttholes 
11  In a clarification that can help us understand the interchangeability of feminized bodies counting as the female target, 
Jordan Crandall reminds us that drones, that ultimate embodiment of digital violence, have no windows, that is, 
what matters is their function – what they can do for/to us – not what is inside them (Crandall, 2011).
12  For Fethi Benslama, concerted violence tends to ensue when rupture in processes of identification, or its threat, 
specifically involves fellow beings who are ultimately rather alike (Benslama, 2016: 101).
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with a potent glue of Iranian provenance, which could only be extirpated with 
surgical intervention. The gay men would then be forced to drink diarrhea-
causing medicine and implode in a type of involuntary fecal self-bombing 
devoid of any martyrdom. The torture and subsequent extermination would 
be captured and promptly viralized through cell phones. Interestingly, the act 
does not infect the assailants with the annihilating gayness that they impinge 
on their victim, as if immunity to the feminizing lack could only be granted 
through its violent pegging onto someone else – ideally by a group. Here the in-
fectiousness of lack is contained and performed jointly through a physical pro-
jection that literalizes a symbolic – and founding – projection (of lack) already 
made in the unconscious: it is woman who does not have it. A similar logic played 
out in Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi’s downfall as he was violated by a 
sealing of sorts – and also memorialized on video (extending the kin-making 
to fantasmatic brothers who may not have been physically present to witness 
it) – by rebels shoving a stick up his ass. The identification between “gay” and 
“anal sex” may be complete, but the torture centres exclusively around the bot-
tom gay, or the psychic labour of containing gayness in bottom-ness. It did not 
occur to the Iraqi militia to castrate top gays or to extend gayness to those who 
penetrate supposedly gay bodies (Sáez & Carrascosa, 2011).
I once brought to the attention of my Gender Studies undergraduate stu-
dents the fact that a lot of them felt compelled to preface their blog posts with 
“as a heterosexual male…” before expressing their opinions. One (“heterosexual 
male”) student, then, emailed me with an account of the following game, which 
he described as a common elementary school prank between boys, to illustrate 
his justification for the self-identificatory prefacing: it “revolved around one 
student placing his hand on a peers [sic] shoulder. For however long the hand 
was left on the kids [sic] shoulder determined how ‘gay’ the person was. The 
game may seem harmless at the time, b/c it becomes a competition to remove 
the person’s hand from the shoulder as soon as possible. But when the punish-
ment for being slow or not reacting determines ‘gayness’ probably stimulates 
the crazed out defense mechanism that probably follows kids into adolescence.” 
(Personal communication, September 27, 2011).
In the gangbang, as the men act diligently to plug woman’s openings, to tag 
openings as woman’s (whether their bearer literally be cis or trans, or gay bot-
toms – the necropolitical is staged through clustering bodies into “populations”) 
femininity carries a toxicity similar to the transmitting powers of gayness in the 
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children’s game described above: a hazard to be managed before our exposure to 
it enlists us as one of them. When “we talk about an object of desire, we are re-
ally talking about a cluster of promises we want someone or something to make 
to us and make possible for us” (Berlant, 2006: 20) As such, femininity and 
lack are zoned off as the dangerous properties of the other while the male self 
is further engulfed as a body amongst other male selves, guaranteeing a collec-
tively established signification to “male self ” beyond a shadow of a doubt: if he 
is gay I am gay and thus if he is not I am not. The male self is thus able to share 
not just woman, or the labour of tagging a gay body as unquestionably other, 
but the anxiety, and psychic precariousness, of maleness in general – a category 
dependent on the constant and brutal management of corporeal borders.
The anus as a site of heterosexual undoing is tamed in the gangbang through 
the violent mission enacted towards the female target, said to be the driving 
core of the congregation, like a drain, which excuses whatever exposure of 
normally disavowed (male) lack, or hole-ness. The omnipresence of the male 
ass in the frame in gangbang pornography and in the scene of the gangbang 
in situ points to a flaunting of man’s privileged position, the same kind of urge 
to display one’s fictitious immunity to lack – produced and celebrated by the 
group – that governs so much online violence, such as harassment, stalking and 
trolling. Since the target of men’s gangbang assembly is so loudly (re-)inscribed, 
the practice cuts them some slack, forgiving certain visuals and acts that may, in 
a different setting, throw them into the perceived lack-ness of the homosexual. 
Were this undoing ever to take place – if the female target went missing, or 
failed to do its job – we could expect new differences to be forged amongst the 
bodies that were left to count so that new targets, and new brotherhoods, could 
emerge.
Masculinity is, clearly, not in the genitals or chromosomes, but in the suc-
cessful, and bound to at least partially failed, maintenance of an impenetrable 
body. In the images that document and represent the gangbang, the gangbang’s 
fragments, the heterosexual male body has presumably never come this close to 
being penetrated, as men boast of their unused cavities, brushing them against 
the very tools that would potentially rupture their fantasmatically sealed holes, 
and perhaps courting them – as if to display their successful brush with their 
own undoing, or death. They know they will survive because by the time wom-
an arrives she is already dead. 
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3.  The Digital, The Multiple, and ‘The Great Misdeed’: 
The Gangbang As Bereavement Ritual
The strategy of phallic production through male multiplicity is called upon 
at a time of phallic crisis that digital culture launches by demanding that men’s 
bodies be exposed and exchanged constantly. Man has probably not been in 
such a vulnerable position in relationship to his physicality since “erecting 
himself from the earth” and adopting an upright position, “which made his 
genitals, that before had been covered [by a bent-over gait], visible and in need 
of protection” against feelings of shame (Freud, 2011: 66).13 This demand can 
only sustain itself through representation (digital or otherwise), outsourcing 
(to racialized others, to the group, or to weapons), and pre-emptive refusal to 
perform, or to perform alone. The gangbang’s male multiplicity feasting around 
a t-girl’s body may, for example, project not just lack, but the penis specifically 
as a potentially malfunctioning tool as woman’s exclusivity since the feminine 
body in the middle bears a malfunctioning penis: The devouring of a disarmed 
bomb, or the salvaging of a downed drone. When drones crash, in fact, their 
owners are often reluctant to admit proprietorship.14 A Craigslist lover once put 
it in a text message, as he inquired about my own penis: “I like to see it flapping 
out of control while I’m in control!” 
While pornography itself is based on an erection-penetration-ejaculation 
circuit culminating in the money shot, contemporary digital culture is driven 
by an erection-erection-erection circuit with the demand for actual penetration 
anxiously hovering over it. As a networked system with an endless potential 
for cruising, from one hyperlinked node to the next, the Internet fosters and 
sustains arousal. It is only invested in its resolution inasmuch as it gives way to 
its re-ignition. This drive towards an excitation that never finishes echoes a neo-
liberal ethos that fits nicely with fantasies of invincible masculinities. Websites 
need traffic, not respite. This is a promise only a team of agents – an entire army 
of drone pilots – can keep, with its multiple bodies, turns and shifts. There are 
ways beyond the group, or the gangbang, to manage the weight of the priapistic 
demands of the digital, and neoliberal ideals of productivity – Sáez and Car-
13  Freud describes this moment as “a time when visual stimuli became paramount,” and a new life form began. He also 
associates this with a lowering in value of the sense of smell. (Freud, 2011: 78) 
14  For a poetic-political reading on the erotics of drone crashing, “The shiny drone, the smashed drone”, see Crandall 
(2011).
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rascosa suggest fisting as a technique for the perennial erection of a genderless 
member, for instance. The fist and the anus show sexual difference, which dom-
inant systems depend on, to not be “so evident, and perhaps not even relevant” 
(Sáez & Carrascosa, 2011: 111).15 We can see one way of dealing with the 
digital injunction for phallic exposure in the frequency with which men post 
photographs of themselves working out online with hashtags such as #loading, 
#beasting and #beastmode, along with peptalk-like captions that seem to solely 
address other men, not women, and refer to their bodies as profit-driven ma-
chines immune to feeling. The hashtag here assumes the feminine function as a 
kin-making device linking men but only remotely.
The viral broadcasting of rape also works like an increasingly popular way of 
managing the burden of priapistic circuits. Here certain men are quick to not 
only attack, but also boast about committing assault, documenting their crimes 
and publicizing them. This is true for the Steubenville rape of 2012, when 
members of a football team “dragged a 16-year-old girl almost naked from 
party to party”, while she was unconscious and promptly “fondled, fingered, 
and urinated on” by at least two boys, and this was then shared by many more 
through the Internet. A larger group, dubbed the ‘rape crew’, took pictures and 
videos of the dead living body, which they then posted on Twitter, Facebook 
and Instagram. In one particularly disturbing video, a young man cracked jokes 
about the ongoing actions, claiming “they raped her quicker than Mike Tyson 
raped that one girl” (Chun, 2016: 97).
We see a similar logic in many other cases where boys cannot keep them-
selves from raping, but very specifically, from sharing the rape, when making 
the rape public through viral broadcasting becomes the most fundamental 
aspect of the act. The pleasure seems to be in the flaunting of the other’s body 
as a gaping wound for which one is responsible, which promptly takes the gaze 
away from possibly surveying one’s own body and the potential wounds, or 
holes, inherent to it. To rape collectively, to rape with and for the network, to 
gang-rape digitally, becomes more important than any physical, or sexual qua 
sexual, pleasure the abuse could trigger in the rapist. Stanford University rapist 
Brock Turner, who served three months in jail for his crime, took the time to 
snap a picture of his victim’s breast mid-act to share with his swim team bud-
15  Paul Preciado also points to the fist, and any human limb, as equivalent (if not superior) to the penis’ sexual function 
(Preciado, 2000).
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dies. The Vanderbilt University rape case also illustrates this, as Brandon Van-
denburg and his friends literally gang-raped an unconscious girl and still took 
a video and pictures to share with those who could not take part in the event 
live. Images of surveillance cameras that became widely available on Youtube, 
showing the young men dragging the unconscious girl’s body (the girl is often 
unconscious – would it matter if she was trans, a gay bottom or a doll?) from 
place to place add a chilling layer to the story, as reaching some kind of fantasy 
of notarized airtight masculinity is worth more than one’s freedom. One is will-
ing to risk anything but to remain outside masculinity guaranteed through and 
for the group.
In 2016, a group of around thirty men raped a 16-year-old girl in a favela in 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Thirty was still not enough to assuage the men’s drive to 
gang-rape, as they promptly shared images of the violence online, most notably 
on Twitter, where a video of a man sticking out his tongue in front of the girl’s 
bloodied body/corpse, post-rape, was accompanied by lines such as, “this is 
where the train passed by hahaha, these chicks are too easy”, and, “hahaha the 
train really wrecked this one” (Moraes, 2016, my translation). 
The highly precarious ways of managing the burden of priapistic circuits in 
the digital, exemplified above, refer us all the way back to what Freud described 
as the “great misdeed” that laid the foundation of human sociality. Freud ex-
plains the ambivalent relationship contained in sacrificing the Father by linking 
his murder with the death of the totemic animal in clans where the killing of 
such an animal was so occasional that when it happened it was undergirded by a 
holiday ethos, a ritual of “loud festival gaiety” that accompanied the temporary 
lifting of a prohibition. In a culture of rape, it seems as if assaulting the female 
body, or the body made female through assault, would hardly constitute an 
event such as the parricide described by Freud. In such a dynamic of gendered, 
or gendering, banality of violence, the thrilling holiday ethos lies in the circu-
lation of the act of cruelty, not in the act itself. The flow of data here mirrors 
and dramatizes the violent rush put forth through what certainly can feel like 
unlimited bottomless dissemination. 
The murder in Freud’s account of the great misdeed, or its mourning, could 
only be carried out by the various members of the group, never by one single in-
dividual. The effects of the feast could thus be multiplied at the level of fantasy 
and the guilt involved was promptly relieved through sharing. If the sense of 
231
The Female Target: 
Digitality, Psychoanalysis and the Gangbang
Diego Semerene
CM : Communication and Media  XI(38) 217–242 © 2016 CDI
individual force gains priapistic dimensions through collective circulation, the 
guilt derived from violence simultaneously diminishes. A sense of kinship was 
reiterated as these brothers in death celebrated and lamented, as they dreaded 
some kind of retribution for having killed the animal. We can see how electing 
the animal as the object of sacrifice enabled the murder to be repeated infinite 
times, whereas a Father’s death is unrepeatable. This brings forth a convenient 
economy of substitution where there will always be an easily accessible target to 
hit, which is at play in the interchangeability of girls and t-girls in the gangbang 
scene. In this manner, the t-girl appears as the ideal object of desire, able to trig-
ger the kin-making destructive response from the gangbang men, now brothers, 
while keeping the subsequent need to mourn to a minimum. 
In Freud’s scene, the brothers may have joined forces to overthrow the Fa-
ther, but they were still each other’s rivals among women as the post-murder 
guilt drove them to institute the prohibition of incest, “perhaps the most maim-
ing wound ever inflicted throughout the ages on the erotic life of man”, turning 
their eyes away from the mother and towards representatives of her semblance, 
that is, women more broadly (Freud, 2011: 74).16 Totemism worked as a pallia-
tive settlement, helping the brothers to deal with the anxiety stemming from 
having killed the Father by keeping his surrogate – the totemic animal – safe, 
while justifying that, had the Father treated the brothers themselves as they treat 
the totem, they would not have had to kill him. It was thus in death that the 
Father was most obeyed.
Since, for Freud, the totemic animal is a substitute for the Father, this scene 
of kin-making murder and mourning illustrates not just the interchangeability 
of objects-cum-targets (and certainly, of their materiality) but also children’s 
contradictory feelings towards the paternal figure, who is both venerated and 
despised, “envied and feared” (Freud, 2013: 129). Freud’s account and expan-
sion of the Darwinian conception of the primal horde suggests that a new form 
of technology, “a new weapon”, might have enabled these brothers to finally 
rebel against a Father who kept “all the females for himself and [drove] away 
the growing sons”. This new technology would have brought the brothers a 
16 A Facebook posting by a recent Craigslist lover, ahead of the 2015 Superbowl, illustrates some of these points, “Hav-
ing played both soccer and football, I recently happened to witness and be a part of something that would not be in 
my best interest to mention in detail, but what I got out of it is what my coaches, bosses and fraternity have preached 
to me all throughout my life...no one person is bigger than the team...no one person should ever feel or act as if 
they are...a team is always one... one focus, one goal, and should always work as one, both mentally and physically” 
(Personal communication, 2015).
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feeling of superiority, giving them the push needed to put their feelings (of vio-
lence) into practice and eat their victim raw, like “cannibalistic savages” (Freud, 
2013: 129). 
If we extend the great misdeed further as a blueprint for the thrilling dy-
namics at stake in the gangbang scene, we can see how this switch of targets 
from the actual Father to his bestial representative suggests that the t-girl is a 
rather seductive target for the gangbang feast. The t-girl’s dubious status – si-
multaneously is and is not woman – makes it particularly easy for men to toggle 
between the appropriateness of the target as an object woman enough to merit 
destruction but not woman enough to produce guilt. Let us also remember 
that by the time the t-girl enters the scene, her penis is already dead. In fact, 
the deadness of the penis, at least in its status as a fleshly surrogate for the phal-
lus, is the t-girl’s raison d’être. The fashioning of the gangbang’s target as a t-girl 
at once dramatizes the eminence and irrelevance of sex in the drive to destroy 
and to repair. Genitalia, that presumed gendering guarantor, are either blocked 
from view (by the multitude of male asses in the frame and the fact that only the 
target’s ass can be used) or rendered nonsensical, or rather, non-lenticular (many 
things are true at once). The gangbang then is not a parricide or a matricide; it is 
a violent response precisely to the anxieties that gender’s lenticular logic begets.
For Russell Grigg (2014), mourning is, in fact, not about losing the object 
but commemorating it. He stresses the way in which mourning insists in pre-
serving the semblance of the object – considering its materiality may be missing, 
as in death. Mourning is, then, a commemoration of semblance (of smells, of 
mannerisms – what counts as the object). It is crucial that this commemoration 
be at once private and public, as we can see in the various rituals of bereave-
ment – including, I am arguing, the gangbang – and totems such as the AIDS 
Memorial Quilt. Thus, while, for the congregating men, the gangbang can be a 
perfectly liminal site for a primal settling of accounts in the public and the pri-
vate, for the gangbanged subject herself (the t-girl in the context of this essay) it 
can be an opportunity to render her private position public, to seek legitimacy 
by inscribing her woman-ness publically (yet privately), particularly when her 
woman-ness is  not sufficiently passable to be taken out into the socius some-
what safely – as is the case here, with t-girls who only cross-dress for the purpose 
of sexual encounters with heterosexually identified men. 
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While the great misdeed revolved around the killing of the Father, Melanie 
Klein (1988) reminds us that human subjectivity is founded on violent fanta-
sies of destruction directed at whoever the caretaker is, along with feelings of 
guilt for having destroyed, even if just in fantasy, that which guarantees one’s 
survival. I am arguing that while the great misdeed was a highly gendered 
event, the affects that made it possible, along with the affective reactions that 
it caused (mourning, guilt, and destructive reparation), speak to an actually 
non-gendered drive to destroy and replace, to kill (as much as possible) and to 
mourn (as little as possible), to congregate and to topple, to ruin and to repair, 
and, most importantly, to make reparation by ruining – by ruining again. 
Sáez and Carrascosa argue that sexual binarism and the myth of the heter-
osexual-reproductive couple cannot operate in the domain of the anal, which 
defies its genitally dependent logic. The anal also questions another binarism, 
the one that divides human beings into heterosexuals and homosexuals (Sáez & 
Carrascosa, 2011: 56). They refer to Paco Vidarte’s ethics of anality (analética), 
a counter-cerebral ethics of solidarity “more urgent, honest, carnal, cruising, 
animalistic, prone to the basic necessities of those whose asses stick up in the 
air (…)” (Sáez & Carrascosa, 2011: 66). For Vidarte, this ethics would suck 
in everything and give nothing back in exchange, “usurping all that falls in the 
vicinity of our black hole”. An analethics is thus a bottom-centric scatologi-
cal response to man’s priapistic fantasies of bottomless violence. This ethics of 
anality is a barebacking ethics from the vantage point and for the benefit of the 
gangbangable body, where LGBT militancy would try a very different politics, 
in which all would go inside, all would be received, all would be allowed to 
penetrate so that we would “release shit and farts (…)”.
This new queer politics would embrace the reality of sex, and not its realness, 
by surrendering to the inexorable instrumentality of bodies and their one-sided 
needs of circulation, refusing “exchange, dialogue, and negotiation” (Sáez & 
Carrascosa, 2011: 69).
We might imagine how this analethical stance can spill over onto (social) 
dynamics beyond the sex scene – dynamics that shape the gangbang, but are 
not necessarily infected back by it. This is an active anality where the ass gets to 
choose its objects and functions, and it chooses all. Here the ass speaks back to 
genitalized sexual difference, universalizing the subject as a wounded subject of 
a lack whose sheltering, or hospitality, defies and signifies passivity and open-
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ness. In this analethic economy, brotherhoods would be disarmed because by 
extending kinship to all anus-bearing subjects there would be no-one else left 
to become a target.  
4.  Surrendering to Semblance, 
Retreating to Bottomlessness
On the libertine French site Netechangisme, several of the profiles feature 
duos and groups of male friends who share the same single account as they look 
for potential (female and trans) partners together – even if the interface itself 
only allows for joint accounts featuring one male and one female. Troifoisplus 
(“Threetimesmore”), for instance, presents itself as “3 young men (19, 21 and 23 
years old): Mathieu, Sofiane and Enzo for single or group encounters for pro-
viding women pleasure”. In the users’ comments associated with their account, 
where past lovers can leave performance reviews akin to those on Yelp, leagour-
mande (“greedy Lea”), a t-girl, praises the men as being an equipe de choc, that 
is, a dream team, or more literally, the type of helmet and body armour worn 
by police forces responsible for dispersing crowds. One of their techniques is 
to line up along the extremities of a street, as though they form a wall, and to 
move slowly towards the congregated men. Bukkorgang is one of several profiles 
that call themselves organizers of threeways, gangbangs (pluralité masculine), 
cuckold sessions, and back-to-back blowjobs (pipalachaine), that is pipes à la 
chaine. Pipes means “blowjobs” in French and à la chaine means “one after the 
other” but also “assembly-line work”.17  
The Brazilian roda de samba also illustrates the dynamic behind the gang-
bang’s equipe de choc in its labouring woman (and man) into being – an example 
of what Preciado calls a cybernetics of power, in which power circulates through 
shared performative fictions that are transmitted from body to body like electric 
loads (Preciado, 2008: 317). The roda de samba is a manifestation of working 
class culture, normally associated with the slums of Rio de Janeiro. It tradition-
ally consists of various male musicians sitting in a circle, drinking, riffing and 
improvising songs not unlike a jazz jam session. The lyrics to these sambas tend 
to sing the praises of traditional gender roles and the female form with im-
promptu and rhyming double entendres that lead to male laughter and bonding. 
17  Jc-lyon, who organizes regular events feature “one woman + transvestite + 3 or 4 bisexual friends (35 to 60 years 
old),” claims to have “a stock of about fifteen buddies so it is easy to find some that are available.” 
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While the men sing, women dance in the middle of the roda (circle) of men 
holding their instruments. The woman’s function in the roda de samba is that of 
a travelling target, a mobile eye-candy somewhere between a spinning top and a 
rotating bottle in a truth-or-dare game that keeps the men from having to stare 
at one another.18 As an excitation and shielding device, she is a reminder and 
a justification of the men’s congregated multiplicity. She brings them together 
whilst keeping them from sticking together. Hers is a prophylactic function, 
maintaining men’s relational status and barring contagion.
The gangbang’s exceptional status – it is an event that is at once heterosexual 
and queer – speaks to the totemic feast as its excitement also lies in the rarity of 
its manifestation. We tend to think of the gangbang as an unusual event, in its 
violence, excitement and frequency. The gangbang is a carnivalesque holiday. As 
a Craigslist responder told me in Las Vegas once, in order to justify his asking 
me if he could bring his buddy along to my hotel room, “We are in Vegas, so 
we are like, what the hell, let’s fuck a shemale together”. 
The gangbang works as an air pocket in the quotidian chokehold of a sys-
tem of otherwise draconian maneuvering in which the Father is as dead as he is 
ironclad as a ghostly presence. The Father’s absence is his “deification”, turning 
him into a coding metastasis, which instructs everything, bringing cohesion 
from scene to scene into a sequence, in a way that his non-virtual presence 
never could. To the question, “What is the father?” Freud replies, “It is the dead 
father.” (Freud, 2011: 135). His annihilation is the guarantee that he will never 
arrive to vex the virtues held up by His image. Ironically, a Fatherless society 
becomes a patriarchic one (Lacan, 2006: 688).
What Freud calls the “inciting factors” of the primordial disposing of the 
Father, guilt over the Father’s murder and defiance over his authority, have last-
ed through generations as a kind of damned inheritance, or a symbolic DNA. 
This is illustrated, for instance, in the persistence of religion and monarchies 
throughout history, with their god and godlike fatherly figures, and the repeti-
tive rituals without end associated with them. For Lacan, the Father’s castration 
leads to him “being nothing but a number”, which is “indicated quite clearly 
in dynasties” (Lacan, 1971: 14). The gangbang functions, then, as an uncanny 
re-appearance. When considering the uncanny, Freud stresses the element of 
18  Netechangisme user pachour22 tells me, “my goal is that you become my sex toy for myself and my friends”. Private 
communication in chatroom, retrieved from Netechangisme.com (2014, February 20).
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an unsettling return of something familiar, which had been kept hidden. He 
also relates the uncanny to infantile fantasies of the double (an imagined lost 
twin sibling a child may imagine), which the gangbang multiplies into triples 
and more, and which appears as “an insurance against destruction of the ego”, 
a denial of the irreversible power of death (Freud, 1919: 9).19
 The manifestation of ambivalence that drove the brotherly rebellion against 
the Father, as we have seen, simultaneously reconciles and re-enacts the murder 
for which the brothers seek expiation; as in the law of retaliation in which “a 
murder can be atoned only by the sacrifice of another life”, which can also work 
as a blueprint for understanding the addictive function of cruising writ large, 
and barebacking in particular. In his seminal essay “Matan a Una Marica” (“A 
Faggot Is Being Murdered”), Perlongher (1997: 36) lists gay hate crimes and 
AIDS as outsourced rites of sacrifice and penitence that produce a pragmatic 
eradication of otherness and the (not so) secret pleasure that accompanies it.20 
The bodily sites that remind the subject of his own lack, that is, of his own 
death, what Haver (1996: 12) calls “the body’s lamellae” (i.e., the ears, the va-
gina, and above all, the anus) are violently stuffed in another disavowing coup. 
When the gangbanged body is that of a t-girl, the aim comes into focus more 
clearly, as she represents not only anality, but also liminality itself. As a visibly 
wounded site, the t-girl is the gangbang’s ultimate target as a symbolic and 
material bearer of the very failure of “corporeal integrity of the so-called self ”. 
The gangbanged body being that of the t-girl is also exacerbated, as she repre-
sents bodily lamellae (she is a hole, one hole is all she has), by associations with 
“infection” and “otherness ‘itself ’”, which Haver links to the said lamellae as 
unsettling “surfaces that are both inside and outside (…)” (Haver, 1996: 12).21
In the gangbang scene not only is the power of the penis, the representative 
of the phallus in practice – its fictive animation – multiplied by the number 
of them in the room, but the introduction of a third (and fourth, and so on, 
through physical or digital sharing) male body in the session legitimizes the t-
19  Juliet Mitchell (2003) argues that siblings (in reality and in fantasy) introduce the child to seriality and death anxi-
ety: Where do I go now that there is another one of me? 
20  Fethi Benslama sees in the figure of the “über-muslim” (“surmusulman”) terrorists for whom the kinship-making 
injunction to attack is not about becoming but regressing to the past, a similar kind of expiation through annihila-
tion, or sacrifice, “[s]uch terror aims to reveal a destructive force that dreads nothing (…)” (Benslama, 2016: 19, my 
translation).
21  On the ears as unsettling lamellae, we might recall the multiplicity of men’s laughter during a gangbang, and their 
conversations amongst themselves as though a (t-)girl was not in the room.
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girl further as a her, and not a gender-neutral you. One man is thus able to refer 
to the t-girl by addressing someone else, forcing the gender-defining pronoun 
she to be uttered, whereas if there were only one man and one t-girl in the scene, 
the gender-neutral you would be the only pronoun possible – language failing 
to wound the t-girl enough to publicly inscribe her as woman. That is an event 
of language –with incredible (meta-)physical consequences in which bearing 
(the make-up, the accouterments, the lack) is being. As such, the same event 
can hold vastly distinct functions as it works as a re-enactment for the man but, 
at the same time, as the t-girl’s first entrance into the symbolic system in some 
ways founded by the great misdeed.
Like fire starters, the male multiplicity locks the t-girl’s feminine position 
into place once her mediating presence locks them into relation. “The pussy is 
never yours…It’s just your turn!” says the Internet meme.22 As one Craigslist 
trick said to another right before cumming inside me, “This bitch would be a 
nigga’s best friend in jail…”. Here, “this bitch” holds the gender notarization 
function that a “she” guarantees when the t-girl is stuck not before man but 
between men.
This setup authenticates the t-girl as a woman through the male multitude’s 
speech. When one man addresses another man in reference to her, he performs 
not only the function of “speaking to or about someone” but, and most impor-
tantly, a “way of approaching another such that one presumes who the other 
is, even the meaning and value of their existence”, as Judith Butler puts it in 
response to an unarmed black man addressing the (police) State with “Black 
Lives Matter”, a way of saying “You – white police officers – recognize my/our 
humanity!” (Butler, 2015).
In the gangbang, where a multiplicity of men (re-)gender a (t-)girl into place 
by the uttering she or her, and by sharing her body as they would a meal, the 
tone they use to hail each other reveals a belittlement of the negotiated feminine 
object-cum-female target. This belittlement reiterates she-ness as a filament, if 
not a net, safeguarding the men from taking each other for a she (Butler, 2015). 
If the gangbang is thus an event in language in which ambivalence is 
resolved, the digital is a network where age-old anxieties over ambivalence 
re-emerge, bearing the trace and the veering of their original violence but also 
teeming with opportunities for the re-claiming, or re-coding, of that very vio-
22   Retrieved from http://memegenerator.net/instance/53728866.
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lence. The gangbang, and the gangbang with a t-girl as its target in particular, 
is at once reactionary and subversive; it laughs with and laughs at the coding 
that makes its engendering possible. The gangbang is realistic. It makes good 
use of the code, computational and psychic, in order to find pleasure where it 
can. The gangbang does not re-write; it reads between the lines. The gangbang 
is ultimately trans-sexual, even if a t-girl is not its literal target, for its very dy-
namic exposes the functional role of each body, any body, in a sexual encounter. 
Driving the gangbang is a politics of survival where even if, or especially if, the 
materiality of the body is seen to deny such survival from the t-girl: bodily 
functions matter, not matter itself. Matter disappears, only fantasy is left, along 
with bits of bones, mounds of flesh, holes (avowed and disavowed), and the 
promise of never-ending fluids, like an entirely repaired spring-like breast that 
never dries up. 
I have pointed to the male collective as the agents of what we could call an 
archaic and infantile need to destroy and to repair, to destroy as a way of mak-
ing reparation. I have also established the figure of the digitally enabled t-girl 
as a spectre of re-signifying creativity, enjoyment and the hacker ethic. As such, 
the backend of networked communications (the digital) is not only intimately 
entwined with the backend of psychic structures (the unconscious) but they 
also abide by mirroring architecting powers and emanate corresponding ana-
lytical value. The digitally mediated gangbang is an emblematic instantiation 
of the network’s own orgiastic relationship to the data flows that constitute it. 
The gangbang is, then, a case of the heterosexual symbolic running at once at 
its most normative and its queerest, allowing unprecedented access to the way 
dominant forms of code perform themselves and to imagining techniques of 
enjoyment in the face of the pre-determining propensity of all code. The gang-
bang bugs the system without bringing it to a halt, making room for non-uto-
pian possibilities of enjoyment that make a mockery of the body as a bounded 
individual entity and of the future as something other than a cock-blocking 
operation (Shah, 2015). 
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Abstract: In this paper I explore the intersections of digital media, psychoanalysis, 
and the subject through reference to Felix Guattari’s notion of the chaosmic spasm, which 
the Italian philosopher Franco Berardi picks up in his work and most recently his book 
And. Guattari’s idea, which appears in his Chaosmosis, designates the fatal acceleration 
of the media semio-universe towards spasm, or apocalyptic collapse, and the emergence 
of some new form of schizoid organisation. Following an exploration of Guattari’s idea, 
and a broader discussion of its relationship to his wider thought and Anti-Oedipal 
collaborations with Deleuze, I consider how Bernard Stiegler may be seen to provide 
a meta-historical account of Guattari’s concept of the spasm in his Technics and Time. 
According to Stiegler’s account, the hyper-acceleration of media forms results in a process 
of disorientation and de-subjectivization where the individual is destroyed because of 
their inability to situate themselves in social, symbolic, structures that have collapsed 
towards hyper-rational, meaningless forms. In Lacanian terms, psychosis becomes a kind 
of generalised condition. In response to this generalisation of madness, Stiegler imagines 
the need for a new politics of knowledge and grammar that is able to suture individuals 
back into wider social systems and provide the kind of secure, careful, space that D. W. 
Winnicott writes about in his work on play. In order to unpack what this politics of cul-
ture and knowledge might comprise, I turn to Guattari’s work on schizoid subjectivity, 
or endless subjectivization without subjectivity, and Berardi’s contrast between financial 
semio-capitalism and poetry, in order to suggest an ethical mode of thought and cultural 
expression that might capture the political core of Stiegler’s vision and paint a picture of 
what human thought might look like on the other side of the new media apocalypse, the 
chaosmic spasm.
Keywords: chaos, meaning, globalisation, new media, psychoanalysis, subjectivity, 
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1. What is the Chaosmic Spasm?
How can the concept of the spasm, which describes muscular over-stretch 
and a sudden painful compensatory contraction, capture the experience of 
contemporary new media globalisation? In this article I take the idea of the 
spasm, and more specifically Felix Guattari’s (1995: 135) notion of the chaos-
mic spasm, to explore the reality of subjectivity in contemporary new media 
society. The concept of the chaosmic spasm appears at the very end of Guattari’s 
final work, Chaosmosis, which explores the possibility of the translation of the 
chaos of processes of globalisation into some kind of territorialised fundamental 
thought able to support a liveable form of subjectivity. Guattari writes:
“Psychoanalysis, institutional analysis, film, literature, poetry, innovative 
pedagogies,  town planning and architecture – all the disciplines will have 
to combine their creativity  to ward off the ordeals of barbarism, the mental 
implosion and chaosmic spasm looming  on the horizon, and transform 
them into riches and unforeseen pleasures, the promises of  which, for all 
that, are all too tangible.” (1995: 135)
In this context the chaosmic spasm describes the transitional moment 
where nonsensical chaos folds over into meaningful complexity that can be 
effectively integrated into a new mode of schizoid human subjectivity that is 
sensitive to endless change and uncertainty. For Guattari (2009), this mode of 
subjectivity-endlessly-in-the-making, which he calls subjectivization, is the only 
way to live with the kind of complexity that global capitalism or, in his words, 
integrated world capitalism has thrown humanity into. However, it is not that 
Guattari thinks that complexity is problematic or unliveable in itself, because 
what we find in his Three Ecologies (2014) is a vision of the potential, which is 
implicit in the recognition and experience of complexity for humans, to truly 
come to terms with the ecological truth of their existence on earth. The prob-
lem of global complexity and the new media universe, which has emerged since 
Guattari’s death in the early 1990s, is, therefore, not simply about complexity 
in itself, but rather the kind of wide open tech world into which it throws the 
post-modern subject, a world without effective coordinates or cultural signposts 
to enable proper, liveable, subject formation. It is this cold, unliveable, techno-
capitalist world that Guattari wants to over-turn through the chaosmic spasm, 
which indicates the apocalyptic collapse of human significance in a blizzard of 
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empty communication and the possibility of a new way of making meaning 
that is able to express humanity’s place in the world, where the world is built 
upon an understanding of ecological being on the earth. In order to explore 
Guattari’s (1995: 135) idea of the chaosmic spasm more fully, in the first part 
of this article I unpack the concept in conversation with Arthur Kroker’s (1993) 
theory of spasm from his book of the same name, before moving on to consider 
the development of global processes since Guattari’s death in the early 1990s. 
The point of this work is to situate Chaosmosis (1995), which, it seems to me, 
theorised the potential collapse of integrated world capitalism and the rise of 
a new symbolic order based on a fully realised recognition of ecological inter-
dependence, in the history of global capitalism and the development of what 
Hardt and Negri (2000) talk about in terms of empire in the period since the 
1990s.  
Specifically, here I refer to two events, (1) 9/11 and the subsequent ‘war on 
terror’ and (2) the global financial crash and consequent world recession, which 
might be read through the lens of Guattari’s (1995) theory of the chaosmic 
spasm since what they can be seen to represent is the moment when the over-
reach of empire became apparent and the spastic phase of globalisation that we 
currently occupy started to take effect. Apart from social and political mani-
festations of this spastic phase – which we might understand through reference 
to the rise of nationalism in America, where Donald Trump has suggested the 
withdrawal of the land of the free from the world stage, and similar phenomena 
in Europe, where opposition to the project of European integration has seen 
the UK vote to leave the EU – we can also trace the impacts of the failure of the 
global symbolic order that emerged in the late 1980s / early 1990s in the rise of 
a range of individual psychopathological effects, including depression, despair, 
anxiety, and outbursts of sadistic violence. We can find examples of these kinds 
of psychological responses to what we might call global psychosis brought 
about by the failure of the symbolic system of Guattari’s (2009) integrated 
world capitalism everywhere in contemporary society. Against the depression, 
despair and anxiety brought about by the apparently meaningless world, many 
have sought to escape into repetitive addictive behaviours that are able to of-
fer relief from the chaos of life, while others have fallen into suicide or suicidal 
violence projected onto constructed enemies. Perhaps this is how it is possible 
to understand the continuum between the savage violence of Islamic State in 
Syria and Iraq, which is concerned with resistance to the collapse of the Islamic 
246
Chaosmic Spasm: Guattari, Stiegler, 
Berardi, and the Digital Apocalypse
Mark Featherstone
CM : Communication and Media  XI(38) 243–268 © 2016 CDI
psychological world under the pressure of western modernity, and the suicidal 
violence of European Islamists and so-called lone wolves who take up the cause 
of Radical Islam in order to rage against their worlds. What the European Is-
lamists in the UK, France and Germany are playing out is their own suicidal 
response to the collapse of their worlds through the lens of a global and, beyond 
this, cosmic struggle between good and evil that can give their acts significance. 
In this respect, it would be correct to say that the European Islamists are men-
tally ill, since their violence is based upon a paranoid fantasy of escape from the 
horror of the meaningless present into a meaningful future premised on the de-
struction of all others, but a mistake to imagine that theirs’ is somehow simply 
an individual pathology that is not founded upon a wider cultural condition 
of complexity, chaos and the collapse of symbolic integrity (Benslama, 2009).  
In order to illustrate this point, and further contextualise Guattari’s (1995) 
theory of complexity and chaos, I also seek to theorise the despair of the pre-
sent through a discussion of Bernard Stiegler’s (2011b, 2012, 2014b) work 
on disbelief, discredit, default and the failure of the spirit of capitalism. What 
matters here is that Stiegler locates the disenchantment of capitalism, and the 
related rise of disbelief and despair that has led to general social collapse, in 
the emergence of the final phase of late capitalism or what the Italian autono-
mist followers of Guattari write about through the idea of semio-capitalism 
(Berardi, 2015; Genosko, 2012; Marazzi, 2008, 2011). According to Guattari 
(2009: 244), and his Italian followers including Berardi and Marazzi, semio-
capitalism refers to the moment when capitalist value escapes materiality and 
becomes lodged in the pure abstraction of sign. At this point all language be-
comes subject to the logic of commodification and valuation and there is no 
meaning beyond the ‘more or less’ calculations of relative price. In this context, 
Stiegler (2011b, 2012) shows that the problem with late capitalism, and in this 
respect lateness refers to the senility of the economic domination of the world, 
starts when the symbolic order is reduced to the carrier of quantitative value 
and no longer enables humans to properly articulate their experiences of the 
world. When this happens language has no real, qualitative value but simply 
measures productivity and profitability. This is why the symbolic order fails, 
and centrally fails as a network able to support civilized subjectivity, with the 
result that the subject falls into psychosis (recall that in Lacan’s work psychosis 
names what happens when the subject fragments before the failed master signi-
fier and the symbolic order it structures) and a pathological, defensive mode of 
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subjectivity defined by aggression towards the external world, which becomes 
necessarily threatening and destructive. In Stiegler’s (2012: 80–103) work the 
product of this process is the miserable dis-individual, a kind of destroyed self 
that survives through violent acting out (or what he calls negative sublimation), 
which becomes the principal means for the assertion of their existence in a 
world that seems chaotic and meaningless. In order to illustrate this argument, 
Stiegler (2012: 47) refers to the phenomena of the school shooting, for example 
Columbine or Sandy Hook, where young men seek to take their revenge on the 
cold world through the destruction of its future in young people and children. 
However, we might also refer to the recent terror attacks across Europe, which 
similarly represent violent expressions of an attempt to make meaning in the 
world, and other explosions of apparently meaningless violence.  
Building upon Stiegler’s work, I move on to take up this idea of negative 
sublimation (2012: 6) and read it against Franco Berardi’s theory of the digital 
apocalypse from his recent book Heroes (2015b), but also And (2015a), After 
the Future (2011), and Uprising (2012). In Heroes, Berardi supports Stiegler 
by showing how the collapse of the western cultural symbolic order under the 
pressure of global capitalism has led to the destruction of individualism and 
centrally the impossibility of individual action. Here, the collapse of the indi-
vidual able to make a difference, and the collapse of the hero who acts upon the 
world, has led to the rise of a culture of violent anti-heroism, symbolised by the 
violence of figures such as Anders Behring Breivik, who seek to create mean-
ing through notoriety and infamy. In much the same way that Stiegler (2012) 
attributes the rise of this kind of rage and violence to the collapse of symbolic 
systems able to ground meaningful subjectivity, in perhaps his most expansive 
work, And (2015a), Berardi shows how new media globalisation has effectively 
eroded human forms of communication and destroyed the possibility of the 
articulation of significance in semio-capitalist representations of value. Under 
these conditions, Berardi (2015a) explains that there is no hope and no future, 
since the subject is cast adrift in a sea of meaningless symbols of quantitative 
value that makes it impossible to imagine the new on the basis of a vision of the 
present and an understanding of the past. In this respect, Berardi’s individual is 
truly lost in the existential sense of the word because they cannot locate them-
selves in the world on the basis that they have no real language to articulate 
their experiences of the present.  
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When all that matters is productivity and profitability, experience becomes 
meaningless. As a result, the future ceases to exist beyond the endless demand 
to produce more and increase profitability, which is no kind of future at all be-
cause it fails to imagine the new. What, then, is the alternative to the dystopia of 
global capitalism without a future? In the conclusion of my article I pick up Be-
rardi’s (2012: 134–171) claim that escape from the horror of the late capitalist 
nightmare of connectivity, complexity and chaos would have to entail the recla-
mation of language from the abstraction of finance and new media communi-
cation and the reengagement of a poetic approach to expression where language 
becomes the carrier of embodied experience and perception in the world and 
perhaps more importantly of being on the earth. In this respect, I think Berardi 
(2012) can be read with Stiegler (2013: 98), who argues that escape from the 
destroyed culture of the present resides in a new politics of knowledge, disci-
pline and cultural engagement. However, where I think Berardi (2012: 8) rep-
resents an advance on Stiegler is in his reference to the experience of the body. 
Although he does not fully work out exactly what his embodied critique of 
semio-capitalist abstraction would mean for the contemporary, my view is that 
his target is what we might call the semiotic reduction of reality that tears lan-
guage out of communication with corporeal experience. In the semio-capitalist 
world of Berardi (2012), and for that matter Stiegler (2014a), the problem is 
that language has become subject to the logic of floatation and has no relation 
to real experience. This is, therefore, why Berardi’s (2012: 20) notion of the 
uprising is not simply about a taste for poetry, but rather concerns the creation 
of new worlds founded in the articulation of experience and perception, and 
Stiegler’s (2013) critique would benefit from the language of embodiment to 
gloss his theory of cultural politics. In this instance, it is not simply that the 
escape from the horrors of the permanent ruined present of late capitalism relies 
on a kind of elite cultural politics, where there is more to life than work and 
money, but rather that these cultural politics must reimagine the world through 
the expression of lived experience on the earth. In this way, the world, or the 
construction of a symbolic order able to sustain subjectivity, emerges from and 
presupposes expressions of an embodied experience and perception of earth.  
Finally, I conclude my article by returning to Guattari’s (1995: 135) theory 
of the chaosmic spasm, which I seek to contextualise in terms of the theory 
of geo-philosophy, that he wrote about in his final work with Deleuze, What 
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is Philosophy? (1994). The point here is to show that what Guattari imagines 
through the figure of the chaosmic spasm is a new ecological, terrestrial mode 
of subjectivity rooted in the experience and perception of earth. Since ecology 
is characterised by complexity, this new form of subjectivity could never form 
around a static paranoid fantasy of self-identity, but would instead escape the 
desperate need to assert defensive security through its ability to express experi-
ences and perceptions of an earth-bound existence in a new world that is sensi-
tive to what it feels like to live, suffer and imagine other ways of life. In this 
way I show how this new reality, the reality of the subject endlessly made and 
remade in the experience, perception and expression of life on earth and in the 
world, is what Guattari (1995) imagines when he writes of chaosmosis. It is this 
form of identification, which would render complexity liveable, that Guattari 
(2009) thinks will emerge from the catastrophe of integrated world capital-
ism, and which both Stiegler (2009) and Berardi (2015a) explore in their own 
works that are concerned with what we might call the contemporary new media 
apocalypse. However, before I reach the point where I conclude in a discussion 
of the ecosophical mode of subjectivity, I want to take up a discussion of the 
concept of the spasm and the ways it is understood by first, the Canadian media 
theorist Arthur Kroker (1993) and second, Guattari (1995), who complicates 
the idea through reference to the concept  of the chaosmic spasm.
2. The Chaosmic Semio-Capitalist Spasm
In his Spasm (1993) the Canadian media theorist Arthur Krorker explores 
the other side of the virtual, new media utopia that emerged in the 1990s. 
Written in the teeth of this utopia, where the limitations of reality itself seemed 
to have collapsed before the virtual where everything seemed possible, Kroker 
suggests that the problem of the new computational universe is that the pos-
sibilities that it might allow are firmly held in check by a technological concern 
for functionality. Even though it may not have been immediately apparent, the 
new utopia was never, in Kroker’s view, open to human possibility. Instead, 
it was primarily concerned with the absolute expansion of a logical system 
organised around digital data, and the representation and reconfiguration of 
the world in instrumental terms. In this way, Kroker reverses Deleuze and 
Guattari’s (1987) idea of the body without organs, which was primarily about 
the schizophrenic overcoming of the bounded organism in the terrestrial body 
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ecological, through the idea of the organs without a body (1993: 36–46), where 
all that matters is functionality and the kind of rationality that ends in the 
nihilistic disenchantment of wider significance. The difference between these 
two figures is, therefore, that while Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) formulation 
seeks to found subjectivity in significance based upon the ecology of life, Kro-
ker’s (2003) virtual utopia attempts to escape the limits of terrestrial reality for 
computational metaphysics and the flesh of earth-bound identity for the new 
infinite space of the digital where life can be made and remade without concern 
for boundaries. However, the problem with this new utopianism, which we 
might call the final modern utopia based upon the strategy of escape, is that its 
reliance on what Kroker (1993: 5–6) writes of in terms of a logic of floatation 
was actually tightly bound in terms of its fanatical adherence to the instrumen-
tal rationality of digital universe. Here, everything can be reduced to the repre-
sentation of zeroes and ones. Although the virtual utopians often imagined the 
infinite possibilities for novel experience that might be opened up by the new 
computational reality of the internet, Kroker (1993: 7) writes of the great ‘re-
cline of western civilization’ in order to illustrate the death of real experience in 
easy, coded representations of reality. The truth of the new virtual utopia of the 
1990s was, thus, in Kroker’s view a kind of laid back, exhausted stroll towards 
the end of humanity. Slouching towards the apocalypse, Kroker’s (1993) vision 
of the experience of spasm emerges in the abyss between digital ecstasy, where 
everything seems possible on condition of its functionality, and earth-bound 
decay, brought about by the abandonment of experience and perception in a 
utopian fantasy of the absolute reach of numbers and digital data.  
In Kroker’s (1993: 39) theory of the new world algorithm, where numbers 
and data are the ontological truth of the reality of experience and perception, he 
shows how purity becomes the central political category and mutations of new-
ness and unpredictability are destroyed in the name of functionality. The irony 
of the virtual utopia was, in this respect, that it produced a kind of nightmarish 
computational dystopia, what Kroker (1993: 160) calls a zero-culture, charac-
terised by a form of cyber-puritanism allergic to the thickness of the flesh, ex-
perience, perception, and more broadly terrestrial life itself. It is this situation, 
where the virtual sphere of computation expands to the detriment of embodied 
existence, which returns in the form of a kind of excremental remainder, that 
Kroker captures in the concept of spasm. It is the same experience of spasm 
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that I think Guattari writes of in the final pages of his book Chaosmosis (1995: 
135), where he opposes the hyper-rationalism of what he calls integrated world 
capitalism to the reality of earth-bound existence and shows how the distance 
between these two worlds finds its limit in the chaosmic spasm or momentary 
phase transition, which sees one universe of (in)significance collapse before 
some other vision of the world.  
The problem of integrated world capitalism or semio-capitalism is, in the 
work of the key thinker of the autonomists Christian Marazzi (2008, 2011), 
that economic value is no longer related to things. Reading Marazzi’s (2008: 
13–69) work we can see that upon the deregulation or floatation of money by 
Richard Nixon in the 1970s, there was no longer a solid relationship between 
money and materiality (precious metals), which meant that money was able to 
take flight from the world. But if the issue was the simple separation of value 
and things, the problem might be one more concerned with the integrity of 
money, rather than some wider crisis of meaningfulness itself, which might 
have opened up utopian possibilities for the rearticulation of value. However, 
what floatation, and the emergence of semio-capitalism, actually produced was 
the colonisation of reality by the symbolic form of money that was able to trans-
form its idealistic redundancy into a virtue on the basis of its absolute commen-
surability. Herein resides the real catastrophe of semio-capitalism, integrated 
world capitalism, and symbolic value for Guattari and later his autonomist 
followers. It is not simply that money floats off into the metaphysical universe 
of Platonic forms, but rather that it comes back in its redundancy to over-code 
human and non-human reality and transform everything into an empty sem-
blance of economic value. The ultimate Platonic sleight of hand is, therefore, 
the semio-capitalist reduction of terrestrial life to abstract value that becomes 
(virtual) reality itself, which is then absolutely malleable precisely because it is 
no longer real in the thick phenomenological sense of the term we might find 
in the work of Merleau-Ponty (2012).  
It is this situation that Guattari (1995, 2014) thinks has become unsustain-
able and unliveable for humans because they are essentially bound to the flesh 
of the earth through their own bodies, which they cannot escape. Apart from 
the violation of the thickness of things in the name of the infinity of abstrac-
tion, the catastrophe of semio-capitalism is that it destroys the fleshy integrity 
of the symbolic order, which holds the subject in place through the provision 
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of a meaningful world, through its totalitarian reduction of communication 
to rational calculation concerned with productivity and profitability. Thus the 
two-fold problem of the dystopic system that Guattari (2009) writes about 
in terms of integrated world capitalism is that it transforms the human life 
world into a paper thin construct organised around empty capitalist objectives 
focused on profitability and at the same time blocks the emergence of alterna-
tives to this meaningless universe through the transformation of economy 
into a system defined by scarcity and the struggle for survival. Cast out of the 
systems of significance that might enable social action, the individual collapses 
towards the figure that Stiegler (2012: 80–103) talks about through the idea of 
the dis-individual, and humanity starts to resemble the form of animality that 
Heidegger (2001) found poor in the world. In fact, the situation may be even 
worse than this, since there is a distinct difference between the animal and the 
dis-individual, which is that the animal occupies an ecological umwelt that or-
ganises its behaviour, whereas the dis-individual is thrown out of the meaning-
ful world into a kind of barren un-world that seems ecologically unsustainable 
and unliveable. This is how, I think, integrated world capitalism penetrates 
through to the level of subjectivity and essentially turns humans into zombies, 
staggering through their environment in a liminal state somewhere between life 
and death.  
The zombification of the modern or post-modern subject has been brought 
about by the reduction of the symbolic order to the level of a kind of instru-
mental command system that leads to the emergence of a hyper-rational subject 
that cannot easily survive and is now on the verge of total collapse. In this re-
spect, the problem that the desperate dis-individual, or we might say post-mor-
tem subject, faces, is that the contemporary situation is worse than that which 
Nietzsche (1961) imagined in the 19th century when he wrote of the horror of 
Godless modernity, simply because the abyss of capitalism blocks the possibil-
ity of the Übermensch through its transformation of reality into code. Here, the 
situation of integrated world capitalism more closely resembles the horror-show 
imagined by Weber (2001: 123) in the final pages of his work on the spirit of 
capitalism, where the iron cage transforms society into a system of bureaucratic 
rules and regulation devoid of wider significance, because the existential abyss 
is always-already full of nonsense and there appears little room for the new. 
However, I think that it is this condition that Guattari (1995: 135) considers 
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representative of a kind of transitional moment, where apocalyptic collapse 
opens out onto the possibility of something else. This is what, in my view, he 
captures in the idea of the chaosmic spasm, precisely because the present seems 
entirely unliveable and unsustainable. Under these post-human conditions, the 
chaos of global complexity – which seems meaningless because of high levels of 
post-human technological development, the lightning fast speeds of economic 
interaction, and levels of inter-connectedness that mean that events seem to ap-
pear ex nihilo – suggests the possibility of utopian innovation in the creation of 
what Guattari (1995: 10–11) calls a novel ethico-aesthetic paradigm. But how 
would this new paradigm work?  
Although Guattari is light on the precise detail of the possible emergence of 
this new order, my view would be that it would occur through a necessary phase 
transition from integrated world capitalism to a new ecological vision of the re-
ality of the world. Thrown out of the human world of significance into the post-
human quantitative un-world of balance sheets, the monstrous, de-subjectified, 
dis-individual would need to return to the earth and to their experience and 
perception of suffering in order to imagine a new world beyond the present. 
Given the poverty of language available to the autistic un-self, they would need 
to fall back on the most basic terms concerned with the expression of pain and 
suffering in order to articulate their ethical opposition to the semio-capitalist 
un-world and from there seek to represent the truth of schizophrenic subjectiv-
ity where the self only ever survives through its relation to others and its terres-
trial life support machine. This is, in my view, the kind of world that Guattari 
(1995: 108) imagines and what he means when he writes of machinism in his 
ecosophical works. In this context, machinism does not refer to the Heideg-
gerian nightmare of modernity from his The Question concerning Technology 
(1977), where everything collapses before the instrumental rationality of the 
machine organised around the world picture that enframes existence itself, but 
rather the more ancient conception of technology captured in the term techne, 
which suggests the sympathetic communication and coevolution of humanity 
and environment that we also find in the work of Gilbert Simondon (2016). 
Against this more ancient conception of technological machinism, which sug-
gests ecological communication and interaction, it is, I think, possible to argue 
that the virtual utopia that Kroker writes of in his Spasm (1993) represents the 
final stage in the development of Heidegger’s modern technological system 
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precisely because of the ways in which it uses, abuses and brutalises man and 
nature in the creation of a totally integrated system organised around infinite 
commensurability and endless exchange in the name of profitability.  
While this model of technology is programmatic and static in terms of its 
conception of change, what Guattari (1995: 108) imagines through the term 
‘machinism’ is open, dynamic and defined by deterritorialisation. However, the 
converse is also the case. Where the modern, and what would later become 
the post-modern, version of technology seeks to escape all limits in the name of 
abstraction and virtuality, Guattari’s ecosophical notion of machinism commu-
nicates with other machines in the name of the creation of bounded sense and 
significance in the otherwise chaotic un-world. In this respect, I think Guattari’s 
understanding of technology respects the limits of terrestrial space, which is 
precisely what we find expressed in his theory of geophilosophy outlined in his 
final book with Deleuze, What is Philosophy? (1994), even though this humil-
ity before ground is endlessly extended by the shifting nature of reality (the 
chaotic un-ground) to produce a dynamic, fundamental thought in touch with 
the abyss of experience, perception and earth. This is what Guattari (1995: 
80–87; 112) means by chaosmosis – which refers to the way that chaos can 
find a temporary form in a kind of fundamental thought that is simultaneously 
able to make sense and respect the endless turbulence of reality – that he at-
tempts to explain through a rearticulation of Freud’s (2003) theory of the death 
drive from his key paper Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Where Freud takes his 
young relative’s game of fort / da for a symbol of the basic inertia of being that 
is endlessly repetitive of cycles of birth, life, and death, Guattari (1995: 72–76) 
points out that the first stage of the game (fort) may be taken to represent the 
traumatic experience of chaos that the little boy orders through the second stage 
of his play (da) in the name of the creation of sense in the world. While Freud 
emphasises the essential trauma of being, which humans can never escape until 
they flatline out of existence, Guattari’s more optimistic reading of the work of 
life concerns the way that humans are able to make meaning in the world in 
order to organise their experiences.  
It is possible to argue that Guattari (1995: 135) saw the potential collapse of 
integrated world capitalism in the happy days of the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
when the really existing communism fell before a capitalist future that seemed 
to promise endless freedom and prosperity to those who had been locked out 
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of the American-led boom since the 1950s. When Frances Fukuyama (1992) 
wrote of the end of history in the triumph of capitalism and George Bush I 
spoke of the NWO (New World Order) of American power, Guattari’s early 
1990s critique of complexity seemed off the mark, simply because there was 
a clear organising structure through which to understand the new globalised 
world, which was defined by concepts such as freedom, democracy and pros-
perity. In many respects the virtual utopia of the 1990s, which saw the internet 
become perhaps the most visible representation of processes of globalisation, 
seemed to make these abstract principles virtually concrete, since it appeared to 
enable endless freedom to communicate, consume and develop. The emergence 
of Web 2.0 and social media further supported the fantasy of the virtual utopia 
through the promise of a new kind of cyber-democracy and cyber-society and 
in many respects it seemed that Marshall McLuhan’s (2001) media utopia of 
the 1950s had been realised at the end of the 20th century. However, in much 
the same way that McLuhan’s (2001: 45–53) utopian story of global media 
was qualified by his dark vision of the gadget lover, who makes up for their 
loss of embodiment through the possession of the high tech fetish object, it 
soon became clear that the virtual utopia was also a new disciplinary or, to refer 
to Deleuze’s (1997: 177–183) famous essay, control space for the integration 
of workers, who would now never stop working, and consumers, who were 
similarly never out of reach for corporations desperate to increase their profit 
margins.  
In this way, the virtual space of absolute freedom, the abyss of possibility 
founded upon the bright light of the screen, opened out onto a nightmarish 
dystopia, a slack jawed world defined by trans-fixed cybernauts caught some-
where or nowhere between here, there and everywhere. Caught up in the virtual 
un-world, where one could apparently float free of the ground of terrestrial 
existence, even the promise of ‘the social network’ where one could make mil-
lions of new friends, seemed to fail before the logic of commodification and 
quantification, which saw friends become immaterial objects that one collects 
in the name of the quantifiable popularity necessary to offset the void of real 
life beyond the shiny, happy world of screen culture. In this respect it is pos-
sible to read what we might call the spasm of new media culture, which saw the 
virtual utopia contract from its expansive utopian phase of absolute possibility 
back towards a more dystopian realisation of the limitations of the immaterial 
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computational world, in terms representative of the evolution of the wider 
culture of floatation from the 1990s through to the present period where there 
seems to be no way to move forward, but through a return to the real world of 
terrestrial bodies. The signs of this impasse have become clear since the turn of 
the 21st century. According to Slavoj Žižek’s (2009) exploration of the failure 
of the final utopia of the 20th century in his book First As Tragedy, Then As 
Farce, the first shock to the New World Order was 9/11, which struck at the 
very heart of American economic power, and opened out onto the ‘war on ter-
ror’. Akin to Vietnam, which similarly proved that technological power can 
never overcome territorial resistance, the ‘war on terror’ was soon revealed to be 
unwinnable, economically unsustainable, and perhaps even worse, enormously 
destructive for the project of global integration, which began to freeze before 
the translation of communication into its fearful other, contagion. On the back 
of the shock of 9/11, the second shock to the virtual utopia took the form of the 
global financial crash of 2008, which further undermined the semio-capitalist 
project by showing that the creation of money from money ex nihilo was ul-
timately an unsustainable project: the repressed real would continue to return 
from the abyss of materiality hidden from view by the shiny world of virtuality. 
The deep economic problem that the crash revealed was essentially con-
cerned with Nixon’s floatation of money in the early 1970s; the subsequent 
deregulation of finance and the rise of fractional reserve banking; and the over-
leveraging of available assets in the form of debts that turned out to be unsus-
tainable because of a lack of real economic activity. Of course, this process of 
financialisation, which took place from the 1970s through the 1980s and 1990s 
up to the crash in 2008 under the banner of neoliberal economics, was the mo-
tor of globalisation and what Guattari (2009) wrote about in terms of integrat-
ed world capitalism. When capitalism started to fail in the 1970s, because of a 
crisis of productivity and a related lack of growth, floatation and financial in-
novation seemed to represent the way forward, because they allowed for the ex-
pansion of capitalism beyond the limits made possible by real production alone. 
While this process organised around the virtual creation of money from money 
for investment in innovation and financial profit was supposed to be made safe 
by systems of securitisation, these structures could not prevent the near collapse 
of the system in 2008 because of the abyss that had opened up between levels of 
debt based in virtual money and the really existing value founded in the econ-
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omy of bodies and things. At this point, the virtual utopia of free floating signs 
came crashing back down to earth in the revelation of its economic limits in 
reality. However, while the supporters of neoliberal financialisation have sought 
to save the system, from the point of view that the problem of 2008 was an issue 
of greedy bankers looking to make a killing from people who would never be 
able to make their repayments, what Guattari’s work and particularly his Three 
Ecologies (2014: 27–28) suggests is that the financial crash was less representa-
tive of a narrow issue of economic mismanagement and more concerned with 
global ecological sustainability relating to first, the ability of humans to live in 
a complex world where qualitative significance has been undermined by quan-
titative calculation; second, the possibility of society and social integration in a 
world where people have lost touch with embodied language and the primary 
good has become competition; and finally, the potential of the world to survive 
the progressive destruction of the earth that sustains organic life by capitalism, 
which, even in its virtual form where it seeks the elimination of materiality, lives 
off the exploitation of planetary resources. 
From the point of view of Guattari’s (1995, 2014) ecosophical works, the 
problem of integrated world capitalism and the virtual utopia is, therefore, far 
more expansive than an issue of financial mismanagement and instead relates 
back to the post-modern rejection of materiality in the name of the apparent 
freedom of abstraction that has now run into its outer limits in the formation 
of a bleak un-world that suffers the loss of its terrestrial body. In this sense, 
it is possible to argue that the problem with the present is actually less about 
the psychotic flight from reality into fantasy (the post-modern critique of 
the hyper-real we find in Baudrillard (2010), for example) and more about a 
schizoid  break from the fantasy of virtual semio-capitalism that has occupied 
people since the 1970s but has now run its course in the contemporary period, 
which we might talk about in terms of post-mortemism defined by the chaosmic 
spasm, the terror of endings, and existential questions about what comes next. 
For Guattari and his autonomist followers, such as the contemporary German 
thinker Gerald Raunig (2016), the answer to this question is, I think, that we 
must seek to translate the lack of a post-modern virtual future, which finds rep-
resentation in the post-mortemism of the destroyed individual, into a potential 
excess, which opens the otherwise closed, militarised self out onto others and 
the earth itself in the form of the figure that Raunig calls the dividual. Where 
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Stiegler’s (2012) dis-individual represents the person who has lost their sense of 
self founded in the ruined symbolic order and cannot think beyond the mean-
ingless present into the future for this reason, I think that the potential of the 
dividual resides in the possibility of the conversion of ruined subjectivity that 
knows nothing but pain and suffering into an ecological being founded upon 
their ability to communicate their experience and perception to others on the 
basis of their common occupation of earth-bound bodies. This is, in my view, 
how the ecosophical response to spasm, which represents the painful, strained 
relation between the virtual and the material might begin to find resolution 
in the foundation of a new sustainable world based upon being on the earth. 
In the final section of this article I propose to outline the longer history of the 
spasm through reference to Stiegler (1998, 2009) and Berardi (2012, 2015) 
before returning to Guattari (1995) to argue that the other side of the chaosmic 
spasm must involve a return to the kind of ecological being he wrote about with 
Deleuze in his theory of geo-philosophy (1994).
3. The Politics of Spasm
Although he never mentions the idea of spasm, it is possible to argue that 
Bernard Stiegler (1998, 2009, 2011a) provides a pre-history of the concept in 
his three volume work, Technics and Time, through his discussion of what he 
calls disorientation. In the first volume of this study, The Fault of Epimetheus 
(1998), Stiegler picks up Plato’s (2009) Protagoras, and specifically the myth of 
Epimetheus (16-18), to oppose the Promethean reading of technology where 
the machine represents a symbol of human superiority over the world. In order 
to oppose this story, Stiegler refers to Prometheus’ brother, the comic figure of 
Epimetheus, who forgets to make sure that humans are ready for entry into the 
world. The fault of Epimetheus is that he provides every other animal with the 
means of survival (claws, wings, sharp teeth, thick fur and so on), but forgets 
about men, which means that Prometheus has to steal fire from the Gods in or-
der to give humanity a fighting chance in the state of nature. We know the rest 
of the story, which concerns the punishment of Prometheus and the emergence 
of techno-man, but the importance of the reference to Epimetheus for Stiegler 
is less clear. It turns out that the importance of Epimetheus is that he illustrates 
humanity’s prematurity. We are always born too soon, inadequate, in a state of 
default, and have to spend the rest of our lives (history) trying to make up for 
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this lack through technological development. At this point we enter familiar 
Heideggerian (2001) territory, where we learn that the difference between ani-
mals and humans is that animals live in ecological harmony with nature while 
humans have an uncanny world-forming relation to their environment, even 
though Stiegler’s (1998) point is always to emphasise human lack. The rest 
of Stiegler’s history, which develops through volume II of Technics and Time 
(2009), revolves around what happens when technological evolution starts to 
outpace humanity. When this happens the very mechanical organs meant to 
support human life turn upon their creators and become monstrous things that 
throw their former masters back into a state of inadequacy. In order to capture 
this problem, which refers back to Heidegger’s (1977) critique of modern tech-
nology, but also Marx’s (1998) work on estrangement and proletarianisation, 
Stiegler (2009) explains that humans enter into a state of disorientation, since 
they live in a high tech world beyond their comprehension. In other works, in-
cluding his book on youth and the generations (2010), Stiegler points out that 
the neoliberal economy and the exploitation of communication in the name of 
profitability exacerbate the problem of disorientation because the use of media 
to capture consumers means that language is no longer available for mapping 
the world and making sense. It is through this idea, which Stiegler (2014a) talks 
about in terms of symbolic misery, that I think it is possible to connect his work 
to the theories of the contemporary critics of semio-capitalism, such as Marazzi 
(2008, 2011), who show how the potential of language to transmit human 
significance breaks down before its neoliberal transformation into a means to 
promote capitalism. When language no longer works to enable the translation 
of real experience and perception into words suitable for communication with 
others in the name of the creation of the world, humans effectively fall out of 
the symbolic order and collapse back into a kind of psychotic state of nature. 
Thus we encounter the experience that Guattari (1995: 135) writes of through 
the idea of the chaosmic spasm.  
Cast out of symbolic structures into near chaos, men become bankrupt, 
in default, caught in a state of existential lack, and thrown back upon their 
animality. This is the case even though we have seen that this connection of 
the dis-individual and animality might be overly optimistic, since the animal 
lives in harmony with the world, while the dis-individual occupies an uncanny, 
monstrous un-world. However, it is precisely here, in the teeth of chaos, that 
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the possibility of the new emerges, because the destruction of the techno-
human and the birth of a new kind of post-mortem savage opens up the space 
for a reconnection to experience and the expression of the perception of what 
it is to occupy the position of earth-bound life. But Stiegler (2012: 4) is clear 
that this will not be a painless process, since the contemporary moment has 
become about the desperate attempt to hold on to the ruins of modern and 
post-modern symbolic systems through addictogenic forms of identification 
characterised by the primacy of drive over desire. For Stiegler (2010, 2012), this 
situation comes about because late capitalism exploits the destruction of desire, 
which necessarily relies on the integrity of human symbolic systems to create 
meaningful objects, in the emergence of drive-based economics where the ad-
dictogenic nature of drive makes it possible to sell everything and anything on 
the basis that ‘this thing’ will fill the dark abyss at the centre of ‘your’ life. Fol-
lowing Adorno and Horkheimer (1997), however, Stiegler is clear that drive is 
a fatal (or indeed thanatological) machine, since its objective is the reduction 
of the misery, pain and horror of the traumatic life lived in the un-world where 
there is no safety, security, or sense of home in others or in the wider environ-
ment, but what it actually achieves is the augmentation of alienation, estrange-
ment and objectification. Against drive, which simply piles misery upon misery, 
Stiegler (2013: 132–133) states that educators must seek to engage in a battle 
for the integrity of knowledge, thought and significance, but what he fails to ex-
plain is that these new cultural politics must prioritise the relationship between 
language and other forms of expression and human experience, perception, and 
being on the earth, because it is precisely this which has been lost in the horror 
story of neoliberalism.  
Following this train of thought, perhaps it is possible to put Stiegler’s (2013: 
1–4) reference to Winnicott’s (2005) theory of play, where the toy becomes a 
symbol of security and safety and a container for meaningful interaction, in 
conversation with Guattari’s (1995) own extensive discussion of the object, 
which turns the oedipal triangle of Daddy, Mummy, and Me into an ecological 
dialogue between Self, Other, and the ultimate object, Earth in order to prop-
erly ground his account in a theory of earth-bound life. Moreover, my sense is 
that this eco-phenomenological critique of the contemporary is also the hidden 
basis of Berardi’s (2012, 2015) recent works, including And, which is subtitled 
The Phenomenology of the End. In terms of explaining the problem of the end, 
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Berardi follows Stiegler in respect of his view that the end concerns the inability 
of humans to effectively articulate a vision of the future that is qualitatively 
different from the present. However, where Berardi (2015a: 9–111) departs 
from Stiegler is in the way he locates this problem in the politics of the global 
network, which he explains through the opposition between conjunction, where 
self and other meet in such a way that changes both sides of the interaction, and 
connection, which he thinks dominates today, and comprises a programmatic 
model of debased sociality where there is no deep engagement or transforma-
tive effect upon either person. For Berardi, conjunction represents true human 
relationality, where individuals engage with each other empathetically on the 
basis of their common occupation of a world and, beyond this, the earth itself. 
By contrast, he writes of connection in terms of the simulation of interaction, 
where engagement takes place through the medium of a technological network 
that sets rules and regulations about how relationality should take place. In 
other words, the interaction is already mapped out and planned, and its future 
outcome is always already known. Berardi (2015a: 233–331) points out that 
this leads to, on the one hand, the autistic disassociation of self from others and 
nature, and, on the other hand, the emergence of a kind of totalitarian or glo-
balitarian network where everybody seems to be friends with everybody else, on 
the basis that the programmatic logic of commensurability ensures that nobody 
would have a reason to not be friends with anybody else.  
But  the key point here is that this global negative friendship network (think 
Facebook or Twitter) is a simulation that masks the reality of the monstrous 
machine that alienates people from their ecological being in order to transform 
them into tech-no-subjects who follow its programmatic logic on the basis of 
their melancholic despair about their lost object of love – the other, the world, 
the earth itself. This is, essentially, Berardi’s (2015a) critique of new media, 
which is that the network has become a machine for the provision of the simu-
lation of intimacy in a cold world where true intimacy has been banned by a 
global, technological system that is allergic to the thickness of materiality that 
necessarily refuses its own reduction to objective truth or quantifiable value. 
Living in the cold technological un-world, it is no surprise that people cling to 
their gadgets, which connect them to the global network that can provide a vir-
tual sense of home, and seek to lose themselves in connectivity and fantastical 
cyber-space. The contemporary new media network has become a technological 
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surrogate, which was, for Avital Ronell (1989: 280), exactly what Alexander 
Graham Bell unconsciously understood when he called America’s first tel-
ephone network, Ma Bell, in 1876. Thus, the new media network stands in for 
mother, and provides the simulation of safety and security that human subjects 
would have otherwise found in their real mothers, before the screen found its 
way into every space in the home. However, the problem with this ‘new media 
Mom’ is that she is jealous and possessive. She seeks to capture and control 
her children in ways that even Freud’s (2003) original nightmarish engulfing 
mother who comes to symbolise death never would. This is the case because she 
knows she needs to keep them away from their real Moms, and beyond them, 
their common global mother, mother earth. This is why techno-Mom traps her 
children within cyber-space and what Berardi (2015a: 41–48) calls cyber-time, 
which requires the tech-no-subject to spend their life online in order to keep up 
with the blizzard of communication flowing across the network and through 
their inbox. For Berardi (2015a), this is the final form of futurism, the futur-
ism of the end times, because there is now no more space and no more time 
for expansion to happen. Where space is concerned, processes of globalisation 
meant that the earth became lost somewhere deep underneath the un-world 
of late capitalism, where all that matters is work and shopping, but this soon 
opened up onto the final frontier of time and the colonisation of every moment 
by economic logic. Here, the difference between work and free time fell into 
what we might call capital time, where every living moment becomes about 
value creation, and beyond this the automisation of humanity, which comprises 
the destruction of freedom in the necessity to work and consume. For Berardi 
(2015a: 41–57), it is this situation that has led to the rebellion of the embodied 
mind in the endless list of mental health conditions that plague the contempo-
rary individual – anxiety, depression, dysmorphia, addiction, and so on – which 
are, in short, psychological representations of spasm.  
Finally, the condition of spasm, which is the focus of this article, has its own 
kind of politics, which are concerned with the desperate attempt to escape from 
the pain of estrangement. While many have sought to escape into pharmaceu-
ticals in order to speed up, slow down, get hard, or whatever other response is 
necessary in order to survive the un-world, others have fallen into alternative 
kinds of addictive behaviour. Regarding sex addiction, for example, Berardi 
(2015a: 50) notes that the lonely cybernaut replaces real intimacy with the 
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simulation of sexual interaction in the consumption of hard-core Californian 
porn straight out of the San Fernando Valley, where pumped up sexual super-
heroes fuck like machines in the name of a barren kind of pleasure that knows 
no other. Ironically, Berardi (2015a: 68–91) thinks that it is possible to trace 
the hyper-sexualisation of contemporary culture, which objectifies the other in 
porno scenes that strip back its phenomenological depths until there is noth-
ing left but a stupid lump of flesh, to the original American puritans because 
they were the first settlers who turned against the organic world, the body and 
the flesh because of its imperfections and relationship to sin. In a sense, this 
explains the strange ambivalence of the online porn scene, which resides in its 
simultaneous fascination and revulsion with the flesh, and the reason why the 
sexualisation of tech-no-society seems to know no bounds. While techno-cap-
italism pushes ever further into abstraction, the destroyed subject seeks out es-
tranged representations of their former fleshy self only to lose this immediately 
in cold mechanical fucking on screen that transforms the pornstar into a mind-
less thing, closer to Heidegger’s (2001) rock, which seems absolutely un-related, 
than the animal poor in the world. The result of this immediate cancellation of 
the pleasure that comes from intimacy in the horror of objectification on screen 
is that the lost subject experiences the compulsion to push on ever further into 
pornographic culture, concerned with the disappearance of phenomenological 
depth in the transformation of bodies into data.  
But what is the objective here? Surely the objective of the online porn addict 
is the identification of what it feels like to have a body, to experience intimacy 
with the other, and relate to them on the basis of a common experience of 
the earth, without the engagement of bodies that are impure in the techno-
scientific semio-capitalist universe of abstract signs and symbols. Since this is 
a fatal strategy, and there is no way to experience intimacy without some level 
of carnal interaction, the estranged figures, which Berardi (2015a: 96–110) 
calls neo-humans fall into addiction and, in the infamous case of the Japanese 
Hikikomori, or ‘shut in’, retreat back into media technology in a desperate at-
tempt to reach out to the world of others. But if this represents one side of the 
politics of spasm, which Berardi (2015a: 311–321) thinks will eventually result 
in the emergence of a new form of neo-human readjustment, what he calls 
neuro-totalitarianism, where the embodied self is totally aligned with the global 
circuitry of semio-capitalism through the mapping and manipulation of neural 
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networks, the other side of the strained, stressed relation between technology 
and humanity resides in Stiegler’s (2013) cultural politics, Berardi’s (2012) 
poetic uprising, and ultimately Guattari’s (1995) chaosmic creation of ecologi-
cal sense – the ethico-aesthetic paradigm. Where Stiegler pushes for a form of 
culture that might make life meaningful, and Berardi suggests the reclamation 
of language from semio-capitalism in the name of a return to a poetic form of 
language that is able to express human experience and perception in the world, 
Guattari’s ecosophy shows how the escape from the contemporary impasse will 
not come through ever more virtuality, but instead requires a new eco-politics 
that recognises the organic limits of the individual, the position of the individ-
ual within a society made up of others, and the dependence of this social world 
of significance upon the earth, which ultimately supports life and cannot be 
simply expended in the name of profitability. Thus, I think that it is possible to 
read Guattari, Stiegler and Berardi together and ultimately understand their cri-
tiques of spasm culture through reference to Guattari’s final work with Deleuze, 
What is Philosophy? (1994), where geo-philosophy becomes a vehicle for think-
ing through a new ecological utopianism: a minor utopianism characterised 
by humility rather than hubris, and a deep understanding of the ontological 
truth of what we might call being on earth. The minor utopia is, therefore, the 
hopeless hope found on the other side of the chaosmic spasm, which signals the 
collapse of civilization into neoliberal barbarism, and the radical potential that 
Guattari, Stiegler and Berardi similarly search for in the new media apocalypse.
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